US embassy cable - 04HARARE1313

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ZI 
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE AND THE SADC ELECTION AGENDA 
 
REF: (A) PRETORIA 3339 (B) HARARE 1250 (C) HARARE 
 
     1157 (D) HARARE 1067 (E) HARARE 751 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: A proliferation of meetings relating to 
election standards in the run-up to next month's scheduled 
SADC summit in part reflects Zimbabwean and regional efforts 
to lower domestic and international tensions associated with 
Zimbabwe's political crisis.  Central to the effort are draft 
"SADC Principles and Guidlines Governing Democratic 
Elections", which draw from a host of other sources.  The 
latest draft (faxed to AF/S) is very general in terms of 
affirmative responsibilities imposed on member governments 
and lacks specific prescriptions for correcting gross 
imbalances in Zimbabwe's electoral playing field.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) According to press reports, SADC foreign and defense 
ministers approved principles for free and fair elections at 
a two-day meeting that ended July 23 in Sun City, South 
Africa.  The document reportedly would be forwarded to heads 
of state for adoption at the SADC summit scheduled to be held 
next month in Mauritius. 
 
3.  (U) The Sun City gathering followed on the heels of the 
sixth general meeting of the SADC Election Commission Forum 
(ECF) in Victoria Falls earlier that week.  In an address to 
the conference given front page coverage by the official 
media, President Mugabe emphasized that democracy "could not 
be transplanted from one country to another because each had 
its own distinct historical, cultural and socio-economic 
conditions."  He warned against being misled by Western 
countries and urged SADC members not to accept foreign funds 
for election administration.  He reportedly maintained that 
elections alone were not sufficient in developing democracy 
because although they could contribute to conflict 
resolution, they could also exacerbate conflict.  "Does 
democracy exist when powerful nations seek to influence 
political events in our countries by supporting opposition 
parties or by deliberately sowing seeds of discontent?  Does 
unconstitutional regime change constitute a democratic 
process?", he asked the conference.  Press reports indicate 
that the meeting addressed the possible establishment of a 
permanent ECF secretariat to replace the Electoral Institute 
of Southern Africa (EISA), a donor-funded body that currently 
serves as an interim secretariat. 
 
4.  (U) On August 2-3 in Victoria Falls, EISA and the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) will sponsor a 
conference "Regional Initiatives for Electoral Reform in 
SADC: Strengthening Democratic Transformation Through 
Identified Benchmarks in the Region."  The event is scheduled 
to be opened by Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs Patrick Chinamasa, with the keynote addresses to be 
delivered by Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa and 
Speaker of the Lesotho National Assembly Nthloi Motsamai. 
The conference program is slated to feature sessions on 
electoral processes in the SADC region, existing benchmarks 
for elections in the region, best practices, and electoral 
reforms.  Polchief and USAID Mission Director plan to attend 
the EISA/ZESN event. 
 
5.  (SBU) We have not seen a copy of the instrument approved 
by ministers in Sun City but have obtained a copy of the "2nd 
zero draft 9 June 2004" that we understand served as the 
departure point for discussions in Sun City.  We are unaware 
of significant changes made to the document or of the focal 
points of debate there.  The draft is notable for the brevity 
of obligations placed on member states in the conduct of 
elections.  In Section Two, members pledge to adhere to seven 
"principles": full participation of the citizens in the 
political process; freedom of association; political 
tolerance; equal opportunity for all political parties to 
access the state media; equal opportunity to exercise the 
right to vote and be voted for; independence of the judiciary 
and impartiality of the electoral institutions; and voter 
education.  Section 5.4 commits member states to "safeguard 
the human and civil liberties of all citizens including the 
freedom of movement, assembly, association, expression, and 
campaigning."  The instrument elaborates on obligations and 
treatment of election monitors and observers but on its face 
only contemplates monitoring/observation by SADC.  Indeed, 
the document devotes more space to constraints governing 
monitoring/observation of elections than it does to member 
state obligations in the conduct of elections.  The 
instrument stands in stark contrast to the SADC-Parliamentary 
Forum's "Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC 
Region", a much lengthier document that contained much more 
detailed prescriptions on how member states were to achieve 
free and fair elections.  Signed on behalf of Zimbabwe by 
Speaker Mnangagwa, the SADC-PF norms and standards have since 
been vehemently rejected by the GOZ as an instrument of 
neo-colonialists and imperialist puppets (ref E). 
 
6.  (C) According to ZESN Chairperson Reginald Matchaba-Hove, 
the new SADC principles were drawn from the SADC-PF document, 
the Principles of Election Management, Monitoring, and 
Observation (PEMMO) instrument adopted by SADC election 
commissions last November, and  related AU principles.  He 
indicated that South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania had been 
most engaged in the drafting of the new instrument. 
 
