US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2431

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE, OAS 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S RECALL REFERENDUM: OBSTRUCTIONS AND 
OBSERVERS 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.5 (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  With little more than two weeks to go before the 
scheduled Presidential recall referendum, Venezuela's 
National Electoral Council (CNE) refused July 29 to consider 
requests to changes in voting locations which the opposition 
claims were done fraudulently.  The more than one million 
changes, according to Accion Democratica's Henry Ramos Allup, 
affected persons who the government had identified as signers 
of the petition to recall the President.  Sumate, however, 
believes the changes will not/not have a major effect. 
Separately, the OAS observer mission began operations after 
signing its agreement with the CNE.  Despite the agreement, 
mission members do not expect things to go smoothly as they 
approach the referendum.  End Summary. 
 
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Where to Vote? 
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2.  (U) CNE director Jorge Rodriguez announced July 29 that 
the CNE would not consider requests to correct changes of 
voting location submitted after midnight July 26.  Accion 
Democratica Deputy and Secretary General Henry Ramos Allup 
told reporters July 26 that the CNE had fraudulently changed 
the location where more than one million persons (1.16 
million) are to vote.  In response to the allegations, 
Rodriguez said CNE offices around the country would be open 
until midnight to address the problem. 
 
3.  (U) Ramos said the number is nearly four times the number 
of voluntary changes they would normally expect over a 
six-month period.  Ramos highlighted the case with the names 
of some municipal officials who have not moved, are in 
office, and whose voting location has been changed to distant 
points.  Media reports publicized numerous cases of 
Venezuelans who have been finding the changes as they check 
their registration via Internet and an 800 number.  (The 
divergent information from these two sources has led to 
opposition charges that the CNE is working with duplicate 
electoral registries.)  Some examples were changes within a 
city, but others were more egregious, such as a person who 
had been moved from one end of the country to another (Zulia 
to Amazonas). 
 
4.  (C) CNE President Francisco Carrasquero called the 
changes routine, the result of citizens' changes of address. 
He cited himself as an example, noting that he had always 
voted in Zulia and now the electoral registry shows him 
voting in Caracas.  Aragua State Governor Didalco Bolivar 
told Charge July 27 that the government's switch some one 
million voters' voting place will be seen for what it is (an 
attempt to reduce opposition votes). 
 
5.  (C) Opposition representatives told reporters they would 
bring the matter to the attention of the international 
observers.  Edgardo Rheis, the number two under Brazilian 
Ambassador to the OAS Valter Pecly in the observers mission, 
told A/DCM that he knew of the allegations, but the 
opposition had not approached the OAS yet.  He noted that the 
electoral registry had not been finalized and that such 
changes are not unusual.  He said the number of changes 
alleged, however, and the distances cited as examples smacked 
of something wrong. 
 
6.  (C) Sumate's Luis Enrique Palacios said the NGO is 
conducting a study to see how many people have been moved 
against their will.  Palacios said that the Governance Accord 
event for August 1 is designed to inform people about the 
Accord, but more importantly to get people to figure out 
where they are registered to vote.  Sumate also plans a poll 
for July 31-August 1, where volunteers will visit over 1,000 
people around the country to ask them about the change of 
voting centers.  The Sumate hypothesis is that the change in 
voting locations will not have a major effect on the 
referendum. 
 
 
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Why the Changes? 
---------------- 
 
7.  Fernando Bazua, National Democratic Institute consultant 
working with the Coordinadora, told A/DCM July 27 that 
Coordinadora leaders believe the changes are part of 
President Chavez's strategy to bring down the number of 
guaranteed yes votes for the recall.  (Ramos alleged that the 
people who had been changed had been identified as signers of 
the petition calling for a presidential recall referendum.) 
Bazua noted that, although the number of the fraudulent 
changes may not total the AD number, even half the alleged 
1.1 million would be significant.  He also  pointed out that 
while the opposition appears to have discovered the 
phenomenon early, the possibility of confusion on August 15 
will favor Chavez.  Former Supreme Electoral Council 
President also did not discount that Chavez supporters had 
resorted to the maneuver.  He told A/DCM July 29 that Accion 
Democratica itself had manipulated the electoral registry to 
redistribute its known supporters during gubernatorial 
elections, albeit unsuccessfully. 
8.  (C) Bazua acknowledged that, as the poll numbers showed, 
Chavez had done well in boosting his support, and the voter 
location changes would help bring the opposition numbers 
down.  That, however, would not be enough, he said, and 
asserted that another Chavez fraud effort involves the growth 
of the electoral registry.  Bazua asserted that contrary to 
what some Chavez opponents espouse, all the new voters cannot 
be Chavez supporters.  The trick, he said, is that a portion 
of the new voters are only names.  Using different identity 
cards issued by the government, one person could assume 
various identities and vote multiple times, Bazua asserted. 
He said that is why the CNE is insisting on using the untried 
fingerprint comparison machines to spot possible multiple 
voting instead of indelible ink. 
 
