US embassy cable - 04HARARE1335

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REGIONAL ELECTION CONFERENCE CHALLENGES GOZ

Identifier: 04HARARE1335
Wikileaks: View 04HARARE1335 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2004-08-06 08:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ZI 
SUBJECT: REGIONAL ELECTION CONFERENCE CHALLENGES GOZ 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1313 (B) HARARE 1250 (C) HARARE 1157 
     (D) HARARE 1067 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: At an NGO-sponsored conference on regional 
electoral reforms, senior ruling party officials sounded 
familiar election-related themes to a critical audience of 
domestic and regional parliamentarians, regional election 
commissioners and administrators, and NGO representatives. 
They reiterated GOZ plans for electoral reforms and urged the 
opposition, NGOs and media to play "appropriate" roles. 
Comments on the conference's margins offer further evidence 
of rifts in the ruling party over proposed electoral reforms, 
but hard-liners resistant to meaningful reforms so far appear 
to enjoy Mugabe's backing.  Pressure from SADC member states 
appears to have been a key stimulus to the GOZ electoral 
reform initiative thus far and could be decisive in 
influencing how far reform efforts go.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Plane Chat with the Speaker 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) On the flight to Victoria Falls August 1, poloff was 
seated fortuitously next to the conference's keynote speaker, 
Speaker of the Parliament and ZANU-PF Secretary of 
Administration (and presidential aspirant) Emmerson 
Mnangagwa.  Upon inquiry about progress on the party's 
proposed electoral reforms, the Speaker went into exhausting 
detail on well-reported technical aspects of the reforms (use 
of indelible marking ink, translucent boxes, one-day voting, 
etc.).  He explained the contextual difference between the 
SADC-PF norms and standards and the principles expected to be 
adopted by SADC heads of state in Mauritius later this month. 
 The states were consulting on technical distinctions in 
their various election laws; the principles to be adopted 
would be guidelines that reflected common denominators but 
would not necessarily require states to change their laws. 
Sovereignty would not be impinged upon and state 
constitutions and laws would prevail over any competing 
interpretations under the SADC principles. 
 
3.  (C) Mnangagwa acknowledged that a constitutional 
amendment to establish an independent electoral commission 
was desireable and would require discussions with the MDC. 
Discussions already underway were "amicable," although the 
issues were numerous and many were technically difficult. 
For example, the parties were vexed by election 
representation formulas: ZANU-PF favored having 100 seats 
awarded to parties on the basis of proportional 
representation and 100 based on constituency elections so 
that geographic constituencies would have advocates in the 
legislature; the MDC favored proportional representation for 
all seats.  Mnangagwa asserted that the MDC had a history of 
agreeing on issues until "the 11th hour," when they would 
hold things up with additional demands.  If they did that 
this time, he maintained, the ruling party would content 
itself with using its parliamentary majority to undertake as 
many reforms as possible through legislation rather than a 
constitutional amendment. 
 
4.  (C) Mnangagwa raised the Senate confirmation hearing 
remarks of Ambassador-designate Dell.  He asserted that 
Dell's remarks would make it difficult for many to deal with 
him.  On reading the text of the remarks provided by poloff, 
Mnangagwa said only that "he does not appear to have been 
misquoted."  He did not suggest that the 
Ambassador-designate's credentials might not be accepted. 
(Note: In discussions with poloff at the conference, ZANU-PF 
parliamentary back-benchers appeared to assume the 
Ambassador-designate's credentials would be accepted.  End 
note.) 
 
ZANU-PF at the Podium 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (U) In opening the conference August 2, Mnanagwa 
emphasized the importance of free, fair, transparent, and 
peaceful elections for stability and legitimacy.  He 
complimented the region on being at the forefront of the 
continent in its pursuit of democratization, which was an 
ongoing process.  In a familiar refrain, he stressed that 
African and Western values differed, and noted that SADC, 
cooperative experiences and efforts were "subservient" to 
each nation's distinct history and culture.  He maintained 
that SADC recognized the sovereignty and supremacy of 
national law and constitutions; SADC structures to support 
free and fair elections would be welcome but "must pay 
obeisance" to local history, culture and law. 
 
6.  (U) The Speaker urged NGOs and civil society to avoid 
partisan politics.  Adding that the media should go beyond 
partisan messages, he appealed to the media to desist from 
inflammatory stories and to promote voter registration and 
voting.  Regarding election observers, Mnangagwa suggested 
that observers of elections in SADC countries should be 
welcomed from SADC, the AU, and developing countries without 
preconditions.  He urged resistance to observing, monitoring, 
and funding by Western countries, which tended to be biased 
and make unreasonable demands.  He decried the "arrogant and 
patronizing manner" of Americans and British and 
"machinations" by outsiders to have Zimbabwe excluded from 
SADC activities. 
 
