US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS3210

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, MCAP, PHUM, CH, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU/CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: BRIEFING THE PSC ON CHINA'S 
MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 2539 
 
     B. THE HAGUE 1846 
     C. USEU TODAY 7/23/04 
     D. REIDHEAD/ALLEGRONE ET. AL. E-MAIL 7/22/04 
     E. USEU BRUSSELS 2896 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The EU Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) hosted an informal gathering July 22 to receive a USG 
intelligence briefing on China's military modernization 
efforts and implications on regional stability if the EU 
lifts its arms embargo on China.  Post-briefing readouts from 
EU participants indicate that our briefing will feature 
prominently in internal EU discussions (including the July 27 
PSC) of the strategic implications of lifting the embargo. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S/NF) EAP China Analyst John Culver delivered the 
briefing to roughly sixty (60) EU officials, including PSC 
Ambassadors and Deputies, Council DG Robert Cooper, WMD Rep 
Annalisa Giannella, and Council and Commission officers from 
regional and functional desks.  Dutch PSC Chair Ambassador 
Hamer opened the meeting by acknowledging that many in the 
room viewed the embargo as anachronistic and not reflective 
of China's HR progress or of the strengthening strategic 
relationship between the EU and China.  In that context, he 
said it was important that the PSC have the opportunity to 
hear and discuss US concerns about the implications of 
China's military modernization on regional stability.  (NOTE: 
Under prior arrangement with the Dutch hosts, we did not 
deliver the human rights segment of the briefing, as had been 
done in Berlin and The Hague (refs A and B).  We told the 
ambassadors that our human rights briefer was in the room and 
would be available to answer questions should they arise 
(none did).  We strongly support including the HR briefing 
alongside future military modernization briefings in willing 
EU capitals.  Many thanks to DRL Senior Advisor Susan 
O'Sullivan for being willing and available.  END NOTE.) 
 
3. (S/NF) Culver relayed an impressive amount of detail about 
China's military modernization program, and at the same time 
demonstrated how it was oriented toward acquiring the ability 
to defeat Taiwan, and the US forces protecting Taiwan, in a 
cross-straits conflict.  He also explained how China was 
seeking (through industrial espionage and military-commercial 
partnerships) advanced weapons and dual-use technologies from 
the West to support this modernization. 
 
4. (S/NF) None of the attendees made policy points or used 
the occasion to corner us in a debate.  There were no 
questions about human rights, the EU Code of Conduct on arms 
exports, or other policy matters.  Instead, the audience 
stuck largely to the topic at hand.  The atmosphere was 
informal, courteous and respectful.  Several Ambassadors 
asked questions following the briefing, all of which Culver 
fielded expertly: 
 
-- Dutch Ambassador Hamer: How does China's increase in 
defense spending relate to its dramatic increase in GDP? 
 
-- Council DG Robert Cooper:  How does the US control its 
dual-use transfers?  How much do countries that supply China 
restrict their arms transfers?  (Note: DCM McKinley answered 
the first question by referring to US sanctions on China, 
which include strict dual-use controls). 
 
-- Irish Ambassador Kelleher: How much of China's military 
modernization is fueled by off-the-shelf technology?  What 
should be done? 
 
-- Greek Ambassador Paraskevoupoulos:  Couldn't China's 
military modernization be defensive, not offensive, in 
nature?  Can China really threaten the US and allies? 
 
-- Italian Ambassador Melani: What percentage of China's 
defense spending goes toward dual-use purchases?  What is 
China getting from Israel? 
 
-- Portuguese Ambassador Pereira Gomes:  What is Taiwan's 
nuclear capability?  How big is the defense spending gap 
between China and Japan?  Is the US going to engage China in 
arms talks to prevent an arms race? (Note: We deferred on 
this last question.) 
 
-- UK Ambassador Gooderham:  How concerned is the US about 
recent Taiwanese rhetoric and its potential to provoke China? 
 (Note: We used EAP-supplied points to respond.) 
-- Belgian Ambassador Wouters: In terms of military 
capabilities, what does China need to invade Taiwan?  Can 
they do it yet?  Will China even be able to invade Taiwan in 
2008 (the year used for projections in the briefing)? 
 
-- Dutch Military Rep: Isn't China's submarine fleet fairly 
weak?  Why are they focusing relatively more effort on 
shorter-range diesel technologies than on their nuclear subs 
and related technologies? 
 
5. (S/NF) The Council Secretariat China Director, Ana 
Ramirez, told us afterward that while our briefing would not 
change minds on lifting the arms embargo, it would strengthen 
the hands of those who want to ensure strong controls on 
European exports to China, with or without the embargo.  She 
thought our briefing would feature prominently in upcoming EU 
debates (including the July 27 PSC).  WMD Rep Giannella's 
Deputy, Andreas Strub, agreed that our briefing would be 
useful as Member States debate the issue in coming months, 
but added "not all Member States fully share your threat 
assessment."  Council Policy Advisor Chris Holtby thought our 
briefing -- which he described as "wowing them with data" -- 
had reinforced our argument that lifting the embargo might 
have unintended destabilizing consequences for the region. 
 
6. (S/NF) COMMENT:  While our briefing did not change any 
minds, it certainly impressed upon the EU the seriousness of 
China's military modernization program and regional goals. 
We expect that the reports going back to capitals from the 
PSC delegations will strengthen the hands of those with 
outstanding concerns about the impact of lifting the embargo 
on regional stability.  And aside from the inherent value of 
the intelligence contained in the briefing, our willingness 
to deliver it to all 25 EU Member States -- at the same time 
(as with the PSC) and individually (in the ongoing national 
briefings) -- speaks volumes about the depth of our concerns 
and resolve.  The military modernization briefing, coupled 
when possible with the HR briefing, is a good value and we 
believe it would be useful to offer it in other willing EU 
capitals. 
 
Sammis