US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1552

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR GREEN/DORMANDY, LONDON FOR POL-GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, MOPS, MARR, NP, Maoist Insurgency, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  CPN-UML GEN SEC MADHAV NEPAL ON POSSIBLE 
PEACE PROCESS, IRAQ 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1479 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons 1.4 (a, b, d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (S)   During their first meeting on August 5, Madhav Kumar 
Nepal, CPN-UML General Secretary, sought the Ambassador's 
approval of secret exploratory peace talks in a third 
country.  The UML leader wants the King and parties to 
present a unified front to the Maoists and determine Maoist 
intentions.  If the Maoists are not bona fide in the 
negotiations, the government can expose that fact to the 
people, according to Nepal.  Elections may then still take 
place. The Sec was negative about the prospect of Kathmandu 
providing forces to protect U.N. troops in Iraq. 
 
POSSIBLE PEACE TALKS 
-------------------- 
 
2. (S)  CPN-UML General Secretary Nepal briefed the 
Ambassador on attempts by the Maoists, the palace and the 
government to pursue secret talks in a third country.  The 
GenSec stated that peace talks should start soon, the sooner, 
the better.  He saw an eagerness on the part of the Maoists 
to sit in a dialogue. The Maoists seem to be sincere about 
the talks and have "packed their bags."  Nepal expressed 
frustration about the Prime Minister's delay in talking with 
the King and getting the green light to begin talks. 
Different party leaders should eventually be on the 
government's team, Nepal stressed.  He wants to get the 
message out to the people that the government is really 
starting to talk with the Maoists.  He also wants to create 
an atmosphere to put pressure on the Maoists to solve the 
problem at the negotiating table.  The GON needs to keep a 
certain level of military pressure on the Maoists until they 
realize they cannot win with guns and need to take 
negotiations seriously, according to Nepal.  If it turns out 
there is no real desire on the part of the Maoists to succeed 
at negotiations, that would be exposed during the course of 
the talks.  Nepal wants to make that clear to the people to 
allay their suspicions of the government.  At the same time, 
he recognizes that the government needs to be cautious about 
sharing what the government's bottom-line is; they would only 
provide a general outline to the populace.  The Ambassador 
told Nepal that the USG has no objections to talks in a third 
country and talks out of the limelight make sense.  Likewise, 
the US has no objection to any organization/individual/ 
country that can play a useful role in facilitating talks. 
 
3. (C)  The Ambassador asked Nepal about the role of the 
National Congress (NC) party, and in particular, GP Koirala. 
While wary about Koirala's role, Nepal emphasized the 
necessity of a common understanding among all the legitimate 
political forces.  He said that even if Koirala did not join 
the government, there should still be some joining together 
for the peace process.  He said the coalition partners need 
to take Koirala into confidence and work in channels so they 
can have a clear vision of the steps ahead. 
 
4. (C) When dealing with an insurgency that has the goal of a 
one-party country, there are some fundamental positions the 
government must keep in mind, Nepal noted: no compromise on 
multi-party democracy; no curtailment of people's rights; 
some role for the King in a constitutional monarchy, and 
retention of an open, pluralistic society.  The Maoists would 
need to agree on these positions for the talks to succeed. 
Key to peace would be disarmament of the Maoists and the 
reintegration and rehabilitation of the armed insurgents. 
 
ELECTIONS 
--------- 
 
5. (C) Nepal laid out his vision of a possible way ahead if 
the preliminary talks result in a certain framework for 
future rounds.  Before further talks, the coalition partners 
would use roundtable conferences to engage with all elements 
of Nepalese society.  There would also be international 
involvement, preferably the UN or other INGOs.  Nepal 
stressed that the Maoists would have to submit their arms 
under the custody of the UN or other observers before the 
formation of an interim government or holding of elections. 
He indicated flexibility on constitutional issues - either a 
constituent assembly or interim government or parliament 
could amend the Constitution.  But the process should not 
trample over the Constitution.  If a referendum were needed, 
that would be acceptable.  A series of elections would be 
less expensive than the cost of the war. 
 
6. (C) Agreeing with Nepal that the Maoists need to lay down 
their arms to have free and fair elections, the Ambassador 
asked what the UML people in the field believed were Maoist 
intentions.  Nepal admitted that there was not uniform 
information.  There seemed to be a split between the 
political level, who wanted to go to a negotiated settlement 
as a final solution, and the military level, who believed 
they could win militarily and did not see a need to 
compromise.  They just wanted to continue to strengthen their 
position.  Nepal reiterated that after the armed wings were 
decommissioned and demobilized a political solution would be 
possible. 
7. (C) The Ambassador asked Nepal about the PM's statement 
that elections would be held next April even if there were no 
agreement with the Maoists.  Nepal replied that if the 
government tried its best in the peace process, but the 
Maoists were the hurdle, then there would be no other choice 
but to have elections.  But he restated his hope that the 
Maoists were sincere about talks.  He went on that if the 
King were the hurdle to the peace process, then there would 
be no elections because they would be meaningless.  Nepal 
expressed distrust regarding the intentions of both the King 
and the Maoists.  His main concern was retaining the 
multi-party system, even if the King had to lose some of his 
power and become a 21st century monarch. 
 
PEACE BUREAU PLUS A PARALLEL MILITARY ADVISORY BODY 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (C)  The Ambassador and Nepal discussed how a Peace Bureau 
could fit into the process.  The Ambassador explained the US 
wants to support a Peace Bureau that would be apolitical and 
act as a thinktank to advise the politicians.  Nepal accepted 
the idea of a working secretariat composed of experts, but 
thought there should also be a parallel advisory body that 
would include representatives from the political parties. 
The decision-makers would thus get an apolitical take and a 
political take from party advisors. 
 
9. (C)  Nepal then suggested that the government needed 
something similar to the Peace Bureau, but on the military 
side.  The country lacked an expert team that could analyze 
events and assess incidents.  He saw a need for an 
organization similar to our J5 that focused on Strategy and 
Plans, however, he saw it as having experts not only from the 
RNA, but also the Armed Police Force, the civil police, and 
intelligence.  Nepal said that unlike the Peace Bureau, which 
should be discussed in the press, this military body should 
be kept quiet. 
 
NEED FOR MILITARY REFORM 
------------------------ 
 
10. (C) In addition to the military needing to incorporate 
counter-guerilla warfare and tactics, Nepal stressed the need 
for military reform.  The RNA leadership needed to take 
strong steps against those who had committed serious crimes; 
rape being the most serious.  Military personnel should be 
publicly punished in such cases.  To boost the morale of the 
people, the RNA needed to take steps to show it was 
addressing abuses.  Nepal realized, however, the need to use 
certain methods to extract information and saw some room for 
maneuver in those cases. 
 
 
NEGATIVE ON TROOPS FOR U.N. PROTECTION IN IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C) The Ambassador pressed Nepal to support sending 
Nepali troops to Iraq to protect the UN presence and help 
stabilize Iraq.  Nepal said that while he understood the US 
desire to have many countries involved, Kathmandu had to 
consider the serious crisis it is facing here.  At this 
stage, when people suspect that Nepal could become a failed 
state, it would not be wise.  He voiced an additional concern 
that it would be hard to find consensus on this issue and 
another controversy was not what the government needed now. 
The Ambassador pushed back. Reminding him that Nepal has done 
great service to the UN, the Ambassador said he would 
appreciate the General Secretary keeping an open mind. 
 
 
MORIARTY