US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT2425

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, SA/INS, DRL/PHD, DRL/ILA, G/TIP 
STATE FOR CA/OCS/ACS/NESA, M/P FOR JAY ANANIA 
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2009 
TAGS: MOPS, ETRD, EAID, PREL, PHUM, IN, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (U) INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES IMPOSE BAN ON 
CITIZENS' TRAVEL TO IRAQ 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 7175 
     B. BAGHDAD 541 
     C. KUWAIT 1598 
     D. NEW DELHI 2808 
     E. NEW DELHI 2795 
     F. NEW DELHI 2766 
     G. NEW DELHI 3175 
     H. KUWAIT 1683 
     I. KUWAIT 1834 
     J. KUWAIT 1835 
     K. KUWAIT 2006 
 
Classified By: EconCouns Stephen Carrig; Reason: 1.5 (b and d) 
 
1.  (U) Action request at para 11. 
 
2.  (C) Summary.  MFA reports that the Embassies of the 
Philippines and India, responding to a deteriorating security 
situation, requested GOK assistance on 3 August in banning 
travel of their nationals to Iraq.  MFA, reportedly in order 
to provide USG an opportunity to propose additional security 
assurances, asked MOI to "make haste slowly," in implementing 
the ban.  Embassy of India confirmed for us 3 August that a 
travel ban had been requested on the instruction of New Delhi 
to remain in effect until the situation in Iraq stabilizes. 
Embassy of the Philippines did not respond to our calls 
requesting clarification.  Coalition forces are heavily 
dependent on Filipino and Indian drivers and other logistical 
support personnel for the humanitarian fuels, military food 
supply and other mission-critical programs in Iraq. 
Contractors and U.S. military report that a fully enforced 
travel ban would cripple these operations.  There are no 
readily implemented short-term workarounds to ameliorate the 
effect of a travel ban.  Should Department concur, Embassy 
proposes to collaborate with CFLCC in providing the concerned 
missions here in Kuwait a detailed security briefing and 
written assurances.  We would note that none of the kidnap 
victims in Iraq was taken from a military-escorted convoy and 
request that a waiver be granted on the ban for individuals 
who are in Iraq under the protection of Coalition forces. 
Embassy requests that Department initiate similar demarches 
at capitals of third country nationals working in support of 
OIF.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (C) MFA Consular Affairs Department Deputy Director Abdul 
Aziz Al-Reshaid told EconCouns on 3 August that Kuwait's 
Ministry of the Interior (MOI) had requested MFA guidance on 
how to respond to informal requests from the Governments of 
India and the Philippines that their citizens be prevented 
from traveling to Iraq via Kuwait.  Al-Reshaid reported that 
he requested MOI "make haste slowly" in implementing the ban 
in order to give the Coalition time to react. 
 
4.  (C) The Indian request of MOI reportedly was made by 
telephone on 3 August, following up on a press release dated 
31 July that was faxed to MFA on 1 August and to Embassy 
Kuwait the evening of 2 August.  Responding to recent 
kidnapping in Iraq, the press release notes that the decision 
to "ban deployment of Indian nationals to Iraq" was taken "on 
account of the security situation."  The press release 
admonishes that "All Indian nationals in Kuwait are requested 
to note this and strictly refrain from traveling to Iraq for 
any purpose whatsoever (and that the Indian Embassy) requests 
the cooperation of sponsor companies/individual 
sponsors/Government agencies in the implementation of this 
ban."  There was no diplomatic correspondence supporting the 
press release, or the telephone call.  The Philippines' 
request of MOI, also on 3 August, was, according to 
Al-Reshaid, even less formal and made by telephone without 
any press release or note requesting a ban on travel. 
 
5.  (C) Al-Rashaid was our principal interlocutor in Embassy 
efforts resolving the earlier Indian ban on travel to Iraq 
(Refs C, H, I, J and K).  Today, he volunteered that the 
Governments of India and the Philippines might -- given that 
no formal, written request to ban travel had been provided -- 
be amenable to whatever immediate assurances USG might offer 
them regarding enhanced security procedures for their 
citizens traveling in Iraq in support of OIF.  It was for 
that reason, he said, he had asked MOI not to impose the ban 
effective immediately. 
6.  (C) Al-Rashaid's message tracks with information provided 
EconCouns in telephone conversations 3 August with Embassy of 
India DCM Kanawal Jit Singh Sodhi.  Sodhi reported that the 
ban was a "temporary consideration" and would be lifted 
immediately upon "an improvement in the situation in Iraq." 
He said the negotiations in Iraq over release of three 
kidnapped Indian employees of the local firm "Kuwait and Gulf 
Link Transport Company" (KGL) -- purportedly held by members 
of the so-called "Holders of the Black Banners" -- more 
involved "bargaining with criminals than anything political." 
 He said the firm KGL, itself, had the lead in the 
negotiations, that no/no Government of India officials were 
involved in the process, press reports notwithstanding.  He 
emphasized that the ban was a decision taken by the 
Government of India and could not be reversed at the local 
level.  The Philippine Embassy did not return our calls for 
background regarding their decision to ban travel to Iraq. 
 
