US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS3226

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL, TU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING SIGNALS FROM COMMISSION AND DUTCH 
PRESIDENCY ON TURKEY 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 1288 
 
     B. PARIS 5495 
     C. USEU BRUSSELS 3225 
     D. ANKARA 4133 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reason 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) In meetings on July 26-27 in Brussels with Dutch 
Presidency, Commission and Council officials, EUR DAS Laura 
Kennedy heard guardedly optimistic assessments from all that 
the EU, at its summit this December, would reach a positive 
decision on opening EU accession negotiations with Turkey 
next year.  All officials, including acting Director General 
for Enlargement Barbaso, excluded the possibility that the 
Commission's October report to the EU leaders would recommend 
against opening negotiations with Turkey.   But they also 
indicated that an unequivocal "Yes" was also unlikely.  Much 
discussion from now to October between Commission staff, 
Commissioners, and the Dutch Presidency will be on how much 
contextual language the Commission should include about areas 
where Turkey should continue to progress.  All interlocutors 
added that while Turkey should be encouraged about a likely 
good result, Ankara must not be complacent or presumptuous 
about its status.  Nonetheless, the Dutch Presidency said its 
preference for the December decision would be a clear 
decision that sets a date, with no need for any further 
decisions by the EU prior to the commencement of 
negotiations.  If they are able to secure this outcome, any 
language on "conditionality" would be unimportant, and should 
not spark a negative reaction from the Turks.  Every EU 
official cited the recent visit of PM Erdogan to Paris, and 
French President Chirac's positive comments about Turkey's 
candidacy, as making a "yes" in December much more likely. 
At the same time, they were generally dismissive of the 
chance that the government of Cyprus would veto the decision; 
"they wouldn't dare," said one official.  (COMMENT:  Given 
Nicosia's recent behavior in the Council - see REF C - we 
fear the EU may be underestimating this risk.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) This is a joint USEU/Embassy The Hague report.  DAS 
Kennedy's discussions on Cyprus are covered Ref C. 
 
3. (U) On July 26 and 27, DAS Kennedy met with a team of 
Dutch Presidency officials (Pieter de Gooijer, MFA Director 
for European Integration; Hannie Pollmann-Zaal, Director for 
Western and Central Europe; and Jurriaan Kraak, Enlargement 
Counselor of the Dutch PermRep in Brussels) as well as, in 
separate sessions, with Fabrizio Barbaso, the Commission's 
acting Director General for Enlargement; Matthias Ruete, DG 
Enlargement's Director for Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria; and 
Christoph Heusgen, Director of the Council's Policy Planning 
Unit.  She also met with Turkish Ambassador to the EU Mustafa 
Oguz Demiralp. 
 
COMMISSION REPORT DUE ON OCTOBER 6 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Barbaso and Ruete said that the European Commission 
(EC) report on Turkey, scheduled for approval by the college 
of all 30 Commissioners on October 6, would have three parts. 
 The first part, which Barbaso said the EC had already begun 
drafting, would be an assessment of Turkey's progress in 
meeting the EU's Copenhagen Criteria (political, economic and 
administrative) for EU membership.  Most important will be on 
the political criteria, including democratic practice, rule 
of law and human rights, which must be adequately fulfilled 
before accession negotiations could begin.  The focus will be 
on Turkish progress since the EU Summit of December 2002, 
when the EU set this December as a deadline for a decision on 
Turkey's candidacy. 
 
5. (C) Barbaso said that in regulatory and legislative terms 
Turkey has achieved an enormous amount in the last two years. 
 A couple of necessary pieces of legislation are outstanding 
such as the revised penal code and the foundations law, but 
the EC was confident that Ankara would deliver on its 
promises to get these passed.  More difficult for the EC to 
assess is the implementation of these reforms.  Barbaso 
observed that the Member States in the EU Council clearly 
knew in December 2002 that two years was not enough time to 
allow for absolute implementation everywhere on everything. 
But Ruete commented that implementation was the "real worry." 
 The key issue will be if progress appears "sustained enough" 
to be confident that full implementation will eventually be 
achieved. 
 
WHAT TURKEY NEEDS TO DO 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C) Ruete listed several key areas being watched and where 
Turkey should continue progress.  First was the continued 
harassment "by the deep state" of defenders of human rights, 
including prosecutors bringing cases against activists. 
Another was the delay in returning internally displaced 
persons and refugees to their homes, especially in the 
southeast.  On this, he said, Turkey could improve 
cooperation with the UN.  Ruete also highlighted the issue of 
religious freedom and the foundations law, where the 
Christian groups had been particularly vocal.  He described 
this as an "exaggerated" issue that was being treated 
disproportionately, noting that the draft report has more 
pages on this issue effecting some 60,000 people than it does 
on the Kurdish issue.  But nevertheless, religious freedom 
was a politically powerful issue for EU politicians and 
publics.  Minority rights, especially Kurdish language and 
education rights, were another big issue for implementation. 
The changes to date are "great successes", but progress is 
still "in its infancy", he said.  Ruete added we should not 
forget steps such as revision of the Penal Code, appointment 
of a civilian as head of the national security council, and 
resolution of the Leyla Zana case -- even if, for now, this 
appear well in hand. 
 
