US embassy cable - 04ANKARA4419

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR ADMIRAL JOHNSON FROM CDA DEUTSCH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2029 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, OVIP, TU 
SUBJECT: COMNAVEUR VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S. Deutsch. 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Welcome back to Turkey!  Although you are a 
frequent visitor, this visit is particularly important 
because you will be wearing your US (vice NATO) hat.  As 
such, yours is the first visit by a US four-star admiral in a 
national capacity since ADM Natter,s visit as Fleet Forces 
Command in July 2003.  You are coming at a time when our 
bilateral relationship is in good shape:  The President's 
successful visit to Ankara on the eve of the NATO Summit in 
Istanbul capped a year in which we have spent much time and 
energy in rebuilding after a rocky period around the 
beginning of the Iraq War.  In the course of that year, we 
cooperated closely on Cyprus (although you might encourage 
the cancellation of this year's exercises on the island), and 
at Sea Island, PM Erdogan agreed to Turkey's taking a role in 
the Broader Middle East Initiative.  Turkey is focused on 
winning in December a date to begin accession negotiations to 
the EU, but is also dealing with a range of other important 
issues:  Iraq -- the PKK and security for Turkish workers, 
SFOR transition to a EU operation, ISAF command in February 
2005.  On the military front, our relationship is almost but 
not quite as good as the overall relationship:  Relationships 
between TGS and both the Joint Staff and EUCOM are good 
(despite Turkish disappointment at our lack of action against 
the PKK in Iraq), and the Air Force relationship is solid. 
Problems exist in our Army-to-Army relationship (not much to 
it right now) and you are likely to hear complaints that our 
ships don't visit very often any more.  End Summary. 
 
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Current Conditions 
------------------ 
 
2. (U) With a two-thirds majority in parliament, control of a 
majority of municipalities, and no viable political 
opposition, PM Erdogan and his AKP government appear firmly 
in control.  AKP's passage of major legal reform packages and 
constitutional amendments appears to have put Turkey more 
firmly on track to get a negotiation start date from the EU 
in December, although chronic problems with implementation 
continue to plague the government.  In his meetings with 
foreign leaders, Erdogan projects confidence, power, and a 
pragmatism that seems to belie his Islamist firebrand past. 
 
3. (C) Yet, while seemingly at the peak of their power, 
Erdogan, his party, and his government face fundamental 
political challenges.  AKP has not consolidated itself as a 
party and Erdogan increasingly struggles to impose discipline 
and direction on the cabinet and parliamentary group. 
Erdogan's frequent travel interferes with his control of 
party policy-making and the Cabinet, and he stretches himself 
thin trying also to oversee Istanbul (he retains an intense 
interest in the management of the city he dominated as mayor 
from 1994-98).  AKP has not come to grips with the deeply 
entrenched State bureaucracy or established a solid modus 
vivendi with the judiciary, armed forces, and presidency. 
Corruption in the cabinet and AKP's provincial organizations 
has also become a serious problem.  Elements within the 
Turkish military and other elements of the "secular" 
establishment continue to assert that AKP intends to 
undermine Turkey's "secular" structure. 
 
4. (U) Helped by a massive IMF program, the Turkish economy 
has made an impressive recovery from the financial crisis of 
2001 and the near-crisis of early 2003, with inflation 
dropping to single digits, interest rates falling sharply, 
and growth in the 5 percent range in both 2003 and 2004. 
Still, the economy is not out of the woods, with a high 
public debt and serious structural problems ensuring 
continued vulnerability.  The government has implemented 
sound fiscal policy, but has moved slowly to implement 
structural reforms, such as privatizations and strengthening 
of independent regulatory agencies, needed to ensure 
sustained growth.  Turkey has not ratified the bilateral 
financial agreement governing the $8.5 billion U.S. loan, nor 
has it moved to resolve the numerous investment disputes and 
problems that are deterring additional U.S. investment.  The 
U.S. and Turkey continue to cooperate well in the development 
of the East-West energy corridor, designed to bring Caspian 
oil and gas to Western markets. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
EU-Related Reforms Adopted, Implementation Lags 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5. (U) The drive for EU accession is popular in Turkey, with 
support cutting across political and religious/secular lines. 
 The AKP government has passed three packages of wide-ranging 
political and constitutional reforms aimed at bringing Turkey 
into compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
membership.  The reforms apply to areas such as torture, free 
expression, religious freedom, the role of the military in 
government, and freedom of association.  While praising the 
reform effort, EU officials have repeatedly noted that 
implementation to date has been slow and uneven.  Still, most 
observers expect Turkey will get a qualified 'yes' from the 
EU Summit in December to begin accession negotiations. 
 
