US embassy cable - 04HELSINKI1025

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 001025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, YI, FI, NATO 
SUBJECT: KFOR: FINLAND'S CAVEATS IN KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. STATE 162868 
 
     B. PRISTINA 951 
 
Classified By: ACTING POL CHIEF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) According to the Finnish Defense Forces (FDF), Finland 
has the following national caveats on the use of Finnish 
troops in Kosovo: 
 
-- No use of lethal force to protect property.  (This caveat 
and the next do not affect the peacekeeper's right to 
self-defense.) 
 
-- No use of lethal force to prevent a detained person from 
escaping. 
 
-- No use of riot control weapons, including tear gas, water 
cannons, or rubber bullets. 
 
-- No use of Finnish forces outside the KFOR area of 
operations. 
 
2. (C) In a conversation with the FDF International Division, 
Embassy Helsinki DATT was told that the FDF has proposed to 
the Ministry of Defense that the latter two caveats be 
lifted.  The third was written into Finnish deployment orders 
some years ago, when it was assumed that soldiers would not 
be involved in riot control actions.  Now the Finns realize 
the situation has changed, said our source.  Nevertheless, 
MoD lawyers are currently examining the use of tear gas to be 
sure that it is consistent with Finland's obligations under 
the Chemical Weapons treaty. 
 
3. (C) In a July 29 conversation with Klaus Korhonen, MFA 
Acting Political Director, and Mikko Kinnunen, Acting Chief 
of the Security Policy Unit, POL Chief urged the MFA to throw 
its weight behind the lifting of all four caveats.  POL Chief 
stressed that this recommendation is the result of the NATO 
study of lessons learned from the tragic violence of last 
March -- when former Finnish PM Holkeri was head of UNMIK. 
We underlined that the first caveat is not a theoretical 
issue, since attacks on patrimonial sites, or on the homes of 
minority groups, have been major contributors to past 
violence.  Korhonen said he understood, but said MFA would 
need to discuss the caveats with its own legal staff, since 
"the principles, traditions, and practices on which (these 
limitations) may be based" have to be addressed. 
 
4.  (C) On August 2, Acting Defense Attache presented a 
parallel demarche to Dr. Pauli Jarvenpaa, MoD DG for Defense 
Policy, and third-ranking official at the Ministry. Jarvenpaa 
said that in response to past incidents in Kosovo, Finnish 
Defense Forces (FDF) legal staff had prepared a document 
addressing the caveats issue; this document is currently 
being studied by MoD. Jarvenpaa opined that use of legal 
force to protect property and to prevent a detained person 
from escaping are the thorniest caveats for the Finns.  He 
said that the Finns will find some sort of work-around on the 
use of riot control weapons  (e.g., use of water cannons) so 
as to avoid violating NBC chemical weapons conventions. He 
further believed that the Finns would relax restrictions 
allowing their troops to operate outside the KFOR area of 
operations. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
5. (C) The Finns remain committed to non-alignment, and are 
proud of the current and past role they have played in 
nonviolent dispute resolution and peacekeeping.  That said, 
their attitude toward security issues also reflects their 
highly pragmatic side.  As a nation they are proud of -- and 
comfortable with -- their close relationship with NATO and 
the fact that they were the first non-NATO country to lead a 
regional unit within KFOR.  We assume that the question of 
caveats has been discussed with the Finns within NATO 
channels; to induce some change in the first caveat may 
require a very high-level presentation -- such as an early 
SACEUR demarche to ADM Kaskeala, the Finnish CHOD.  The 
timing of this demarche is important.  If countervailing 
views favoring restrictive caveats have time to harden, 
Kaskeala will have a more difficult time influencing the 
desired outcome. 
MACK