7.  (U) Mnangagwa then rehearsed a familiar sketch of the 
GOZ's proposed electoral reforms, which he cast as 
"far-reaching" and designed to move away from government 
administration of elections.  Echoing the President's remarks 
at the opening of Parliament, he emphasized that the changes 
followed consultations with SADC.  He asserted that the 
SADC-PF norms and standards, which had not been adopted by 
the SADC governments, would be integrated with the principles 
expected to be adopted in Mauritius.  (Comment: Mnangagwa's 
rather respectful references to the SADC-PF norms and 
standards reflect his status as Speaker and Zimbabwe's 
signatory to the instrument and are at odds with the Jonathan 
Moyo-dominated state media's vilification of SADC-PF as a 
body of western puppets.  End comment.) 
 
8.  (U) Princeton-educated ZANU-PF Secretary for Information 
Nathan Shamuyarira at the August 3 session further elaborated 
on elements of GOZ/ZANU-PF electoral reform proposals.  A 
notable addition was that current plans would leave the 
Registrar-General's office with responsibility for 
registering voters but would transfer voter roll maintenance 
duties to the independent election commission.  (Comment: 
Eliminating a meaningful role for the overtly partisan 
Registrar-General is a central objective of the opposition 
and civil society critics.  The change cited by Shamuyarira 
appears not to satisfy the objective.   End comment.) 
Shamuyarira recounted Zimbabwe's experience in five previous 
national parliamentary elections in positive terms, giving 
due credit to the MDC's genuine strength in the most recent 
one.  He acknowledged the important role of an opposition in 
a democracy and urged Zimbabwe's opposition to behave 
constructively.  Shamuyarira expressed disappointment that 
there was "so much outside interference" in Zimbabwe and 
blasted George Bush and Tony Blair for "blatantly supporting 
the opposition" and pushing regime change.  He twice stressed 
the government's and his personal interest in receiving 
public comments and suggestions about GOZ electoral reform. 
In response to a question from the audience, he asserted 
that, as a former journalist, he "personally" did not support 
media restrictions -- as long as media remained balanced. 
 
9.  (C) In a brief exchange with poloff at the airport later, 
Shamuyarira was cordial and said he "learned a lot" at the 
conference.  He cryptically singled out Justice Kriegler as a 
particularly insightful panelist.  (Comment: Kriegler was 
notable in two respects -- he stressed the primacy of 
attitude and willingness to give a real voice to the people 
over the letter of law in producing a legitimizing election, 
and he brought the house down with a barely oblique equating 
of Africa's few remaining despots to the emperor who wore no 
clothes.  End comment.) 
 
Panelists, Participants Critical 
-------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Mnangagwa and Shamuyarira were playing before a 
skeptical crowd.  Their more provocative comments about NGOs, 
the media, and the opposition elicited audible chortles, 
jeering, and derisive comments from the audience.  NGO 
representatives, including those based outside Zimbabwe, 
attacked reported GOZ plans to implement a restrictive NGO 
bill.  MDC MPs repeatedly underscored to the ZANU-PF speakers 
and other panelists the importance of addressing election 
environment issues, such as media access, freedom of 
assembly, and political violence.  Other panelists, including 
Namibian Election Commissioner Shafimana F.I. Ueitele and 
former South African Constitutional Court Justice and 
Electoral Commission Chairperson Johann Kriegler, took thinly 
veiled swipes at Zimbabwe's election climate and GOZ 
posturing.  MPs and election officials from the region 
generally avoided commenting directly on Zimbabwe.  Mnangagwa 
sat dispassionately through the barrage of critical comments 
that followed his address through the remainder of the 
morning of the first day, while Shamuyarira busily took notes 
throughout the entire two days. 
Opposition's Scathing Critique 
------------------------------ 
 
11.  (U) Following Shamuyarira at the podium on the second 
day, MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube delivered a 
blistering and comprehensive attack on the GOZ's past 
election practices and questioned the ruling party's 
sincerity in its electoral reform proposals.  Decrying 
Zimbabwe's long "culture of unilateralism", Ncube recounted a 
familiar litany of election abuses, centering principally on 
ruling party deployment of the full weight of state 
machinery, the inadequacy of law enforcement efforts and 
legal processes, a pervasive climate of intimidation, and 
abuses under restrictive laws such as POSA and AIPPA.  He 
also stressed the importance of international observers and 
an impartial constituency delimitation exercise.  Ncube 
emphasized the MDC's desire for genuine dialogue but asserted 
that the ZANU-PF Central Committee had "tied the Justice 
Minister's hands" from engaging in meangingful negotiation. 
 
