US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1262

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E.MILLARD 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  NORWEGIAN DEPUTY FM DESCRIBES LONG UPHILL ROAD 
AHEAD FOR GSL-LTTE TALKS 
 
REF:   COLOMBO 1243 AND PREVIOUS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASONS 1.5 
B, D. 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Helgesen found President Kumaratunga 
flexible on peace talks agenda issue, but Karuna situation 
is preventing progress on getting back to talks. LTTE is 
seeking a military solution to the Karuna issue. Helgesen 
sees task as safeguarding the Cease Fire Agreement while 
Karuna issue plays out. Norwegian involvement seems likely 
to slow considerably until the Fall. Helgesen was blunt in 
briefing local press, making clear he thinks peace process 
is in danger. Helgesen was contemplating whether the Co- 
Chairs might take some action at this point. A carefully 
crafted--and blunt--Co-Chairs statement might be useful. 
END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (U) Ambassador attended lunch briefing given by 
Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen July 28 
at the conclusion of his three-day trip to Sri Lanka. 
While on the island, Helgesen met with LTTE Political 
Chief Tamilchelvan, President Kumaratunga, Prime Minister 
Rajapakse and other assorted players. 
 
3.  (C) Following her meeting with Helgesen on July 26, 
the President issued a statement which said, inter alia, 
that "the President indicated to Mr. Helgesen that her 
Government is willing and keen to commence negotiations on 
an interim authority within the framework of a united 
State and to reach a durable solution to the conflict. The 
Government hopes that the LTTE will agree to resume talks 
on this basis." Some media have been interpreting this 
statement as a concession by the President to begin talks 
on the basis demanded by the LTTE that talks deal only 
with an interim administration for the North and East. 
Helgesen said that the President is, in fact, being 
flexible on the agenda issue. However, the two sides are 
still not close to sitting down, and the main reason is 
Karuna and the situation in the East. The LTTE is 
convinced there is an Army link to Karuna and has given up 
on the government clearing up the situation. Therefore, 
the LTTE is dealing with the situation in its own way-- 
through military means. Helgesen said that although he has 
no personal proof that the Army has been aiding Karuna, it 
appears to him that a proxy war is now being waged in the 
East. It is a low intensity conflict, but there is a 
potential for escalation. Whether or not the Army is 
aiding Karuna, the GSL has an obligation under the Cease 
Fire Agreement to rein in paramilitary groups. It is not 
doing so. 
 
4. (C) The scenario, Helgesen said, is for weeks or even 
months of killings as Karuna and the LTTE fight it out. 
Would this escalate and lead to outright war? Helgesen 
said he thought not but it was possible. He noted a 
"stunning complacency" in the South about the Cease Fire 
Agreement. The program for the coming months would be 
"stalemate management" on the political front, while 
working hard to reinforce the Cease Fire Agreement. He 
noted that the Cease Fire was actually quite stable in all 
areas except the East. He would stay in touch with both 
sides and try to "talk them to their senses." 
 
5.  (C) Helgesen said he told the LTTE that the President 
was being flexible. She has undertaken a number of 
confidence building measures, including apologizing to the 
Tamil people for the riots of 1983, canceling provocative 
anti-LTTE broadcasts on state-run radio, returning land 
from the High Security Zones to Tamil farmers, etc. He 
told Tamilchelvam that, by contrast, the LTTE was showing 
its negative side by its actions, and that the 
international community was watching. He mentioned the 
recent killings of eight Karuna followers in Colombo, and 
Tamilchelvam repeated the LTTE line that this was done by 
Karuna supporters who wanted to re-defect. 
 
6. (C) Helgesen said that right now it is difficult to see 
how the donors can bring the parties to the table. He said 
that at his meeting Tamilchelvam had reiterated the LTTE's 
commitment to the peace process and to the Oslo 
declaration and federalism.  The LTTE was now preparing to 
hold their postponed meeting in Switzerland with 
legal/constitutional experts from the Tamil diaspora. 
Ambassador asked if Helgesen thought there was any 
specific step for the Co-Chairs at this time.  Helgesen 
said he needed to contemplate on that, and that perhaps an 
even stronger version of the Brussels statement would be 
useful. Admitting that donor pressure can be assymetrical 
in that it puts more pressure on the Government than on 
the LTTE, he said that it could still be useful in 
pressuring the other members of the government, 
specifically the JVP. 
 
7.  (C) Helgesen was leaving Colombo on July 29 morning 
along with Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar. They would 
travel to London to meet the LTTE's Balasingham. 
Brattskar would then be on vacation for a month.  Helgesen 
had no specific plan on when he or Eric Solheim might 
return. 
 
8.  (C) Before departing Colombo, Helgesen gave a rare 
press conference. He was blunt in his analysis of the 
situation, leading to equally blunt headlines in the July 
29 English-language press.  The Daily Mirror headlined: 
"Oslo warns: frozen war starting to melt" and the Island 
ran it as "Norway admits failure on reviving peace talks." 
Helgesen made many of the same points he made to donors, 
and captured his feelings in the metaphor that "The Cease 
Fire Agreement is not a peace agreement. It only means the 
war has been frozen. Today, a frozen war is melting at the 
edges. It is not a good situation."  He also noted that he 
was "disturbed about the incredible complacency," adding 
that people were in favor of peace but not in favor of the 
peace process. Helgesen concluded that he would consult 
the international community on the next step to be taken 
given the stalemate and the security situation. 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: Helgesen was about as gloomy as we have 
ever seen him, but certainly did not act as if the 
situation was hopeless.  His position now seems to be 
that, in the absence of some positive action by the 
government, the Tamils will have to sort out the Karuna 
issue themselves--which means a period of internecine 
warfare. After that he could get back to work on bringing 
the two sides to the table, if the inter-Tamil violence 
does not escalate into greater violence. With Ambassador 
Brattskar absent for all of August, we think Norwegian 
efforts will diminish considerably for a time. 
 
10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Helgesen's analysis seems 
generally on track to us. The Karuna situation, which was 
totally unexpected, presented the government with a 
variety of unpleasant options. Whether by design or 
chance, the government has now drifted into a position 
where it has gained almost nothing. If it is supporting 
Karuna--which is probably the case--it is annoying the 
LTTE without gaining any lasting advantage, and at the 
same time has seriously soured the atmosphere for renewed 
talks. Options for improving this situation are limited. 
The Co-Chairs could certainly consider issuing a statement 
warning once again, as they did in Brussels, that the 
attention span of the international community is limited. 
Such a statement would need to be carefully calibrated. It 
would have to tell the LTTE that its behavior in the 
Karuna affair is unacceptable. It would have to tell the 
Government that it has a positive responsibility to see 
that the Karuna affair does not jeopardize the peace 
process, i.e., that it must take some action and not just 
allow the situation to drift.  It should also stress that 
the Government must ensure that all its members speak with 
one voice. 
 
LUNSTEAD