US embassy cable - 04ACCRA1560

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ACCRA 001560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, GH, ECOWAS 
SUBJECT: CHAMBAS ON ACCRA III, LIBERIA, SUDAN 
 
REF: STATE 162865 
 
Classified By: Polchief Richard Kaminski, reason 1.5 (B/D). 
 
1. (C)  Summary.  According to ECOWAS Executive Secretary Ibn 
Chambas, the Accra III talks will focus on four main points: 
return of dismissed ministers, resumption of the government 
of "national unity", passage of LMA legislation, and DDR. 
Legislation will be the most difficult issue, with Article 35 
delineation of presidential eligibility at the heart of 
deliberations -- some "transitional" formula must be found to 
avoid a referendum on changing the constitutional provision, 
he said.  The Liberia meeting will bring LURD, MODEL and 
former GOL officials to speak with Presidents Obasanjo and 
Kufuor, and, if possible, Kofi Annan.  Interim Chairman Gyude 
Bryant will be urged to consult more widely, and the three 
factions will be pressured to cease their infighting and 
allow completion of DDR.  Any talks on Sudan will happen on 
the margins of these two ECOWAS-sanctioned meetings, and will 
likely involve only Annan, Obasanjo, AU Commission Chairman 
Konare, and perhaps Kufuor.  Chambas appeared optimistic that 
acceptable formulae would be found to reinvigorate the LMA 
process.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Polchief met with ECOWAS Executive Secretary Ibn 
Chambas July 28.  Chambas said four main issues faced the 
Accra III participants:  return of dismissed ministers, 
resumption of the government of national reconciliation, 
passage of legislation required by LMA, and commencement of 
DDR.  Chambas was confident that acceptable formulations, 
already under discussion in Accra, would be found regarding 
the dismissed ministers: Bedie would be empowered to appoint 
a new minister, as would be the New Forces, with other 
acceptable positions found for the dismissed officials 
(including Soro). Once these formulations were agreed upon, 
return of the G-7 to the government and its resumption of 
duties as a true unity government would follow.  DDR would be 
easier to begin once the government had resumed its 
functioning with G7 participation. 
 
3.  (C)  The heart of the discussions, said Chambas, would be 
LMA legislation and its intersection with the Ivorien 
constitution, most importantly, the constitutional 
stipulation under Article 35 that both parents of 
presidential candidates be Ivorien.  Chambas was adamant that 
a referendum on article 35 be avoided.  The enormous 
difficulty in holding a valid referendum in such a divided 
society, together with the very real potential for a "No" 
vote on changing the constitution, meant some form of 
"transitional arrangement" had to be found which would 
effectively trump Article 35.  Chambas said he had been 
suggesting that all signatories to LMA who were heads of 
political parties be accepted as presidential candidates. 
Another formulation would be "all former prime ministers." 
Chambas had discussed the issue with GOCI officials in Accra, 
and they had expressed great interest.  However, President 
Gbagbo had been "holding firm" on the requirement for a 
referendum in meetings around the region.  Gbagbo had to 
"give" on this issue for Accra III to be a success, said 
Chambas. 
 
4.  (C)  On Liberia, Chambas said that Chairman Gyude Bryant, 
LURD leaders Kabinah Janneh, George Dweh and Sekou Konneh, 
former GOL Vice President (and briefly President) Moses Blah, 
and MODEL leaders would meet with Obasanjo, Kufuor, and 
"possibly" Annan, if the UNSG's schedule permitted.  As 
Obasanjo would leave Accra the morning of July 30, this 
session had to occur either late on July 29 or early the next 
day.  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement would i no way be up 
for amendment or re-negotiation.  ather, ECOWAS  wanted to 
urge Bryant to consult mre effectively and systematically 
(his handling of the central bank goveror's departure was a 
cae in point of poor consultation).  The various facions 
would be strongly counseled to cease their factional 
struggles (and identities), and allow DDR to commence 
throughout the country. 
 
5.  (C)  Chambas theorized that any discussions of the crisis 
in Sudan (reftel) would occur informally on the margins of 
the Ivorien and Liberian discussions, with Obasanjo and Annan 
taking the opportunity to compare notes.  Sudan was not on 
the formal ECOWAS agenda for the two sets of talks. 
 
6.  (C) The Ivorien talks would open July 29 with a brief 
plenary session of all the heads of states and Ivorien 
parties, he said, and then break for intensive "one-on-one" 
sessions.  He hoped that agreement would be reached "toward 
the end of the day" on essential points.  The Liberian 
session would probably begin immediately upon conclusion of 
the Accra III talks. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment.  Chambas appeared moderately upbeat, 
encouraged that the various Ivorien parties had shown 
 
flexibility in recent days, but mindful of how far short of 
expectations the Linas-Marcoussis Accords had fallen.  End 
comment. 
 
YATES 
 
 
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