US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1954

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/ER/CC, DS/ITA, DS/IP/EUR, EUR/UBI 
BRUSSELS FOR LEGATT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, NL 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY THE HAGUE SECURITY MEASURES: PROMISE OF 
GOOD NEWS ON AUGUST 5 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 166129 
     B. (B) THE HAGUE 1294 
     C. (C) THE HAGUE 1293 
     D. (D) THE HAGUE 1915 
     E. (E) THE HAGUE 1913 
     F. (F) THE HAGUE 1904 
     G. (G) THE HAGUE 1847 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASON 1.5 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1. (C) The Dutch security "triangle" chaired by National 
Coordinator for Security Jonge Vos and including 
representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and AVID (security service)), met 
late August 4 to review Embassy The Hague security.  The 
results of the meeting are strictly embargoed until Thursday, 
August 5, when the written report will be prepared and 
presented first to the local authorities in The Hague and 
then to the U.S. Embassy.  However, Charge learned 
unofficially from participants in the meeting -- in strict 
confidence -- that the triangle endorsed the request in 
Embassy's July 30 dip note (Ref B) -- reinforced by DAS 
Davies meeting with Dutch DCM the same day (Ref A).  Embassy 
source shared in confidence that the Triangle agreed to 
invoke Article 16 of the Dutch Police law, which permits the 
central authorities to issue a written "advisory notice' to 
the local government (which under Dutch law has nearly 
absolute discretion on matters of public safety).  The 
advisory will call on the City of The Hague to take increased 
measures specifically to strengthen the anti-ram traffic 
barriers next to the embassy -- "in the shortest possible 
timeframe."  CDA was told that "this time we really mean 
business" and the city authorities are expected to comply 
"promptly."  Jonge Vos' office separately said he would be in 
touch with Charge directly before the end of the day August 5 
to convey the official decision, and underscored that no 
information could be provided to the USG until the city had 
first been informed.  We expect to get a better sense on 
Thursday what the likely timeframe would be for constructing 
a concrete or metal barrier and any other improvements. 
 
2. (S/NF) Embassy has used recent surveillance incidents 
(refs C,D,E,F) to push hard for a reversal of the Triangle 
position that a decision on security upgrades should be left 
to the City of the Hague.  In the preceding 72 hours, Charge, 
RSO and Ambassador Sobel (from overseas) had frequently met 
or phoned all senior decision-makers in the Dutch government 
to press for action on an anti-ram barrier as a top priority, 
as well as additional security measures previously requested 
by the embassy.  Our contacts emphasized they were building a 
rationale for taking new measures as required by the arcane 
and complex Dutch system.  ORCA reinforced with AIVD the 
serious nature of surveillance incidents and provided 
information regarding upgrade in threat levels in the U.S. as 
well.  In the Dutch security system (hopefully to be revised 
by early 2005 per ref G), triangle security decisions rest 
heavily on AIVD judgment of the explicit threat against a 
particular facility.  In the event, it appears that the 
triangle concluded that the direct threats against the 
embassy were insufficient to elevate its status from the 
current "high" to "critical."  However, they did agree that 
there was justification for issuing the advisory to provide 
elevated protection within the "high" category. 
RUSSEL