US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2509

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LIMA PLEASE PASS TO A/S NORIEGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S VP DISCUSSES REFERENDUM AND HR CASES, 
PROPOSES IMPROVEMENTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DCM Steve McFarland, for reason 1.5 (d) 
 
---------------------- 
  Summary: 
------------------------ 
 
1. (C)  DCM (charge at the time) met July 30 with Venezuelan VP Rangel. 
Rangel was upbeat and dispassionate on broad range of issues: 
the referendum, which the GOV will win; international observers, 
whom he welcomed; campaign violence and intimidation, which he 
agreed that the  GOV and opposition should work to end; 
extradition; foreign exchange for US companies; the alleged USG 
role in the April 2002 coup; USG concerns about passports; and 
the Capriles and Sumate/NED court cases.  On the last issue, the 
VP insisted that the judiciary and prosecutors were independent; 
he did, however, hear out USG concerns, and subsequently noted 
them publicly.  Rangel urged that the USG and Venezuela talk the 
day after the referendum to mend their political relationship. 
DCM said the proposal was interesting, but that events of the 
next two weeks would influence strongly our ability to improve 
our relations.  The discussion of the Capriles arrest and the 
Sumate/NED treason accusations established a useful precedent 
that we hope other governments will follow.  End Summary. 
 
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Referendum: 
----------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Rangel, accompanied by chief of staff Rene Arreaza, was 
confident the GOV will win handily.  GOV polling and grassroots 
presence in the barrios indicated that Chavez would win by 10 or 
15 percentage points.  The opposition is disorganized and its 
message unclear; many persons who are not Chavistas will vote to 
keep Chavez because there is no alternative. The GOV's big 
concern is that the opposition will not accept the results. 
The DCM said that we believed that either side could win; this 
was why there had to be a strong international observer 
presence.  No one disputed Venezuelan sovereignty nor the 
authority of the CNE, but there was a large sector of the 
population that needed to hear the opinion of the international 
observers.  Rangel agreed, and said that they were welcome.  The 
DCM also said that the USG believed it was in both the GOV's and 
opposition's best interests to make every effort to end any 
intimidation or violence.  Rangel agreed, but said he believed 
that the opposition, or at least part of it, would not accept a 
loss, whereas the GOV would respect an adverse result.   The DCM 
replied that the USG believed that everyone would have to accept 
the results of a fair, transparent process.  The USG had made 
clear that it would do so. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Capriles and Sumate/NED cases 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3.  (C)  The DCM told Rangel that he needed to discuss two 
sensitive cases:  the incarceration of opposition mayor Henrique 
Capriles, and the accusations of treason against NGO (and NED 
grantee) Sumate.  While the DCM was not going to comment 
directly on a judicial case, the arrest of a prominent 
opposition mayor, and the allegations of treason against an NGO, 
sent a very strong message in this electoral environment to 
foreigners (note:  Washington Post editorial had appeared that 
morning).  Was this really the message the GOV wanted to convey? 
Rangel replied drily that the prosecutors and judges were 
independent of the executive branch, just as the DCM had earlier 
noted regarding the US judicial system (see below).  The DCM 
said that in the case of Sumate,  the accusations also involved 
the NED, therefore we -- and senior members of both parties in 
the US -- felt the need to respond.  He stressed the bipartisan 
nature of the NED; its focus on democracy; its similarities to 
the German stiftungs.  Rangel responded that Venezuelan 
democracy didn't need such programs; if there were carried out, 
then they should be carried out in accordance with local law, 
which Sumate failed to do.   The DCM  ended by reminding Rangel 
that the NED accusation would be a prominent part of our 
bilateral relationship, no matter which party was in power in 
Washington.  He said he  understood the GOV's stance, and would 
transmit it to Washington, but that it was important that the 
GOV know how much these actions resonated throughout the US, 
 
 
including prominent leaders in both parties and inside and 
outside government.  The GOV needed to appreciate the 
implications of pursuing these cases. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Extraditions and Alleged anti-government action in Florida: 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
4. (C)  The DCM noted that MVR Deputy Maduro had made yet again 
some outrageous statements about the U.S. and the extradition 
process.  The USG rejected such statements.  Extradition and 
asylum requests were judicial processes; they were not 
politicized, and the USG had a clear interest in keeping it this 
way.  The DCM said that, following up earlier GOV expressions of 
concern about alleged anti-Chavez activities of the F-4 group in 
Florida, the FBI was pursuing the issue, but had not yet 
uncovered any violation of the law.  The DCM urged the VP to 
share with us any information they might have to the contrary. 
Rangel agreed, and then said that the July 25 Carlos Andres 
Perez interview was extremely worrisome.  CAP was in Miami, and 
was calling for the violent overthrow of the GOV and for 
violence against Chavez.  He wished that the USG had said 
something about his interview's prediction/endorsement of 
violence.  The DCM  said the USG was on record as denouncing 
violence and endorsing the terms of OAS res. 833.  The DCM 
reiterated  that an effective international observer presence 
was critical to election results being accepted by whoever 
loses. 
 