7.  (C) Matchaba-Hove confirmed that the GOZ had been closely 
engaged in the SADC deliberative process.  His own 
communications with Chinamasa had suggested that the GOZ 
wanted to stake out a fairly maximalist position on domestic 
electoral reforms in "testing the waters" but intended to 
have them align at least nominally with SADC principles.  He 
said that Mugabe clearly was opposed to reforms, but had been 
pushed effectively by SADC counterparts and ZANU-PF 
"mavericks", such as Mnangagwa, Party Secretary for 
Information Nathan Shamuyarira, and Politburo member Dumiso 
Dabengwa.  (Note: These three "mavericks" are all old guard, 
but are motivated in part by a desire to reduce Zimbabwe's 
isolation and to counter the influence of younger hard-liners 
(i.e. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo) who currently share 
Mugabe's confidence and more repressive inclinations.  End 
note.) 
 
8.  (C) According to Matchaba-Hove, both the SADC standards 
and Zimbabwe's reforms were still being worked out.  SADC's 
Section Two principles could be expanded further before the 
Mauritius Summit.  Nonetheless, it was critical that the 
benchmarks not be set high enough to scare off the GOZ or 
other more reticent members.  Better to have a generally 
framed document that could be fleshed out and strengthened 
over time. 
 
9.  (C) As to the GOZ's proposed electoral reforms, 
Matchaba-Hove said they represented meaningful improvements, 
althought they did not yet address fundamental issues such as 
media access, unobstructed campaigning, and political 
violence.  Of concern even on their own limited terms, the 
electoral reforms did not encompass delimitation, and did not 
include mechanisms to assure the true independence of the 
election commission.  He thought these issues were 
negotiable.  He urged the USG to be encouraging in its public 
assessments of the SADC principles and proposed GOZ electoral 
reforms, while recognizing the need to address the 
fundamental election environment issues. 
 
10.  (C) Matchaba-Hove indicated that the scope of outside 
observers was also open for discussion; Chinamasa had told 
him it would be decided by the independent election 
commission.  (Note: This coincides with what Mnangagwa told 
us and contradicts suggestions by Mugabe and Politburo member 
Didymus Mutasa that the election would be closed to Western 
eyes (ref C).  End note.)  Matchaba-Hove noted that the 
likelihood that the proposed reforms would require a 
constitutional amendment offered the opposition MDC 
potentially significant leverage, which it could exploit to 
wrest concessions from the ruling party.  (Note: MDC sources 
have advised that Chinamasa had approached MDC 
Secretary-General to enlist support for 
 
SIPDIS 
passage/implementation of electoral reforms.  End note.) 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT: The GOZ and its fellow SADC members share 
an interest in regularizing Zimbabwe's relations with the 
outside world.  The prospective conduct of Zimbabwe's 
parliamentary election in accordance with SADC standards for 
now is a central means to this end -- in large part through 
an exercise in image management.  From the perspective of the 
GOZ and its sympathizers in the region, the establishment of 
relatively easy benchmarks is crucial: first, to assure GOZ 
accession, and next, to offer prospects of an an election 
that can be judged somewhat positively, if not completely. 
Our assessment continues to be that the ruling party will not 
concede anything that will meaningfully reduce its control 
over the March election results, notwithstanding its interest 
in burnishing its image abroad and in offering SADC cover to 
recognize the election results.  We recognize some potential 
utility in getting the GOZ to accede to a set of meaningful 
standards but foresee risk in a scenario that offers the 
region cover to approve what is expected to be a sham 
election regardless of conformity to some SADC standards.  We 
would welcome reports from other SADC capitals on host 
governments' objectives, expectations, and engagement on the 
SADC election standards and Zimbabwe. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): The GOZ's electoral reform 
strategy is related to the NGO Bill currently under 
discussion (ref B).  Some observers characterize the NGO Bill 
as the means by which the GOZ would negate any balancing 
effect putatively afforded by electoral reforms.  In fact, 
the NGO Bill conforms to the GOZ's well-documented 
comprehensive effort to hamstring or eliminate all sources of 
dissent in the country; the reforms may serve as no more than 
window dressing or distraction.   The NGO and diplomatic 
communities here are energized and coordinating significantly 
on both issues.  We understand that they will be engaging 
their counterparts in other SADC countries.  The NGO Bill has 
not been officially released and circulated, so official 
comment on it would be premature.  However, we will be 
working with NGOs, diplomats and the local UNDP office to 
convey concern about the apparent direction of events and to 
seek to nip the bill's progress in the bud. 
WEISENFELD