US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1967

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP FOR 6 AUGUST 2004

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE1967
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE1967 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-08-05 13:28:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PARM PREL CWC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001967 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CWC 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  WEEKLY WRAP-UP 
FOR 6 AUGUST 2004 
 
This is CWC-91-04. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (U) A recent trip by the Director General proved 
uneventful and produced little or nothing in terms of 
substantive results - an outcome considered very successful 
by the DG.  The OPCW Chief of Cabinet Raphael Grossi 
expounded on a number of personnel issues, most notably 
appealing for a solid US candidate for the position of Head 
of Industrial Verification, to replace the outgoing Don 
Clagett - an appeal seconded a few days later by Deputy 
Director General Brian Hawtin. 
 
2.  (U) While the Libyan initiative for a technical change to 
permit the conversion of Rabta has largely fallen prey to the 
summer doldrums in The Hague, planning and lobbying by the 
delegation continues and the prospects for approval appear as 
sound as at any point so far.  France's position may/may be 
softening, and the delegation is making an active effort to 
identify potential problem delegations in advance of EC-38 
with an eye to initiating a dialogue with those who may not 
be fully supportive.  Thus far only Pakistan has indicated 
they have a significant problem, though India will require 
further attention in the coming weeks, as the signals from 
them to date leave it unclear whether they have or will cause 
significant problems. 
 
3.  (U) The effort by the delegation to begin establishing a 
relationship with personnel at the Iraqi Embassy has been 
placed on temporary hold, at the request of the Iraqis 
pending the arrival of their new Ambassador in September. 
 
----------------------------- 
Grossi on DG's Trip to Tehran 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) On Tuesday, 27 June Deloff met with OPCW Chief of 
Cabinet Raphael Grossi to discuss a range of issues, 
including his understanding of the state of play with Libya's 
request for a technical amendment. 
 
5.  (U) The conversation began with a debrief by Grossi of 
the Director General's (DG)recent trip to Iran.  During an 
earlier conversation, Grossi indicated that the Iranians had 
pressed the DG quite insistently to come to Tehran for a 
visit.  Reluctant but unable to decline without giving 
offense, the DG agreed to a whirlwind trip in which he 
arrived late on a Friday night, engaged in two meetings on 
Saturday, and departed on Sunday.  The overriding concern by 
the DG was the prospect of a media circus, which, in the 
event, did not materialize. 
 
6.  (U) Grossi's description of both meetings was that they 
were pro forma and largely non-substantive.  Iranian hosts 
said nothing provocative except the obligatory comments, in 
response to the DG's admonitions about promoting universality 
in the region, that Israel continues to be the obstruction. 
 
-------------------------- 
Grossi on Personnel Issues 
-------------------------- 
 
7.  (U) On the subject of OPCW consultants, it was clear 
Grossi had arrived at the meeting with the objective of 
defending the DG's apparent decision to extend the contract 
of South Korean consultant Chong.  Chong has been working on 
the issue of promoting universality on the Korean peninsula 
for approximately one and one half years, and it appears he 
will continue for the foreseeable future.  The DG recently 
returned from a trip to Seoul where it became clear to him, 
according to Grossi, that Chong was wired in at very senior 
levels of the Korean government.  This placement, along with 
the important objective of eventually gaining North Korea's 
accession to the Convention, warranted Chong's further 
retention.  It is the DG's view that Chong is definitely 
adding value (Note: Deloff viewed this as an effort to 
justify a political decision taken by the DG.  Chong's 
contributions to the organization have been questionable 
since he began his work.  He appears to be extremely 
conscientious and industrious, but the 
portfolio he has been assigned makes it far from clear, and 
indeed Grossi offered no substantive evidence, that anything 
substantive is being done and that Chong therefore 
"continues" to add value.)  The consultants retained to work 
on universality in  Latin America and on optimization of 
verification at demilitarization facilities, will not have 
their contracts renewed.  To emphasize, French consultant 
Gregoire Diamantides will return to the OPCW for a few weeks 
to finalize his report on optimization in Russia, and will 
then end his tenure at the OPCW.  Grossi accented these 
non-renewals apparently to bolster the case for the decision 
to retain Chong. 
 
8.  (U) Grossi availed himself of the opportunity to do some 
repair work after the discord created when delegates were 
informed during the course of budget discussions that Chong's 
work was classified and very sensitive and that they could 
therefore not be briefed about it, as they had requested. 
Grossi allowed that this had clearly been the wrong answer, 
and that it would be rectified.  Chong would, in fact, 
provide the requisite briefing when the issue came up again, 
presumably during the next round of budget discussions. 
 
9.  (U) Continuing with personnel issues, Grossi lamented the 
loss of the American head of industry inspections, Don 
Clagett to the tenure policy.  He appealed once again for a 
strong US candidate and noted that UK had proposed Steve Wade 
as a national candidate and is apparently pressing the DG 
quite hard for Wade's acceptance.  Deloff assured him the US 
was searching diligently for a solid candidate and that in 
fact a few extremely good ones had been identified.  The 
remaining question was whether the individuals in question 
were interested.  In any case, we would continue to work to 
get an applicant(s) in front of them to consider.  A few days 
later, delegation received the same appeal from Deputy 
Director General Brian Hawtin, who noted the closeout of the 
extended date for candidates was October 25th and, therefore, 
time was of the essence. 
 
