US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI2508

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 002508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, AF, SY, IZ, PK, TC 
SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, 
AFGHANISTAN, REGIONAL THREATS WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN 
ZAYED 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Richard A. Albright, 
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  CENTCOM Commander General John 
Abizaid on July 24 discussed regional security issues 
with Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince and UAE Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Shaykh Mohammed bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) in Abu Dhabi.  Abizaid thanked 
MbZ for the UAE's strong support for coalition 
operations in Afghanistan.  They discussed political 
developments and military operations in Iraq and 
counter terrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
UAE/Oman.  MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker II 
deployment to Afghanistan on short notice, and 
reiterated his requirement for an armed Predator UAV, 
saying that he must make a decision on acquiring a 
foreign UAV system by February 2005 if the U.S. could 
not release an armed Predator to the UAE.  Abizaid and 
MbZ shared security and public opinion viewpoints, 
including potential problems following the release of 
Guantanamo detainees.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) MbZ was accompanied by his half brother, Maj. 
Gen. Shaykh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Director General 
of Abu Dhabi Police and U/S of the Ministry of 
Interior, and by UAE Armed Forces Deputy Chief of 
Staff Maj. Gen. Hamad Thani Al Rumaithy, and Advisor 
Yousuf Al Otaiba.  Charge, RADM Robb (J5), Brig. Gen. 
Custer (J2), Executive Officer Col. Reynes, USLO, and 
Poloff (notetaker) joined General Abizaid. 
 
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AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
3. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAE's strong 
support for coalition operations in Afghanistan, 
singling out the UAE special operations deployment for 
special praise.  Both agreed that the drug trade, 
corruption, and warlords posed greater threats to 
Afghanistan's stability over the coming year than Al 
Qaeda and Taliban remnants.  Good cooperation with 
Pakistan and Uzbekistan is putting the Al Qaeda threat 
to rest in Afghanistan, according to Abizaid, and 
several extremist leaders have faded from the picture 
due to the pressure. Abizaid was encouraged by the 
positive turnout of Afghan citizens registering to 
vote.  Almost eight million Afghans have already 
registered, well exceeding the prediction of six 
million voters or less. Abizaid said that the 
remarkable success in registering voters indicated a 
strong desire among Afghans for a normal state.  A 
strong turn-out at the polls would convey legitimacy 
to the Afghan government.  MbZ asked if coalition 
forces were finding Arabs in Afghanistan.  Abizaid 
said no.  MbZ responded that this was both good and 
bad - good because Arab extremists shouldn't be there, 
bad because we don't know where they are going and 
what they are doing instead.  MbZ expressed his view 
that the Pakistanis were starting to do a better job 
in controlling extremists. 
 
4. (S) MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker II 
deployment to Afghanistan on short notice, stating 
that border security requirements mandated deploying 
the Seekers at home.  (NOTE: The commander of the UAE 
Special Operations Command briefed USLO Chief July 17 
on the cancellation of plans to deploy its squadron of 
Seeker II UAVs to Bagram, scheduled for late summer. 
In a very cordial meeting, Brig. Gen. Juma Ahmed Al 
Bawardi expressed regret at the cancellation and also 
cited "operational requirements" for border security 
as the reason for the change.  On July 19, the 
commander of UAE Land Forces - Artillery told USLO 
officers that the Seeker II was now being deployed in 
patrols along UAE'S western border with Saudi Arabia. 
END NOTE.) 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
5. (C) Abizaid and MbZ discussed political changes in 
Iraq since their March 2004 meeting.  They agreed that 
while the security situation remains extremely 
dangerous, Iraq's security forces have improved, since 
they are more motivated to fight for an Iraqi-led 
government than for the coalition. Abizaid expressed 
cautious optimism about the immediate future of the 
region's security, emphasizing that the key to 
stabilizing the region was to ensure that the upcoming 
national elections in Afghanistan and Iraq occurred as 
planned.  Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAEG's effective 
support, in particular for funding the transfer of 
Jordanian APCs to Iraq, in cooperation with King 
Abdullah of Jordan. 
 
----- 
SYRIA 
----- 
 
6. (C) Asked by MbZ which Arab country was causing the 
greatest problems for Iraq, Abizaid replied Syria. 
Abizaid told MbZ that Syrian President Bashar had 
promised Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to increase 
border control efforts.  But terrorists, including 
suicide bombers, are still regularly getting through. 
Abizaid said that he believes Syria is aware of the 
problem but is not doing all it can to stop the 
incursions.  Abizaid also told MbZ that Damascus 
appears to be home to a number of former regime 
elements who may be supporting the insurgency and that 
the Syrian government is aware of these activities. 
 
------------ 
SAUDI ARABIA 
------------ 
 
7. (C) MbZ informed Abizaid that the UAE is watching 
its border with Saudi Arabia very carefully.  He 
credited Saudi efforts to arrest terrorists, but 
expressed concern that the more effectively the Saudis 
clamp down, the greater the potential for the 
extremists to collect in neighboring countries. MbZ 
cited Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain as likely 
destinations.  Abizaid recalled MbZ's characterization 
of this in an earlier conversation when MbZ compared 
the Saudi's moves to "squeezing water" - extremists 
find cracks and collect elsewhere. 
 
