US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1547

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014 
TAGS: PREF, PGOV, PREL, NP, Tibetan Refugees 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: OFFICE OF TIBET REPRESENTATIVE MEETS 
AMBASSADOR MORIARTY 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1096 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 1418 
     C. KATHMANDU 1479 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Wangchuk Tsering, Director of the Office of 
Tibet, outlined for Ambassador Moriarty on August 5 the 
issues facing Tibetan refugees, both those transiting Nepal 
to India and those resident in Nepal.  The Ambassador 
informed Wangchuk that he had raised many of these issues in 
his meetings thus far with GON officials, and that the 
Embassy would continue to push Tibetan refugee concerns.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Highlighting the need for Nepal-resident Tibetan 
refugees (those who arrived before 1990 and their children -- 
about 20,000 people) to be furnished with identification, 
Wangchuk explained that he had sent a list of more than 4,000 
paperless refugees to UNHCR to raise with the Home Ministry 
(Ref A).  Particularly in light of the insurgency, these 
refugees needed identification, both to move about freely in 
Nepal, as well as to seek higher education.  Wangchuk also 
noted that Nepal had never granted these refugees the right 
to work here in Nepal, although many were doing so just the 
same. 
 
3. (C) Wangchuk outlined the problems faced by refugees 
attempting to enter Nepal from Tibet for onward transit to 
India (on average about 2,500/yr).  Aside from the physical 
dangers of the passage, he noted, thus far the Nepali Home 
Ministry had not issued the terms of the "Gentleman's 
Agreement" in writing to border officials.  When staff from 
UNHCR or the Tibetan Refugee Reception Center (TRRC) traveled 
to the border to receive refugees, border officials generally 
accepted a UNHCR letter asking that the refugees be allowed 
to travel on to Kathmandu, but often expressed reluctance to 
release refugees without clear instructions from the Home 
Ministry.  The Ambassador told Wangchuk that he had raised 
this issue with both the Prime Minister and Home Minister 
(Refs B and C), but had not received a clear answer.  The 
Prime Minister appeared to believe everyone at the border was 
aware of the need to allow transit of legitimate refugees. 
Wangchuk then told the Ambassador how transiting Tibetan 
refugees, a particularly vulnerable group, had faced 
harassment and had been robbed by police occasionally and 
Maoists regularly, especially when forced to travel from the 
border to Kathmandu by road.  Wangchuk stated that he had 
asked UNHCR to provide one or two counselors to the TRRC to 
help the refugees that had been traumatized by such 
experiences. 
 
4. (C) Wangchuk also explained that the Chinese Embassy had 
made the Tibetan issue their number one priority in Nepal. 
The Chinese had exerted great pressure on Nepali officials to 
prevent resident Tibetans from holding their celebrations, 
and had also pressured the Nepalis to force refugees to 
return to Tibet (Ref A).  The Chinese had highlighted Tibetan 
refugees as an obstacle in the bilateral relationship. 
Wangchuk stated that while it was impossible to know if 
refugees had been turned back at the border, he was unaware 
of any recent refoulements of Tibetans who had made it past 
the border areas into Nepal. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Moriarty assured Wangchuk that the Embassy 
would continue to push the GON to issue written instructions 
to border officials, and would also continue its close 
cooperation with UNHCR on behalf of the Tibetans. 
MORIARTY