US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA1655

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USSOUTHCOM FOR GEN HILL 
STATE FOR PM, INR, AND INL/LP 
STATE FOR WHA AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014 
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MCAP, SNAR, PREL, KCRM, HO 
SUBJECT: FURTHERING REGIONAL INTEGRATION; GENERAL HILL 
DISCUSSES SOUTHCOM INITIATIVES AND OTHER ISSUES WITH GOH 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 1518 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry L. Palmer; 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (U) Summary:  On July 15, General Hill, USSOUTHCOM 
Commander, met with Honduran Minister of Defense, Federico 
Breve, and separately, with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS), General Jose Isaias Barahona to discuss Central 
American integration, narcotrafficking, U.S. military 
assistance, and other issues of importance.  General Hill 
also paid a courtesy call on President Ricardo Maduro on July 
14.  The Government of Honduras (GOH) remains receptive to 
SOUTHCOM initiatives, although limited resources and 
political concerns remain stumbling-blocks as Honduras 
continues to focus its armed forces on addressing pressing 
regional concerns.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Regional Integration and Possible "Plan Centro America" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
2. (C) MOD Breve told General Hill he was generally pleased 
with the direction and pace of regional integration and the 
path the Conferencia De Fuerzas Armadas (CFAC) was taking. 
He noted that Central American presidents were engaged on 
regional military issues, and that CFAC was focusing its 
efforts on trans-national threats such as combating 
terrorism, narcotrafficking, and organized crime in general. 
Breve also indicated CFAC was in the initial process of 
considering a comprehensive regional plan to further address 
these problems, but noted that budgetary constraints were a 
real problem, suggesting Honduras alone needed some USD 40-50 
million to "guarantee" better results.  Breve did express 
some consternation that El Salvador and Guatemala, despite an 
agreement in 2002 to do so, had yet to submit comprehensive 
arms inventories to the Secretaria de Integracion 
Centroamericana (SICA). 
 
3. (C)  General Hill recommended CFAC follow the example of 
Colombia by developing a comprehensive, regionally integrated 
plan and then in a unified manner approach the U.S. for 
funding.  General Hill pointed out that individually it could 
be difficult to garner political support in Washington for 
military assistance funding increases;  jointly, however, the 
Central American countries had a much better chance of 
success.  He also noted, considering upcoming U.S. elections 
in November, that realistically, no action would be taken in 
Washington until next year, allowing CFAC sufficient time to 
develop a sound action plan.  General Hill indicated to Breve 
that if CFAC were to do this, DOD and DOS would likely both 
be supportive of the effort. 
 
----------------- 
Next Steps on RTI 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) General Hill queried MOD Breve and CJCS Barahona on 
their latest thinking regarding SOUTHCOM's proposed Regional 
Training Initiative (RTI), while at the same time elaborating 
in more detail where he saw RTI heading.  General Hill 
assured Breve and Barahona that the U.S. understands the RTI 
process will take time to evolve but that it presents 
Honduras with an opportunity to show regional leadership 
while also providing a venue the Central American states can 
use to better regionally integrate.  General Hill also told 
Breve and Barahona that the U.S. does not envision a single 
facility with an RTI sign posted above it, but rather that 
the philosophical concept be embraced by the GOH who could 
then, with U.S. assistance, seek other Central American 
participation, including exercises in those countries. 
 
5. (C)  MOD Breve stated agreement with RTI in principle and 
again confirmed Honduras' willingness to participate. 
However, he did say that other countries would also have to 
agree to host exercises on their bases.  He did not claim, as 
had been indicated previously, that Honduras' participation 
in RTI would require National Congress approval but, he did 
allude to the political "scene" as currently not being 
"ideal" to advance such an initiative. 
 
6. (C) General Hill suggested as a next step that within six 
months, SOUTHCOM would generate an exercise concept involving 
Honduras and a number of other Central American countries to 
be held at Soto Cano and a separate location within another 
participant's country.  General Hill envisioned this initial 
training exercise would be held at the platoon or company 
level.  Breve agreed in concept and said he looked forward to 
what SOUTHCOM would propose. 
 
------------------- 
Hondurans in Haiti? 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) General Hill raised the issue of Honduran 
participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Haiti with 
both MOD Breve and CJCS Barahona.  He indicated he would 
shortly be sending Honduras, and the other CFAC members, a 
letter suggesting they form a PKO battalion (one company from 
each of the four countries) that could possibly deploy to 
Haiti.  He underscored the U.S. Government's understanding 
that, if accepted, it would take time to organize.  Breve was 
open to the idea in theory, but told General Hill that many 
details would require attention before CFAC could deploy to 
Haiti, including a decision on who would command the 
expedition. 
 
8. (C) CJCS Barahona stated the Honduran military is 
ready/able to deploy to Haiti, but the decision to 
participate is a political decision and the issue is a 
sensitive one.  (Comment:  Honduran national primary 
elections are scheduled for February next year and public 
opinion, although hardly fully informed, has been squarely 
against any type of deployment to Haiti.  The GOH might still 
be willing to support the UN mission there, but they are not 
pushing it.  One thing the GOH mentioned in the past (and 
something that would help give them political cover) is their 
desire to receive a formal invitation from the UN to provide 
PKO forces to Haiti.  End Comment). 
 
------------------------------ 
Honduras' No Shoot-Down Policy 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) General Hill stressed to both MOD Breve and CJCS 
Barahona the utmost importance that Honduras strictly follow 
its declared no shoot-down policy.  Breve and Barahona 
assured General Hill they fully understood U.S. legal 
requirements regarding CNIES information sharing and they 
again reiterated Honduras' "no shoot-down" policy.  MOD 
Breve, however, echoed President Ricardo Maduro's earlier 
frustration with U.S. policy, particularly the U.S.'s 
expectations that Honduras scramble air intercepts simply to 
escort intruding aircraft through Honduran air space. 
General Hill told Breve that the U.S. was working on a 
regional air-bridge denial strategy that addresses these 
issues but the policy making process was still not complete. 
 
------------------------------ 
Honduran Ordnance Destruction 
------------------------------ 
 
10. (C) On July 6, a SOUTHCOM Navy Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) team arrived in Honduras for a three day 
mission in response to a Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) request 
that the U.S. assist them with limited ordnance destruction. 
The team's primary mission was to assess the types and 
quantities of ordnance, particularly the air-launched 
munitions that Honduras currently holds, and to explore 
disposal options.  (Note: It was initially thought that 
Honduras might be willing to significantly reduce its 
stockpiles of air-launched munitions, particularly those 
capable of being delivered by Honduras' aging fleet of F-5s. 
It appears, however, that the GOH is seeking U.S. assistance 
for only destroying obsolete and/or dangerous ordnance that 
poses a health and safety risk to HOAF personnel.  As the EOD 
team's initial report concludes: "The problem is that the 
vast majority of ordnance in their destruction plan is not 
air-launched ordnance." End Note). 
 
11. (C) General Hill urged CJCS Barahona to consider 
selecting more air-launched ordnance for destruction.  He 
did, however, assure Barahona that the U.S. would be willing 
to assist the HOAF with general ordnance destruction. 
(Comment:  The current state of some of the HOAF's munitions 
stockpiles poses a serious health and environmental risk. 
The HOAF is aware of this and is seeking U.S. assistance in 
its destruction.  It does not appear, however, that the HOAF 
is considering even marginally reducing its serviceable 
air-launched munitions.  In this light, Honduran ordnance 
destruction should not be considered in any way a 
quid-pro-quo for Nicaraguan MANPADS destruction.  End 
Comment). 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
Pierce