10.  (U) In a somewhat strange turn of the conversation, 
Grossi expounded at length the virtues of acting Head of the 
Inspection Directorate Jose Carvalho.  He particularly 
highlighted the sense of allegiance and cooperation Carvalho 
had shown during implementation of the tenure policy, in 
sharp contrast to some other senior staff members, notably 
Horst Reeps.  Carvalho had shown no resistance to carrying 
out the staff turnovers demanded by the tenure decision and 
had carried out the process in a very professional and 
reasoned manner.  Further singing his praises, Grossi noted 
that when he had been informed of the recent decision to hire 
Japanese incumbent Akiyama to head the Inspection 
Directorate, and the attendant removal of Carvalho as acting 
head, Carvalho's response had been to express gratitude for 
the opportunity to fill the position for the time he had been 
given. 
 
----- 
Rabta 
----- 
 
11.  (SBU) In a brief exchange regarding the Libyans' request 
for a technical change, Grossi confided (please closely 
protect) that in a conversation with French delegate Sophie 
Moal-Makame, she informed him that he "should be optimistic" 
about the fate of the request.  There would be problems along 
the way, but eventually a "good outcome".  Grossi had taken 
this to mean the France would, in the event, come around. 
Grossi also said that in conversations with the Chinese 
delegation, it seemed clear that China would not cause any 
trouble on this issue.  He did not expect the Indians to be a 
problem either, but said they might look for some kind of 
language to the effect that the decision "does not set a 
precedent", though it was not clear what precedent it 
wouldn't set. 
 
12.  (U)  Delegation also attempted contact with the Indians 
to discuss their views on Rabta, but was unable due to the 
Summer holiday season.  Delegation will attempt to schedule 
the meeting later in August when the Indian delegate 
responsible for the issue will have returned. 
13. (U)  At delegation's request, Ambassador Javits contacted 
Pakistani Ambassador Kazi to gauge Pakistan's likely response 
to the Libyan proposed technical change.  In an unexpected 
turn, Kazi expressed extreme dislike for Libyans and 
agitation that Libya had not bothered to approach Pakistan to 
discuss the initiative.  Kazi referred to unspecified "raw 
wounds" between Libya and Pakistan as the basis for his 
dislike and indicated that an effort would have to be made to 
overcome that baggage.  More substantively, Pakistan had no 
problem with the principle of converting Rabta but they may 
have problems with the mechanism of a technical change. The 
change being sought may require an Amendment Conference. 
Delegation intends to follow up with the Pakistan delegation 
to gain a clearer view of their position and to suggest to 
Libya that they make a clear political effort to engage 
Pakistan. 
 
14. (U)  During a discussion in the delegate's lounge at the 
OPCW, deloff overheard half of a phone conversation between 
the Director of Chemical Demilitarization Jerzy Mazur, and 
German Ambassador Alexander Olbrich.  The thrust of the 
conversation was that Olbrich was attempting to gain some 
background and understanding about the status of equipment at 
Rabta, specifically whether it had been "secured" by the TS. 
In addition, Olbrich was trying to determine whether the TS 
considered it appropriate for Germany to send a team to Libya 
to examine the CW facilities there.  Mazur assured him the 
equipment was under OPCW tags and seals and that the question 
of a trip to Libya was between Libya and Germany.  There was 
nothing Mazur knew of from a Convention standpoint that 
prevented it.  Delegation believes it is likely that Germany 
is or will be in the near future, planning such a trip. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
15.  (U) At Washington's prompting, delegation began pursuing 
a dialogue with the Iraqi Embassy here in The Hague to 
establish lines of communication, establish relationships, 
and to identify who locally would be working OPCW issues.  In 
preparation, delegation discussed the issue with the UK 
delegation which, in turn, contacted the Iraqis.  While very 
engaging, the Iraqi Embassy personnel UK spoke with indicated 
they are in the midst of rotating in a new Ambassador and 
until he or she arrived they did not want to engage on such 
issues, even superficially.  They anticipated having their 
new Ambassador in place in September, and delegation will 
renew the initiative with them shortly thereafter. 
 
------------------------------- 
Pine Bluff DG Verification Plan 
------------------------------- 
 
16. (U)  In a series of discussions, delegation sought to 
clarify with TS personnel the nature of the concern that 
drove the TS to include certain items of equipment in Table 2 
of its draft Verification Plan for the Pine Bluff Arsenal DF 
Production Facility.  TS concerns were related to its 
practical ability to confirm the destruction of these items 
of equipment, specifically to have adequate "before" and 
"after" photographs of the equipment upon which to make a 
sound determination of their destruction.  In the course of 
the discussions, delegation and TS were able to agree that 
photographs taken of this equipment under the regimen for 
"standard, various" equipment would in fact provide the 
necessary tools to confirm destruction, and the TS removed 
the contentious items of equipment from Table 2. 
 