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Global War on Terrorism and Iraq 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) Turkey has been an ally in the global war on 
terrorism.  Since the Iraq war, Ankara has permitted the 
transit of supplies for our forces and humanitarian goods, 
offered in October to send troops to Iraq, approved the 
operation of tanker aircraft from Incirlik Air Base to 
support missions to/from both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
authorized the transit of US troops from Iraq, and trained 
Iraqi diplomats.  This despite our actions in Iraq being 
highly unpopular among the Turkish public and our lack of 
military action against the PKK/Kongra Gel terrorist group's 
camps in northern Iraq.  The recent murder of a Turk working 
in Iraq who had been taken hostage led the Turkish 
International Transporters Association to call for a ban on 
truckers carrying goods for the USG.  This was cited by 
terrorists in Iraq for their release of two other Turkish 
hostages.  Nonetheless, the GOT has asserted that, while 
security is a concern, cross-border trade will continue and 
we have not yet perceived a significant drop in the number of 
truckers willing to carry our goods to Iraq.  In Afghanistan, 
Turkey is contributing troops and helicopters, and is 
prepared to send additional troops in February when the 
Istanbul-based NATO High Readiness Force is expected to 
assume command of ISAF.  Turkey also contributes troops to 
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and is supportive of a 
number of nonproliferation activities, such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
 
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Issues to Discuss 
----------------- 
 
7.  (C) With Gen Ozkok and ADM Ornek, you might consider 
touching on the following issues: 
 
-- Naval Relations:  You will want to praise our naval 
cooperation in the NATO context and bilaterally, although you 
will need to explain the reduced number of ship visits in the 
last few years.  (We understand both force protection 
concerns and op tempo are to blame.) 
 
-- PSI:  This is one area where our naval (and other) 
cooperation could expand.  The Turks asked us what it would 
take for their entry into the PSI Core Group after Russia was 
admitted last May.  Washington has not responded yet, 
although we understand there is reluctance to further expand 
the core group.  Turks have told us that they intend to offer 
assets for PSI exercises next year (they have already 
indicated that an aircraft would be available early in the 
year), but that in the tight budget environment, services and 
agencies believe Turkey should be involved in decision making 
if they are to expend resources.  The ultimate answer may 
depend on how the Turks performed at the PSI experts meetings 
in Copenhagen and Oslo this week.  You will need to encourage 
greater Turkish participation while avoiding an answer on the 
core group question. 
 
-- BLACKSEAFOR:  To the best of our knowledge, the Turks have 
not yet responded to your letter of May 31 asking to observe 
the next BLACKSEAFOR activation.  During State DAS Laura 
Kennedy's recent visit, TGS Acting J5 MG Arslan said that 
Turkey was also promoting anti-trafficking activities in the 
Black Sea, although it wasn't clear whether this was related 
to non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, anti-crime, 
anti-trafficking in persons, or all of the above.  You might 
ask Gen Basbug about your letter, and both he and Ornek about 
ongoing activities off Turkey's northern coast.  Some 
littoral state diplomats have told us that the Turks are 
loathe to let outsiders in out of fear of losing their 
leadership position in the force, and the Russians just don't 
like non-littoral states involved in the Black Sea.  You 
should reassure both interlocutors that we understand and 
respect the limitations of the Montreux Convention and we 
want to be supportive of what Turkey is doing in the Black 
Sea. 
 
-- Cyprus:  Turkey and Turkish Cypriots gained the moral high 
ground with their acceptance of the Annan Plan.  The Greek 
Cypriots have launched a diplomatic offensive to blunt 
international efforts to end the international isolation of 
the Turkish Cypriots.  The Greek Cypriot effort is having 
only a limited affect on world opinion.  However, the Turks 
run the risk of ceding the high ground.  Plans for the annual 
Toros exercise on Cyprus are in place (we presume Greek plans 
for Nikiforos, an exercise with the Cypriot National Guard, 
are also ready).  Recent discussions with TGS staff indicate 
that there is some thinking of going ahead with Toros despite 
its being canceled each of the last several years.  The Greek 
Cypriots would use Toros to highlight their ostensible 
"security" objections to the Annan Plan.  Worse, the Greek 
Cypriots would also use the exercises to put the spotlight 
back on the presence of the Turkish "occupation troops" on EU 
member Cyprus on the eve of Turkey's bid to begin EU 
accession talks.  You might encourage Basbug to maintain the 
advantage by agreeing to another reciprocal cancellation this 
year as in the recent past, pointing out that with the EU 
decision in December, this is a particularly sensitive time. 
 
-- Iraq/GLOC:  With Basbug you could express appreciation for 
Turkey's official refusal to give into terrorist pressure by 
keeping its border open for trade and for us.  You might ask 
him to expedite consideration of the logistics hub proposal 
for Incirlik Air Base.  If raised, you could say that the 
private sector (like the Transporters Association) must make 
their own judgments of the risks and benefits. 
 
-- Iraq/PKK:  Although TGS well understands that at this time 
we do not have any extra military forces in Iraq to go after 
the PKK/Kongra Gel in the mountains, Basbug and maybe even 
Ornek could raise our lack of action with you.  While it is 
true we have not taken kinetic military action against the 
terrorists in the mountains, we have gone after their supply 
lines:  We convinced the EU to list the PKK/Kongra Gel as a 
terrorist group; we have pressed Europeans and others to stop 
their financing and prevent travel to PKK/Kongra Gel 
gatherings in Iraq; we helped persuade the French to close 
down one of the PKK/Kongra Gel satellite television stations; 
and, EUCOM has established an intelligence fusion cell in 
Ankara to prepare the information we will need to take action 
against the terrorists in Iraq once we are able. 
 
-- KFOR/SFOR Caveats:  Although you are coming in your US 
capacity, you might nonetheless express appreciation to 
Basbug for Turkey's removing this week the caveats on the use 
of its forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
DEUTSCH