ZANU-PF Rift on Election Strategy 
--------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) On the flight back to Harare August 3, Ncube told 
poloff that his principal ZANU-PF interlocutor Justice 
Minister Patrick Chinamasa had confided that he was losing 
confidence in the ZANU-PF intra-party debate.  Chinamasa 
confirmed to Ncube that Mugabe was opposed to any compromise 
on election reforms but implied that factions were 
energetically debating the issue.  Factions were shifting 
curiously; Chinamasa reported that figures he thought were 
with him on reforms (e.g. Minister for Security Goche and 
elder statesman Solomon Mujuru) appeared opposed during the 
last politburo meeting while others traditionally opposed 
(e.g. Local Government Minister Chombo) were supportive.  He 
identified Mnangagwa, Shamuyarira, and business/young turks 
like Savior Kasukuwere as being generally supportive of 
reforms.  In any event, Chinamasa personally was feeling more 
exposed and anxious that he would be the fall guy if the 
situation went awry. 
 
13.  (C) Namibian Ambassador Kamati reported to the 
Ambassador August 4 that the ruling party remained very much 
undecided about whether to reform elections and, if so, how 
deeply. He said that the hard-liners wanted only those 
reforms agreed by the ZANU-PF politburo and were prepared to 
pass the minimum without MDC cooperation. In that case, the 
ZANU-PF Congress scheduled for December would be a non-event. 
 He said that others, including Mnangagwa, wanted 
far-reaching reforms, including constitutional changes, that 
would create a position of Prime Minister, involve 
simultaneous election of the President and Parliament, and 
delay elections three months or more in order to enact such 
changes.  (Note: Like the independent election commission, a 
delay of more than three months in the conduct of the 
parliamentary election would require a constitutional 
amendment.)  Kamati said also that hard-line Information 
Minister Jonathan Moyo and several others were close to being 
punished severely for their land abuses. 
 
Tidbits on the Margin 
--------------------- 
14.  (C) NGO representatives told poloff on the conference 
margins that Mnangagwa had told them that the President's 
office had added the more provocative references to NGOs and 
the West to his speech.  They also reported that Jonathan 
Moyo had tried hard but unsuccessfully to forestall any 
official GOZ/ZANU-PF representation at the event. One 
indicated further that the SADC election principles 
instrument under consideration for adoption in Mauritius now 
included an annex that offered specific prescriptions for 
effecting free and fair elections beyond the general 
principles laid out in the earlier draft (ref A).  We are 
seeking a copy. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
15.  (C) The likely impact of intense audience reaction, 
including from regional interlocutors, on the two ZANU-PF 
principals is difficult to assess.  Official media coverage 
of the conference was uncharacteristically straightforward, 
albeit omitting key details and downplaying criticism.  The 
ferocity of reaction may play into the hands of party 
hard-liners, but we suspect that the posture of SADC member 
states will remain a key variable in the ruling party's 
calculations. 
 
16.  (C) Although the NGOs and opposition parliamentarians 
present were heartened by supportive comments from regional 
participants, it is significant that participants from SADC 
countries included only NGOs, MPs, and election officials, 
and not senior members of the executive branch who could 
speak for their governments.  In meetings on the conference's 
margins, MPs and election officials from South Africa, 
Namibia, and Lesotho promised to express their concerns 
strongly about Zimbabwe's electoral environment to senior 
officials in their government.  We will have to see if their 
views carry any significant weight. 
 
17.  (C) In that vein and as follow-up to prior instructions 
from the Department, we urge engagement in Washington and 
SADC capitals to stimulate regional pressure on the GOZ with 
respect to electoral reforms and NGO regulation.  We would 
note that the USG's repeatedly expressed posture on 
Zimbabwean elections is entirely consistent with regional 
instruments (i.e. African Union Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa; SADC-PF Norms and Standards 
for Elections in the SADC Region; and the Electoral 
Commissions Forum/Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and 
Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO)).  Specifically, we 
have called for the GOZ (1) to establish an independent 
election commission that has meaningful authority; (2) not to 
restrict freedom of assembly/association unreasonably; (3) to 
lift unreasonable media restrictions; (4) to suppress 
political violence; and (5) to permit political campaigning 
by all parties without unreasonable obstruction. 
SULLIVAN 

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