7. (C) Ruete and Barbaso noted that the EC was collecting 
information on these issues constantly, drawing on reports 
from Commission and Member State officials on the ground, 
reports and meetings with NGOs, and other sources.  Ruete 
said it was ironic that one of the most critical and negative 
assessments of Turkey in the last 12 months was the State 
Department's annual human rights report, which he said read 
as a simple litany of anecdotes, without any real analysis. 
He understood DAS Kennedy's point that certain rigidities in 
the required reporting format could make the report appear 
more critical than it was, but said it was an "unhelpful 
distraction."  He was relieved to hear that the next report 
was not due until well after the EU's December decision. 
 
8. (C) Both Barbaso and Ruete commented on the issue of 
Turkey's relations with Cyprus.  Overall, the lack of a 
settlement on the island should have no connection to the 
assessment of Turkey's readiness for accession negotiations, 
and in any case, no one in the EU was blaming the Turks for 
the collapse of the process.  One potential problem, however, 
is Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and 
particularly the complications that has created in expanding 
Turkey's customs union (the Ankara Agreement) to cover the 
enlarged EU (REF A).  Ruete said Ankara just needs to accept 
it has to be willing to negotiate "with all 25."  DAS Kennedy 
said her impression after meetings in Ankara was that the GoT 
understood the issue and was committed to reaching some 
accommodation on the issue (see Ref D for GOT comments on 
this and ohter aspects of Turkey's EU bid).  All EU officials 
(Commission, Council and Dutch) also commented that a 
unilateral and symbolic gesture by Turkey on troop 
withdrawals from the island would also be very well-received. 
 But they all nodded their heads vigorously in response to 
DAS Kennedy's observation that Turkey would find this nearly 
impossible to do as long as the EU's own measures to end the 
isolation of the north of the island are stalled (Ref C). 
 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE EU 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) The second part of the EC's October report will be an 
Impact Assessment of Turkish accession on the EU.  Ruete said 
that a similar report had been done by the EC in 1997 on the 
accession of the central and east European members.  So there 
is nothing new in this process, he said, and the Commission 
needed to describe to Member States what the sectoral impacts 
of adding the Turkish state and economy to the EU could be in 
areas such as labor markets, justice and home affairs, 
agriculture, as well as on the EU budget. 
 
WHAT WILL THE COMMISSION RECOMMEND? 
----------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The most important, and most closely negotiated, part 
of the October report will be the Commission's recommendation 
on whether the Council should decide to open negotiations 
with Turkey.  Ruete said he had not even begun to try 
drafting this (likely brief) section, until he had a chance 
to discuss with his "political masters," especially 
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen.  Ruete anticipated these 
discussions would only begin at the end of August.  As he is 
certain these discussions would leak, he did not want them to 
begin any earlier than necessary. 
 
11. (C) None of our interlocutors, including Barbaso and 
Ruete, expect the Commission's recommendation would be a flat 
"No" or "we'll look again next year."  Either, the Council's 
Heusgen said, would be a "disaster."  At the same time, none 
thought it very likely that the recommendation could be a 
simple "Yes."  Ruete and Barbaso stressed that the key would 
be what language came with the "yes."  Would it be "Yes, but 
only after Turkey has done X, Y and Z;" or would it be "Yes, 
assuming Turkey continues to make progress on issues 
including X, Y, and Z."  Ruete observed that there were an 
infinite variety of formulas that could be devised.  (NOTE: 
In a separate meeting, Turkish Amb. Demiralp argued that the 
"yes, assuming..." version would be most consistent with the 
Commission's most recent precedent on Croatia, where the 
Commission listed six areas within the political criteria 
requiring "additional efforts", but still recommended that 
negotiations "should be opened."  END NOTE.) 
12.  (C) Ruete flagged that devising language that would be 
approved by the full Commission was no simple task, and all 
30 Commissioners will have a vote at the October meeting.  He 
noted that on previous occasions some Commissioners have 
tried to influence the wording of the Commission's 
recommendations for other candidates, and this would likely 
be true again.  Ruete said Verheugen would begin the process 
by testing his preferred version with key Commissioners, 
including President Prodi and President-designate Barroso. 
To avoid a potentially long and ugly debate, Ruete said the 
final draft of the report and recommendation would only be 
presented to the full Commission a couple of days before the 
October 6 vote.  (NOTE: De Gooijer said the Dutch Presidency 
was already in close contact with the Commission, to try and 
make sure there were "no vetoes, no surprises."  END NOTE.) 
 