-------------------- 
Article VII Meetings 
-------------------- 
 
17. (U)  Del met with Art. VII facilitator (Matthews, UK), 
Trapp and Bauta (TS) on 28 July to exchange information 
regarding bilateral assistance activities pursuant to the 
Art. VII Action Plan.  As directed, del provided copies of 
the US Demarche Status 2004 noting that the copies are not 
intended for public dissemination.  Other than reviewing 
outstanding requests for assistance listed on the status 
report, very little new information was exchanged.  The TS 
continues to push States Parties to provide specific requests 
for assistance and indicated they would circulate an updated 
table with more detailed information regarding requests 
received.  The TS (Bauta) again, asked the del whether the US 
could provide a web-developer on a cost-free basis to assist 
the TS to get the Art. VII/National Authorities collaboration 
website online.  The TS also inquired whether the US was 
willing to provide cash, in terms of voluntary contributions, 
to States Parties to assist in national implementation.  Del 
informed the TS that, while no options are off the table, US 
offers of assistance would need to be tied to specific 
requests and specific, monitorable, results.  Del continued 
that, at this point in time, the US continues to focus its 
assistance efforts towards information assistance via 
bilateral visits, exchanges and training with national 
authority personnel or with the TS rather than through 
voluntary monetary contributions. 
 
18.  (U) On 29 July, the facilitator held consultations on 
the implementation status of the Article VII Action Plan. 
Discussions were sparsely attended, netting primarily the 
WEOG and Asian States Parties extending offers of assistance. 
 Discussions were also largely one-way.  The bulk of 
discussions were the TS informed dels of increased 
transparency measures planned relative to their efforts to 
match donors and recipients.  In particular, the facilitator 
indicated he would be conducting bilateral exchanges, like 
those conducted on 28 July, with donor countries four times 
before CSP 10.  The facilitator will set dates for the next 
round of bilats tentatively in September.  As a follow-on to 
the successful Universality Action Plan discussions held 
recently in Brussels, the TS (Trapp) also reviewed the 
planned London Art. VII consultations set for 1 Sept. to 
discuss Art. VII implementation with delegations not resident 
in The Hague but present in Brussels.  The TS also reviewed, 
in general terms, the types of potential assistance donor 
countries offered during bilateral discussions with the 
facilitator and the TS on 28 July (TS talking points faxed 
back to AC/CB).  Del requested the TS to consider circulating 
a more detailed, comprehensive, list of requests received to 
facilitate offers of assistance.  Del noted that offers of 
specific assistance are difficult to obtain in capitols 
without specific justification.  The TS noted they would 
compile and circulate a more informative list of requests 
received.  In closing, the facilitator reviewed that the next 
round of Art. VII consultations would be scheduled the week 
of 12 Sept to coincide with the Industry Intersessionals. 
 
 
--------- 
ICA Bilat 
--------- 
 
19.   (U) TS reps Davahle and Kisslev (ICA) requested to meet 
with del on 4 Aug to discuss Art. VII ICA assistance 
activities.  Specifically, ICA requested U.S. assistance in 
encouraging African countries to submit applications to 
attend the Second Regional Meeting of National Authorities 
scheduled for 19 and 20 Oct 2004 in Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Davahle indicated that no countries have signed up to attend 
this meeting and the closing date, 17 Aug, is rapidly 
approaching.  Davahle indicated the TS can support 20-25 
participants to this event.  Second, ICA requests that the 
U.S. apply "political" pressure to four countries the TS 
considers close to adopting national legislation in the 
Pacific Rim:  Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau and Kiribati. The TS 
is approaching the U.S., Australia and New Zealand in 
requesting to approach these countries to help push along 
legislation adoption efforts. In each case, the TS 
understands that the draft legislation is complete, has been 
reviewed by the TS, but that the domestic drafters have 
informed the TS that there is a lack of legislative interest 
in movement on the text.  The TS provided specific points of 
contact in each of the countries for reference (faxed back to 
AC/CB 5 Aug 2004).  Third, the TS requested U.S. assistance 
in generating a 2-3 page outreach paper designed to inform 
States Parties on how to assemble a National Authority, using 
lessons learned from the U.S. experience.  ICA views this 
document as helpful in identifying for States Parties lacking 
National Authorities the necessary skill sets, personnel and 
interagency coordination procedures necessary to establish a 
functional National Authority.  Fourth, ICA, again, requested 
U.S. assistance, via a cost-free expert, to establish an 
online Art. VII and National Authority coordination website. 
 
----------------------------- 
Schedule of Upcoming Meetings 
----------------------------- 
 
20.  (U) There are currently no official meetings schedule 
for the duration of the month of August. 
 
21.   (U) To facilitate advance notification of scheduled 
meetings and consultations, del is working to establish an 
AC/CB link to the del's internal electronic calendar on the 
OpenNet.  This electronic calendar contains the time/date for 
upcoming del events, attendee(s), and del notes regarding the 
event and includes links to electronic documents, if 
available. 
 
22.  (U)  Kellogg sends. 
RUSSEL 

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