US embassy cable - 04ACCRA1591

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ACCRA 001591 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, GH, ECOWAS 
SUBJECT: ACCRA III: AGREEMENT REACHED ON COTE D'IVOIRE; 
LIBERIA, SUDAN CONSIDERED 
 
REF: ACCRA 1581 
 
Classified By: Polchief Richard Kaminski, reason 1.5 (B/D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (SBU) Ivoirien parties reached late-night agreement July 
30 to revive the Linas-Marcoussis Accords (LMA).  The 
Agreement sets forth four main components: use of 
presidential powers to revise eligibility for the presidency; 
a new DDR timetable; delegation of powers to the prime 
minister; and resumption of the Government of National 
Reconciliation.  Much appears to be have been agreed 
privately, as the agreement itself does not give many 
specifics.  On Liberia, parties agreed to more regular 
consultations, with no communique to be issued, to avoid any 
suggestion that last summer's peace agreement had been 
altered or reinterpreted. On Sudan, President Obasanjo issued 
a statement upon his early departure from Accra, calling upon 
the Government of Sudan to end the violence, and noting plans 
to expand the proposed African force.  End summary. 
 
Agreement on Cote d'Ivoire, But Details Lacking 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
2. (C) Parties to the LMA signed an Accra III Agreement on 
Cote d'Ivoire at approximately 11:00 p.m. July 30, after 
hours of protracted shuttle negotiations at the Accra 
conference facility.  Ivoirien delegations met repeatedly 
with UNSG Kofi Annan in the final hours, and overcame the 
nearly-two-day impasse.  Most participants attributed the 
extended deliberations to the unwillingness of President 
Gbagbo to accept compromise language on Article 35, the 
section of the Ivoirien constitution governing presidential 
eligibility.  (Late July 29, for example, Gbagbo apparently 
feigned illness to avoid an after-hours meeting with Annan, 
Obasanjo and Kufuor on that topic). 
 
3. (C) Earlier misgivings among ECOWAS and UN staff, as they 
wrestled to compose the text of an Agreement that, in their 
eyes, reflected little real progress in the negotiations, 
perceptibly cleared after the final round of sequential 
deliberations among Annan and Ivoirien leaders (Ouattara, 
Bedie and Soro together, followed by Gbagbo).  "Gbagbo 
finally gave in," said Jimmy Aggrey-Orleans, special 
assistant to UN Special Representive Tevoedjre. 
 
4. (C)  The Agreement provides for the use of Gbagbo's 
constitutional powers to "implement by the end of September" 
the sections of the LMA governing presidential eligibility 
(i.e., changing the requirement that both parents of a 
candidate be Ivoirien).  Several participants told polchief 
that this referred to "emergency powers," presumably meant as 
an acceptable mechanism for altering the constitution itself 
(and overcoming Gbagbo's insistence that the Constitution 
trumps LMA -- he would use his own emergency powers to 
"adjust" the constitution).  Parties also agreed upon the 
adoption of all LMA "legal reform" proposals, now before the 
National Assembly, by the end of August. 
 
5. (U)  On DDR, parties agreed to "commit themselves to the 
commencement" of the disarmament process by October 15.  A 
new timetable forms the basis of the agreement; parties also 
agreed that DDR would cover "all paramilitary and militia" 
groups.  Several participants commented that the new DDR 
timetable had been one of the easiest proposals to deal with, 
and one of the first agreed to by the parties. 
 
6. (SBU)  On delegation of powers to the prime minister, the 
Agreement provides for the President to "undertake to 
translate the terms" of his December 15 2003 letter on 
delegation into a decree, which "shall specify the areas 
covered by the delegation."  The Agreement notes that the 
president and the prime minister "agreed on a decree" for 
that delegation, and for "adequate additional measures." 
(Comment:this language does not seem to clarify the nature or 
extent of delegated powers.  End comment). 
 
7. (U) On resumption of the government, the Agreement 
provides that the various parties "agreed on the urgency of 
resuming the work of the Government of National 
Reconciliation," and further agreed to convene a meeting of 
the council of ministers "within a week." 
 
8. (U) The Agreement also provides for a tripartite 
monitoring body, composed of ECOWAS, AU and UN personnel, 
which is to make "fortnightly" reports.  A human rights 
commission, provided for under LMA, is to be established 
"without further delay." 
 
9. (U) Note: the Agreement was faxed to AF/W July 31, and is 
 
 
now available on the net, for example at Abidjan.net. 
 
Liberia:  Meetings, But No Formal Communique 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU)  LURD (Kabineh Janneh, George Dweh, among others), 
MODEL, representatives of the former GOL (including Moses 
Blah) and Interim Chairman Gyude Bryant of the Transitional 
Government met until approximately 7:00 p.m. July 30. 
Ghanaian Foreign Minister Akufo-Addo chaired the latter 
stages of the meetings, with General Abubakar, last summer's 
peace talks mediator, also attending.  AU personnel present 
at the deliberations said no communique would be issued, so 
as to avoid any suggestion that the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement had been altered or reinterpreted.  A low-level 
"report" of some sort would be issued instead.  The parties 
focused on better communication among the signatories to the 
CPA, with weekly cabinet meetings a possibility.  Attempts 
were also made to  mediate intra-LURD disputes.  LURD 
representatives appeared to accept the concept of better 
consultation as a starting point for a more effective 
government (Janneh with better grace than Dweh, in comments 
to polchief). 
 
Sudan:  Call for Peace, Plans for Bigger African Force 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
11. (U) Upon his early departure from Accra July 30, 
President Obasanjo issued a press release (faxed to AF/W) on 
Sudan.  Noting that a meeting "on the margins" of Accra III 
occured to discuss the situation, he called upon the Sudanese 
government to end the violence. Obasanjo also noted efforts 
to insert an African Union force to provide protection of an 
observer mission, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. 
The statement says that participants "agreed that this 
African force needs to be significantly expanded."  The 
statement closes in calling upon the international community 
to assist with logistics and financial support. 
 
Comment 
------- 
12. (C)  Relief, mingled with fatigue, characterized the 
reactions of many of the UN and ECOWAS personnel present for 
the final late-night signature of the Agreement.  However, 
key details appear to be lacking in the text itself, whatever 
the private understandings may be:  how Gbagbo is to apply 
his emergency powers, how the government is to reconstitute 
itself, and exactly what powers will ultimately be delegated 
to the prime minister.  End comment. 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
YATES 
 
 
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