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U.S. Companies and Foreign Exchange Controls 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U)  The DCM reminded the VP that he had told the Ambassador 
that he would help us contact CADIVI (GOV foreign exchange 
controls) regarding US companies that needed dollars at the 
official exchange rate.  There were some $64 million of 
outstanding US company requests, and CADIVI was putting off 
meeting with us.  The VP instructed his chief of staff to get us 
a meeting with CADIVI. 
 
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Venezuelan Document Control 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  The DCM expressed our concerns about the integrity of 
the Venezuelan passport issuance system; Rangel replied that he 
shared those concerns.  He hoped that a new contract to provide 
additional and more tamper-proof passports would reduce the 
corruption in the passport issuing agency.   DCM noted the TDY 
assistance provided to Venezuelan immigration and customs 
through INL funded DHS personnel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
Rangel Pitches Improved Relations, and Shrugs Off GOV "Anti- 
Imperialism" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
7. (C)  Rangel said that the day after the referendum, Venezuela 
and the U.S.  needed to start discreetly to resolve our 
differences; there already was a healthy relationship in oil, 
commerce, and counternarcotics; we needed to put the political 
relationship on the same footing.  If Bush won, he said, he 
might want to start his new term with an improved relationship 
with Venezuela; if he did not, he might in any case want to turn 
over the relationship in better shape.  The DCM  responded that 
the events leading up to and after the referendum would be 
crucial to any improvement our entire relationship, and he 
reiterated the need to have a fair, transparent referendum 
process.  Rangel understood.  The DCM asked how far the two 
countries  could progress on the political side, when the 
President had announced a few months ago that the revolution was 
in its "anti-imperialist phase?"  Rangel demurred, saying that 
not all Americans were imperialist.  The DCM asked how the GOV 
could characterize any of us as imperialist, when it was 
Venezuela, not the USG, that owned refineries and gas stations 
in the US, when it was Venezuela that could say whether we could 
or couldn't use their air space for the (CN support) FOL 
flights? Perhaps the anti-imperialist analysis made some sense 
 
 
30 or 40 years ago -- but no longer. Rangel smiled, and he said 
that Venezuela was in an electoral campaign, and that afterwards 
we could improve our relations. 
 
------------------------------ 
And Raises April 2002 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Rangel said that we needed to keep the past in the 
past; he noted the GOV's concern about U.S. intervention, 
including the USG role in the April 2002 coup, for which he had 
proof.  The DCM  said that if the GOV had proof, it should 
publish it; Rangel said he might "put all the cards on the 
table,"  but that he didn't want to create another stir.  The 
DCM said it would be better to have all the cards on the table. 
He told Rangel that while he didn't doubt the VP's sincerity, 
the USG had investigated the allegations and found nothing; our 
recent investigations into 9/11 and into the WMD issue showed we 
could do an honest investigation. 
 
----------------------- 
9.  (C)  Comment: 
------------------------ 
 
Rangel was confident and unusually dispassionate.  He, like most 
other Chavistas we've met with in the last weeks, says he's 
confident the GOV will win -- and he appears to believe it.  So, 
if the GOV loses, or wins by a hair, they will be extremely 
suspicious and combative.  On Capriles and Sumate, Rangel didn't 
budge -- but we expected no less, given Chavez' personal stake 
in these cases.   Rangel's hearing us out on these cases, 
however,  suggests that he's aware of the cases' negative impact 
on GOV image.  In any case, we have established a precedent of 
talking with him on these issues that we hope other governments 
will follow.  The fiscalia and to varying degrees the courts are 
of course beholden to the GOV, and the cases' outcome will 
depend upon Chavez.  Should the GOV win the referendum cleanly, 
Rangel's reiteration of previous proposals for meetings to 
discuss the bilateral relationship could be useful. 
 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02509 - CONFIDENTIAL