13. (C) Both de Gooijer and Heusgen believed, and Ruete 
implied, that  Verheugen leans strongly in favor of "Yes, 
assuming...".  But Ruete was concerned that a clear positive 
recommendation could be torpedoed in the full Commission, 
especially if some negative external event such as a terror 
attack or heavy-handed police action soured the mood -- and 
he warned that some anti-EU forces in Turkey might try to 
stage such an event. 
 
MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOW WILL THE COUNCIL RESPOND? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
14. (C) Heusgen said he thought Turkey "is a done deal" with 
the only question being what date would be set for opening 
negotiations, since the Council might decide to follow the 
Croatia example and build in a several month period for 
"screening legislation."  De Gooijer, by contrast, opened his 
discussion by saying "it is not as if it is a done deal."  He 
said the Presidency would give no indications of how the 
Council will handle the issue until after the October report 
is out, other than to say that no additional criteria could 
be added to the basic Copenhagen criteria.  De Gooijer felt 
all Member States expected the Commission to be positive, but 
not definitive, with language referring to the need for 
further implementation.  De Gooijer speculated this could 
allow for a Council decision at the EU Summit on December 17 
that would set out a time frame during which these additional 
efforts could continue in preparation for beginning 
negotiations.  But de Gooijer was quite clear that the Dutch 
did not want to establish a process that would require any 
further action by the Council before negotiations began, but 
rather a decision that the negotiations should start after an 
appropriate time.  De Gooijer added that he was sure there 
would "be lots of words around this simple conclusion" but 
that the Dutch Presidency "firmly intended" to get a real 
decision on Turkey.  (NOTE: Amb. Demiralp, for his part, 
argued negotiations should open by March 2005 if they were to 
be "without delay" as promised in Copenhagen. END NOTE.) 
 
15. (C) This approach would be controversial with some Member 
States, de Gooijer predicted.  But it was the Presidency's 
responsibility to devise a formula that could bridge the 
gaps.  He said a key element of this would be for the 
December summit decision to also include some language to 
"set the context for the negotiations."  "Turkey is not 
Latvia," he said, and Turkey's eventual membership would 
compel revision of many core EU policies and programs, such 
as agricultural supports.  This will be clearer after the 
Commission's impact assessment, but de Gooijer said it could 
be important for the Dutch to lay out some ideas on these 
issues in order to get all Member States on board with a 
decision to open negotiations.  What it could not involve, 
however, was some sort of special or unique status for Turkey 
within the EU.  The final outcome would have to be Turkey as 
a "Member State like all the others." 
 
16. (C) Asked about which Member States might balk on a 
positive decision on Turkey, all of the EU officials noted 
that President Chirac's positive comment (REF B) after PM 
Erdogan's recent visit to Paris was a very positive and 
important development.  Ruete said Austria was still very 
skeptical and faced domestic problems on the issue, and added 
that Denmark still appeared "uncertain."  He also worried 
about the possibility of "sleeper" opposition among some of 
the new Member States such as Hungary. 
 
17. (C) And then there is Cyprus.  Barbaso and Ruete could 
not predict how Papadopoulos might behave.  Heusgen argued 
Nicosia "wouldn't dare" block consensus on such an important 
issue, and would buckle under pressure from Blair, Chirac and 
Schroeder.  Similarly, de Gooijer said that, while the GoC 
has vital interests with Turkey, so does the EU.  Nicosia 
could not be allowed to dictate EU policy toward Turkey on 
its own.  Hannie Pollmann noted that GoC officials have told 
her they would see more opportunities for leverage during 
negotiations than by blocking the opening of negotiations. 
De Gooijer also underlined the role of Greece, who the Dutch 
believe will continue to strongly favor opening negotiations 
as a way of improving vital bilateral relations with Turkey. 
He said the Dutch were very sensitive that they needed to 
"make it possible for Athens to play a constructive role in 
December," implying this could lead to a softer approach in 
the ongoing debates (REF C) about taking measures to help the 
Turkish Cypriots. 
 
HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP 
--------------------- 
 
18. (C) All of the EU officials stressed that U.S. advocacy 
should be behind the scenes and not in public, to avoid any 
risk of backlash.  De Gooijer, Barbaso and Ruete all 
commented that the U.S. could help reinforce the message to 
Ankara not to be complacent, and to continue with the reform 
process.  They all specifically mentioned encouraging Turkey 
to help find a solution to the Customs Union issue over 
Cyprus.  Ruete added that it could also be helpful for the 
U.S. to bolster some of the Member States, particularly the 
new Members from central and eastern Europe, on the value of 
a positive decision on Turkey, a view UK officials also 
expressed to Kennedy in London (septel). 
 
SAMMIS