9.  (C) Aurelio Concheso, President of the libertarian think 
tank Center for the Dissemination of Economic Information 
(CEDICE), told PolOff July 29 that the President's polling 
people had told Chavez July 22 that he would lose the August 
15 referendum, probably by 10 percentage points.  According 
to Concheso, Chavez responded by criticizing Vice president 
Jose Vicente Rangel, who had recently mounted a campaign to 
delay and obstruct the referendum (i.e. CNE announcement of 
voting center changes, international observer obstruction). 
 
10.  (C) Gov. Bolivar told Charge July 27 that although he is 
confident Chavez can win, it's not in the bag.  Bolivar said 
he looks not only at polls that measure intent to vote in the 
referendum, but also polls that look at the regional 
elections.  He says the latter has bad news for Chavez: 
Voters in a number of Chavista states -- primarily those led 
by the most radical Chavistas -- show flagging support.  This 
includes Tachira, Merida, Portuguesa, Cojedes, as well as 
opposition states of Zulia, Miranda, Carabobo, and 
Anzoategui.  Chavez has a clear message, according to 
Bolivar, but it is not enough.  The various "misiones" are 
important, but at most they reach 1.2 million out of some 13 
million voters.  And, some 385,000 of these persons actually 
signed the referendum, and only 50,000 recanted in the 
reparos, which means that voters will take the money, but not 
necessarily give their allegiance.  Chavez has a problem 
reaching younger voters, and his choice of campaign image -- 
the battle of Santa Ines -- will not convince younger voters. 
 
 
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OBSERVERS 
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11.  (C) OAS observer mission leader Rheis told A/DCM July 28 
that they do not expect things to go smoothly with the 
National Electoral Council (CNE).  Rheis said the agreement 
the OAS signed with the CNE provides the conditions they need 
to do their job.  The CNE, he said, will of course try to 
rein the international observers, and the observers will push 
the envelope to get their work done.  Rheis said they would 
abide by certain CNE conditions, such as the limitation on 
 
 
the number of observers (50-51), providing the CNE biographic 
data, having one person participate in CNE director Oscar 
Battaglini's program for observers. 
 
12.  (C) They will not, however, abide by Battaglini's date 
of August 9 to begin their work.  Rheis said personnel will 
come in before that, and if questioned, the mission would 
refer to them as "advance workers" rather than observers. 
(Rheis said President Chavez had told him and Pecly the week 
before that he understood their need to have people in 
earlier.)  Rheis also noted that the agreement says the OAS 
accepts that the CNE reserves the right to make public the 
content of the Mission's reports and (the OAS) will abstain 
from making public its final report.  Rheis said there is no 
problem with that since there is no "Final Report" per se, 
only a report to the Secretary General, and they will issue 
statements not reports. 
 
13.  (C) As for the Mission's composition, Rheis said it 
would include two people each from Japan, U.K. and Spain plus 
three from Canada.  Unlike the delegation for the May appeals 
process, the OAS will not include government officials on 
this occasion.  Asked whether this applied to officials from 
the legislative as well as the executive branch Rheis said 
unfortunately, yes. 
 
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COMMENT 
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14.  (C)  President Chavez and his supporters have been 
confident that they have the winning numbers.  They are not, 
however, leaving things to chance Chavez has been down the 
road where they have underestimated opposition strength twice 
this year, and they appear to be unwilling to leave anything 
to chance.  The CNE's refusal to address the concerns about 
the changes in voter locations, regardless that the real 
dimensions of the issue may are not clear, is a set-back for 
the opposition, but can serve as one more negative they can 
attribute to the President.   The CNE's attitude toward the 
international observers also gives us pause.  The OAS 
attitude, however, appears to be the right approach.  There 
is fortunately still a reluctance among Chavez and his 
supporters to shun international opinion completely, which 
gives the OAS and Carter Center some additional room to 
maneuver. 
McFarland 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02431 - CONFIDENTIAL