7.  (SBU) The GOK clearly wants to support Coalition efforts 
and is looking to us for guidance.  At the end of the day, 
however, local authorities will have to comply if the Indians 
and Filipinos stick to their decision, a decision apparently 
taken in their capitals.  It may be a bit harder to walk them 
back this time because the ban now is squarely linked to 
security conditions and kidnappings in Iraq, not to alleged 
OIF subcontractors' mistreatment of employees.  The latter we 
have addressed with the active participation of CFLCC; the 
former is out of our near-term control.  We are concerned 
also that a bandwagon effect may develop with other nations 
officially banning travel of their citizens into Iraq. 
 
8.  (SBU) Coalition forces are heavily dependent on third 
country national (TCN) drivers and other logistical support 
personnel.  The Philippines and India supply the majority of 
these individuals so essential to OIF success.  For example, 
Public Warehouse Company (PWC), the prime vendor for the 
supply of water and food to U.S. Forces in Iraq, confirmed on 
3 August that fully 48 percent of the firm's 1500  drivers 
are Indian and that at least 10 percent more are Filipino. 
Defense Energy Support Center staff reported recently (Ref H) 
that more than 60 percent of their 1150 TCNs employed in the 
transport of humanitarian fuels to Iraq are either Filipino 
or Indian.  The firms report that a ban on travel would 
cripple the humanitarian fuels and military food supply 
programs.  Similar TCN ratios are said to apply for other 
firms with mission critical support functions in Iraq. 
 
9.  (SBU) Palliative alternatives to reversing the decision 
of the Philippines and India are few and unlikely to succeed. 
 Embassy's 3 August straw poll of Kuwaiti and U.S. firms 
engaged in transport operations drew these observations: 
 
--  Hiring new drivers is a time-consuming and expensive 
process, especially so in Kuwait given the now-enforced visa, 
licensing and residency permit regulations. 
 
--  Bringing Iraqi drivers and trucks into Kuwait to pick up 
Coalition cargo certainly would encounter stiff commercial 
and political resistance, and trigger security concerns as 
well. 
 
--  Transporting cargo to near-by cities in Iraq, e.g., 
Basra, to be stored there pending pick up by Iraq-based 
transport assets offers no realistic short-term prospects. 
Storage facilities are limited; they are not refrigerated 
and, therefore, unsuitable for perishable reefer and other 
cargo. 
 
--  Trailer transfer at the border similarly offers little 
benefit.  The coupling devices on tractors are not 
standardized regionally, so marrying compatible tractors and 
trailers could create a traffic management nightmare.  Also, 
few are the Kuwaiti contractors who would trust to Iraqi 
firms to return with the trailer at the end of the delivery 
round trip. 
 
10. (SBU) One alternative might be to expand on the present 
practice of transferring cargo from Kuwaiti to Iraqi trucks 
at the border.  This would be time-consuming and provide no 
relief for perishable cargo requiring refrigeration, but 
containerized cargo and break bulk could be accommodated 
somewhat.  Kuwaiti/U.S. firms here are working to identify 
Iraqi counterparts should this option prove necessary. 
 
 
11.  (SBU) Action Request.  Embassy briefed CFLCC Deputy 
Commander MG Speer and staff on 3 August regarding 
developments in the ban on Indian and Filipino citizens' 
travel to Iraq.  MG Speer reiterated MG Speakes' earlier 
concerns and offers of reassurance (Ref J) to the home 
governments of TCNs working in support of OIF.  CFLCC will 
put these pledges into writing for Embassy's delivery in 
Kuwait to the missions of India and the Philippines, and the 
representatives of any other similarly concerned governments. 
 We propose also, should Department concur, to collaborate 
with CFLCC in providing a security briefing for concerned 
missions here in Kuwait.  We would note that none of the 
kidnap victims in Iraq was taken from U.S.-military escorted 
convoys and request that a waiver be granted on the travel 
ban for citizens of the Philippines and India who are in Iraq 
under the protection of Coalition forces.  Embassy requests 
Department initiate similar demarches at capitals of TCN 
drivers.  End Action Request. 
 
12.  (U)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
TUELLER