US embassy cable - 04MADRID2958

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002958 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP 
SUBJECT: USOAS AMBASSADOR'S MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  In his July 29 meeting in Madrid with 
Spanish MFA Director General Sandomingo, USOAS Ambassador 
Maisto urged Spain to send observers to the Venezuelan 
referendum and to remain firm on Cuba.  Maisto thanked the 
GOS for its decision to send police/troops to Haiti with a 
Moroccan contingent.  End summary. 
 
Haiti 
 
2.  (C)  Sandomingo told Maisto the GOS had not yet 
determined the exact composition of its joint participation 
with Morocco in Haiti.  Morocco's likely contribution would 
be more in the form of troops, while Spain's would be Spanish 
National Police, Guardia Civil and some force protection 
elements from the military (press reports the Spanish Marines 
might participate), Sandomingo said the total numbers of the 
contingent would be some 200-240, but details were still 
being worked out with the government of Morocco.  Maisto 
expressed USG appreciation for the Haiti contribution, noting 
it had been well regarded in Washington.  He and Sandomingo 
noted the significance of the cooperation with Morocco, just 
several years after the Perejil Island dispute between Spain 
and Morocco.  Sandomingo also emphasized the importance of 
Spain's cooperation with an Islamic country.  Maisto also 
noted the importance of Brazil's contribution and leadership 
role, and the multilateral nature of the effort, including 
the UN, OAS, U.S., Canada, the Latin Americans and countries 
like Spain and Morocco. 
 
Venezuela 
 
3.  (C)  Maisto expressed disappointment at the failure of 
the EU to mount an observer mission for the Venezuelan 
referendum.  Sandomingo acknowledged this was a huge disaster 
and failure for the EU commission, whose practices are far to 
slow, rigid and bureaucratic.  Maisto asked if Spain would 
consider sending observers on a bilateral basis.  Sandomingo 
indicated Spain did not have the time nor the resources to 
send a bilateral observer mission, but was considering 
sending a group as part of the OAS observer mission.  He said 
Spain's participation would be in the form of technical 
experts rather than political officials. Maisto strongly 
encouraged Spain to send a technical team, noting that 
presence of technical experts was equally or in fact more 
important than that of political figures.  Experts who could 
detect fraud in voting machine operations, vote count tallies 
and the like were very much needed, Maisto added. 
 
4.  (C)  Maisto expressed concern about such problems as the 
integrity of the voting process, including voter 
intimidation; efforts to pack the Supreme Court and the 
integrity of the electoral tribunal; voting registry 
anomalies, including the 1.1 million new names on the 
electoral registry; efforts to change the precincts or 
polling locations of some one million people; the process of 
issuance of citizenship cards; and untested touch-screen 
voting technology.  Sandomingo agreed with Maisto on the 
importance of the presence of international observers. 
Sandomingo said that if the international observers could not 
verify the outcome, the referendum results would have no 
value.  He said that even Chaves probably understood this. 
Maisto stressed that U.S. policy on Venezuela was completely 
bipartisan, and this includes the Congress.  Maisto 
underscored that U.S. policy in Latin America in general -- 
including on Cuba and other issues -- is strongly bipartisan. 
 
Cuba 
 
5.  (C)  Maisto asked about Spanish policy in Cuba since the 
release of the 15 political prisoners, including the 
dissident Marta Beatriz.  Maisto said that while the release 
was a good gesture, it was reminiscent of the Soviet style of 
repression, followed by token release of prisoners and demand 
for some sort of reward or recognition.  On the release, 
Sandomingo noted the positive EU statement, which also 
expressed desire for further steps by Havana. 
 
6.  (C)  Sandomingo said that the GOS had some ideas of steps 
in the medium term.  The GOS would like to regain some 
semblance of normal access to Cuban officials, which their 
Ambassador in Havana currently does not have -- the fault of 
Havana, not Madrid, Sandomingo acknowledged.  One idea the 
GOS was pursuing within the EU (which several other EU 
members share) is to terminate EU policy of inviting Cuban 
dissidents to the national days of EU member states.  This 
practice has been anathema to the Cuban government, which 
objects to the symbolism of dissident presence at national 
day celebrations, and to the simultaneous presence of the 
dissidents with Cuban government officials.  Sandomingo added 
that many Cuban officials spurn contact with the dissidents 
because they fear some of the dissidents may be double agents 
for their own security service.  Sandomingo said that as part 
of this proposal, the GOS would propose a broader and more 
meaningful EU program of outreach and dialogue with the 
dissidents, which he said Havana would find easier to accept. 
 Havana might then lift the ban on contacts with Spanish and 
other diplomats, which refuses such access in large part 
because of the national day reception policy.  The EU and its 
members are paying a very high price for the policy that far 
outweighs the benefits the dissidents receive by attending 
the national day receptions.  Currently, Spain and other 
governments are prohibited from having contacts even with 
lower-level Cuban officials who might play a role in any 
future Cuban government. 
 
7.  (C)  Sandomingo also said the GOS was "considering" for 
the medium term (no decisions made) re-opening the Spanish 
Cultural Center in Havana.  Sandomingo expressed his view 
that this would not necessarily be seen as an opening to the 
Castro regime, as Havana despised the Spanish cultural center 
because it feared the center, which welcomed all segments of 
Cuban society.  Maisto asked Sandomingo to keep the USG 
informed as these ideas progressed.  He said he had never 
heard the argument that the Cuban government feared the mix 
of dissidents with government officials at the national day 
receptions, nor Sandomingo's concept of the Cuban view of the 
cultural center. 
 
Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) 
 
8.  (C)  Maisto thanked Sandomingo for Spain's active role in 
CICTE, especially in Costa Rica, and asked for Spanish 
support in the CICTE project on "Cooperation and Legal 
Assistance Development," particularly in the area of 
coordination and structural development.  Sandomingo was 
positive and said Spain likely would offer support.  He noted 
the importance of the terrorism issue for Spain and the 
importance in Latin America of prominent U.S.-Spain 
cooperation. 
 
Dominican Republic 
 
9.  (C)  Maisto noted that USTR Zoellick was signing today an 
FTA with the Dominican Republic as an important step in 
helping to stem deterioration there.  Both agreed the 
situation was of concern, particularly in the economic area. 
MANZANARES