8. (S) Abizaid contrasted his latest trip to Saudi 
Arabia with a visit several months ago.  In July, 
Saudi officials appeared much more confident about 
their ability to combat terrorism.  The amnesty was 
proving effective, and raids have unraveled several 
cells. 
 
---------------- 
OMAN/UAE ARRESTS 
---------------- 
 
9. (S) MbZ briefed Abizaid on the recent joint 
UAE/Oman operation, based on U.S. information, that 
resulted in the arrest of 13 members of an Omani 
terrorist cell.  Those arrested included several 
Afghans and one Emirati woman.  MbZ claimed that the 
cell was planning an "event," and expressed his 
satisfaction at the cooperation between the Omani and 
UAE services. 
 
----------------- 
SECURITY CONCERNS 
----------------- 
 
10. (S) Abizaid told MbZ that he sees intelligence 
patterns emerging that indicate one of three very 
serious incidents potentially occurring before the 
November U.S. elections: 
 
--A strike against one or more European allies to 
force their retreat from Iraq, similar to the pullouts 
of Spain and the Philippines.  Abizaid listed Italy, 
Japan, Bulgaria and the U.K. as potential targets. 
 
--Another major strike on U.S. soil, as damaging as 
9/11 or more so.  However, rather than retreating, 
Abizaid predicted that this would cause an "extreme" 
U.S. retaliatory reaction. 
 
--A major hit against the oil manufacturing 
infrastructure in one or more moderate countries in 
the region.  The economic impact could be global, and, 
like any of the above incidents, the effects could be 
intended to influence U.S. elections. 
 
11. (C) MbZ agreed with Abizaid's concerns, 
particularly related to the oil industry.  MbZ sharply 
criticized the decision by the Philippines to withdraw 
its contingent in Iraq to gain the release of a 
kidnapped citizen.  This would embolden the terrorists 
to kidnap others. He said that the UAE had received 
chatter about potential terrorist activity, noting 
that much of it originates in the U.S.  He shared the 
concern about the potential for an al Qaeda attack on 
regional oil infrastructure, noting that it would be 
relatively easy to destroy a refinery. 
 
------------------------ 
MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION 
------------------------ 
 
12. (C) On several occasions, Abizaid stated 
frustration that the U.S. is losing the "perception 
war" in Iraq and Afghanistan, due in large part to bad 
media coverage.  He stressed that the coalition has 
suffered no military losses in Iraq, even at the 
platoon level, yet the media, particularly Arab media, 
focuses on perceived U.S. failures.  MbZ agreed that 
the Arab media will discredit anything favorable to 
the U.S.  He said that the U.S. needs to present its 
side of the story more effectively.  Citing the recent 
Fallujah bombings, MbZ said that Al Jazeera aired an 
old woman in front of a bombed house saying that she 
and her family were innocent civilians and that the US 
had killed her sheep, goats and cows. This is very 
hard to counter to an Arab audience.  The only way to 
do so was to present the evidence and explain why U.S. 
forces attacked and what they achieved.  Let the 
people see that terrorists have been killed.  He also 
urged the U.S. to better publicize the positive 
changes the U.S. is bringing about.  Abizaid said that 
Iraqi services and facilities, including schools, are 
better now than they have been for 30 years.  However, 
these success stories are not getting out.  MbZ agreed 
that this is the story that the U.S. must tell to 
change the world's perception of the U.S. role in 
Iraq. MbZ's special assistant recommended that CENTCOM 
let the Iraqis talk as much as possible.  They will 
have more credibility to an Arab audience. 
 
---------- 
GUANTANAMO 
---------- 
 
13. (C) MbZ commented that the release of the 
Guantanamo detainees had the potential to cause 
problems.  Citing the appearances of a released 
Jordanian detainee named Rami on Arab talk shows, he 
said that these people are becoming heroes. In the 
future, some of them could be running mosques with 
thousands of followers, plaguing the region for years 
to come.  Saying that this person, who was arrested by 
U.S. forces in Tora Bora, had certainly not been there 
as a tourist, MbZ stated that it would have been 
preferable for these people to have been killed in 
action. 
 
-------- 
PREDATOR 
-------- 
 
14. (S) Referring to General Yagi's visit, Abizaid 
asked MbZ for his views on Predator.  MbZ said that he 
is seeking an armed Predator from the U.S. and 
expressed disappointment that the U.S. appeared ready 
to offer only an unarmed version.  MbZ confirmed that, 
while he strongly preferred the Predator, he was 
looking at co-developing in the UAE alternative UAV 
systems available from other countries.  He said that 
the UAE required armed UAVs to control its long land 
and maritime borders and pointed out that they have 
been using UAVs since the first Gulf War.  He stressed 
the benefits of sharing information through a common 
security system with the U.S. and other allies. 
Abizaid said that he wanted to work with MbZ, and 
asked for some time to explore options and get back to 
him.  MbZ said that he could wait for a few months to 
hear from Abizaid before committing to another system. 
But he said that he planned to make a decision by the 
International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) to be held in 
Abu Dhabi in mid-February 2005.  Both agreed that the 
Predator issue would not damage the strong U.S./UAE 
relationship. 
 
15. (C) In closing, MbZ reaffirmed the strategic value 
of the relationship and expressed his commitment not 
to let disagreements on some issues detract from close 
and effective bilateral cooperation.  General Abizaid 
agreed. 
16. (U) General Abizaid cleared this cable. 
 
ALBRIGHT