US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2480

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002480 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
BOGOTA AND LIMA ALSO FOR A/S NORIEGA 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: VIEWS FROM ANDEAN REGIONAL CAPITAL 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, 
for Reason 1.5 (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) While the Coordinadora Democratica in Merida is 
divided about local politics and how to run the campaign for 
the August 15 Referendum, the leaders of several parties 
agree that President Chavez will be recalled. A barely 
visible &Si8 campaign for the recall contrasts starkly with 
overwhelming &No8 advertisements on the streets of the 
regional Andean capital. The varied opposition 
representatives concur that on a national level the people 
will first unite to oust President Chavez and then require 
that the opposition unite behind one presidential candidate. 
Chavez supporters and opponents worried about possible 
violence after August 15 regardless of the outcome of the 
vote. End Summary. 
 
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The August 15 Campaign 
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2. (U) In the Andean regional capital of Merida, President 
Hugo Chavez's &No8 campaign has an overwhelming visual 
presence compared to the Coordinadora,s weak media campaign. 
"No" posters, banners, flyers and graffiti appear everywhere. 
Comando Maisanta also organized door-to-door visits 
throughout many neighborhoods. Chavez supporters are seen 
patrolling neighboorhoods and talking to people. In contrast, 
the "Si" campaign has a few posters that appear throughout 
the city. The "Si" campaign is much more mobile with some 
meetings, marches or caravans taking place interspercedly 
around the city. 
 
3. (C) Fernando Soto and Ruben Avila of Merida state,s 
Comando Maisanta told Poloffs July 22 that in the state of 
Merida there are 364 electoral battle units, each with 10-12 
people per unit. The roughly 4,000 members go door-to-door to 
both Chavista and opposition households to convince 
registered citizens to vote for Chavez on August 15. Using 
door-to-door visits, posters, banners, flyers and graffiti 
urging the populace to vote &No8, they said, the Comando 
Maisanta hopes to have between 160-170,000 &No8 votes, 
about 40-42% of eligible voters. 
 
4. (C) Representatives of Primero Justicia, People from the 
University of the Andes, Movimiento de Trabajo, Accion 
Democratica, Movimiento Federal and academic leaders in 
Merida agree that despite their not being as organized as 
Comando Maisanta, the vote will show the people are against 
Chavez. Like the Maisanta campaign, the opposition uses 
door-to-door outreaches (scheduled to begin the week of July 
26), and posters and some graffitti. They also use forums, 
small community meetings and car caravans to garner "Si" 
support. Primero Justicia (PJ) mayoral candidate Carlos 
Masini said the mood among the opposition is the most 
optimistic it has been since January 2004. Some, like Marcos 
Pino, the campaign manager for the Coordinadora Democratica 
in Merida, claimed that the people are not out marching and 
plastering posters because they already know they are going 
to vote &Si8 August 15. 
 
5. (C) The various opposition representatives estimated the 
&Si8 votes expected in Merida also to reach between 
160-180,000 voters, 40-45% of total voters registered.  Most 
of the Merida opposition representatives agreed that Merida 
would mirror the national vote. Some others foresaw a smaller 
victory, but a victory nonetheless.  All agreed that an 
important campaign strategy for the Coordinadora Democratica 
to increase the number of people voting &Si8 is to dispel 
rumors and inform people the vote is secret. 
 
6. (C) According to Pino of the Coordinador Democratica 
voters who support neither Chavez nor the opposition 
reportedly are actually a small minority of people in Merida 
and nationwide. He said some of them do not support the 
opposition or its candidates perse but will vote for whatever 
candidate is presented as an alternative to Chavez. In 
contrast, Luis Loaiza of the University of Los Andes claimed 
that the possibility of a win was still good, but said the 
opposition campaign strategy needed to change and to focus on 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING 
 
the undecided voters. 
 
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Primary Possibilities 
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7. (C) Assuming a &Si8 win, many opposition representatives 
in Merida are looking forward to a presidential primary to 
determine who the opposition candidate will be. On a national 
level, opposition representatives agreed that there will be 
no dissensions and only one candidate will appear as a result 
of the primary. Gilberto Belandrini of Movimiento al Trabajo 
asserted that the people will support whoever wins the 
primary and punish any other candidates who enter the race by 
not voting for them. 
 
8. (C) Masini said the primary is the only feasible option if 
the &Si8 wins, because the opposition candidate will not be 
one of the well-known names being thrown around now. The 
candidate, Masini predicted, will be &second string8 since 
it is the policies that are important, not the personality of 
the candidate. Masini claimed that Miranda state governor 
Enrique Mendoza, will not &politically castrate8 himself by 
running for this limited presidency. He claimed that if 
Chavez were to lose the referendum, he would lose his 
momentum and the people would turn against him. 
 
9. (C) Comando Maisanta leaders believe that in the unlikely 
event that Chavez were to lose the referendum, his candidate 
would still win the presidential elections afterwards. Soto 
and Avila saw the opposition as fractured and claimed that 
opposition supporters would not be able to agree on one 
candidate. They claimed that Chavez supporters were united 
and would support the candidate chosen to run. By running 
multiple candidates against one Chavista candidate, Avila and 
Soto claimed, the opposition would be guaranteed to lose. 
 
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After the Vote*Possibility of Violence 
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10.  (C) Comando Maisanta's regional leaders Soto and Avila 
said if Chavez wins and the opposition is not willing to 
accept the decision, which Chavez supporters see as likely, 
then those who support Chavez will &use any means necessary 
to ensure the future of Venezuela for their children and 
grandchildren.8  Chavez opponents thought fraud, or claims 
of it, would lead to violence regardless of the decision. 
Many opposition representatives said that even if Chavez were 
to accept a &Si8 vote, there are politically extreme 
factions and &imported guerillas8 who will not accept a 
peaceful transition. They alleged that Chavista politicians 
and civil leaders who have gained under Chavez's government 
think they have too much to lose and will stir the people 
into violent revolt. Both sides fear that if Chavez 
supporters are persecuted when the opposition wins, this will 
play into the hands of political extremists and increase the 
risk of violence. 
 
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Inclusion Solution 
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11. (C) Unanimously, opposition leaders said that if the 
opposition were to win the presidency for the next two years, 
they would have to insure tolerance, inclusion, 
decentralization and cooperation with factions of Chavez,s 
supporters to avoid violence and insure govern ability. They 
said that there were some politicians, even those who support 
inclusion, who say that those who committed crimes under 
Chavez,s rule would have to be prosecuted. They did not see 
the need for prosecution and acceptance as mutually 
exclusive. Some of the representatives of the opposition 
believed that leaving Chavez supporters in control of some 
institutions and political seats like the CNE, Supreme Court, 
and some gubernatorial and mayoral seats would demonstrate 
tolerance and acceptance of opposing ideals and give the new 
government legitimacy. Others believed that having Chavistas 
with power would be one more problem to be solved. 
 
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Comment 
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C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING 
 
12. (C) Merida opposition representatives agreed that the 
current less organized and less visible &Si8 campaign would 
still be enough to vote Chavez out of power, although some 
disagreed about the margin by which the opposition would win. 
Leaders foresaw possible problems to be govern ability and 
violence. While they recommended inclusion as a means of 
resolving the potential for violence, most disagreed on 
exactly what inclusion might mean. Chavez opponents claimed 
that if Chavez were to win, it would be a no-holds-barred 
attack on the opposition and democracy. 
Shapiro 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02480 - CONFIDENTIAL