US embassy cable - 04AMMAN6369

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006369 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SY, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN ALLEGATIONS OF SYRIAN-AL-QA'IDA/ZARQAWI 
TIES ROOTED IN DEEP MISTRUST OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 5876 
 
     B. AMMAN 6171 
     C. AMMAN 3351 
     D. AMMAN 3288 
     E. AMMAN 6215 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b)(d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S/NF)  Jordanian officials over the last several weeks 
have expressed their concern about alleged Syrian support for 
al-Qa'ida and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi operatives, pointing to 
ongoing smuggling activity through Jordan's northern frontier 
as a major worry.  There is no indication available to us 
that the Syrian government is complicit in operational 
planning, but officials claim that Zarqawi affiliates receive 
logistical support from Syrian intelligence and are allowed 
to operate relatively unfettered in Syria.  The April bomb 
plot targeting the U.S. Embassy and Jordanian government 
buildings in Amman piqued the GOJ's concern about Syrian 
support for Zarqawi's network, since suspects and materiel 
were intercepted en route from Syria.  The bomb plot may have 
been the catalyst for these allegations, but Jordan's 
concerns also are rooted in deep and longstanding mistrust 
about Syrian intentions.  Jordan's $400 million request for 
border security assistance almost certainly is a factor 
encouraging officials to emphasize this particular threat, 
but Jordan's concerns about ongoing al-Qa'ida/Zarqawi 
activity -- and its proven determination to target Jordan -- 
are real, and growing.  End Summary. 
 
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JORDANIANS ALLEGE SYRIAN-AL-QA'IDA/ZARQAWI LINK 
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2.  (S/NF)  Over the past several weeks, senior Jordanian 
officials, including King Abdullah, General Intelligence 
Directorate Chief Sa'ad Kheir, Foreign Minister Muasher, Air 
Force Commander Prince Feisal, and JAF Chief of Staff General 
Nsairat, have raised in various meetings with U.S. officials 
their concerns about alleged official Syrian support to 
al-Qa'ida/Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (refs a and b).  The massive 
bomb plot against the U.S. Embassy and GOJ targets disrupted 
in April in which Jordanian and Syrian Zarqawi operatives 
attempted to smuggle weapons and explosives through the 
Jordanian-Syrian border (refs c and d), appears to be the 
genesis of the GOJ's heightened concern.  Although Jordanian 
officials took pains to publicly downplay any official Syrian 
connection to the plot at the time, they privately express 
the conviction that such activity could not occur without at 
least tacit approval and logistical support from Syrian 
officials. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  Requests for further information from GOJ 
officials have yielded (uncorroborated) allegations that 
Syrian intelligence has allowed Zarqawi operatives safehaven 
in Syria, facilitated their transit between Lebanon, Syria 
and Iraq, and provided other logistical support.  For 
example, the Jordanians point to an alleged meeting in 
Damascus between Syrian intelligence and one of the 
individuals arrested in the April bomb plot in Amman. 
According to the Jordanians, the Syrians called in the 
operative two weeks before he was arrested in Jordan, asked 
him some perfunctory questions (substance of which is 
unknown) and released him.  It is not clear what prompted the 
Syrians to call him in, or if they realized who he was or 
what he was planning. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  Jordanian officials also point to the lax Syrian 
enforcement at the two main border crossings into Jordan, 
noting that several suspects and their weaponry in the April 
bomb plot entered Jordan were caught on the Jordanian side of 
the Jaber crossing.  Militants have long favored the 
Syrian-Jordanian border in their efforts to smuggle weapons 
and explosives destined for the West Bank.  The Jordanians 
believe it is highly unlikely that Syrian officials at the 
border have no idea what is going on.  They believe that the 
Syrians in some cases are looking the other way, and that 
some "bad apples" are actually complicit in the activity, 
receiving bribes from the infiltrators.  While it is not 
clear to the Jordanians how far up the chain of command this 
goes, they are not willing to absolve Damascus of 
responsibility.  A Jordanian military official believes that 
if the Syrians were genuinely committed to policing the 
border, effectiveness could be enhanced.  He noted that fear 
of Israeli military retaliation ensures that the Syrians 
prevent such traffic through the Golan -- evidence the 
Syrians can stop infiltrators when motivated to do so. 
 
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JORDANIAN CONCERN ROOTED IN INTENSE DISTRUST OF SYRIA 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5.  (S/NF)   Longstanding bad blood between Jordan and Syria 
and continued frosty relations on multiple fronts have 
intensified Jordanian suspicions about Syria's intentions. 
Jordanian decision makers have a lively awareness of the 
long, troubled history of bilateral relations and persistent 
Syrian efforts to destabilize Jordan starting in the 1950s. 
In particular, Jordanians will not soon forget Syria's role 
in the 1970 "civil war" and support for Palestinian 
rejectionist groups' bombings in Jordan in the 1980s with 
Damascus' approval.  Jordan's public announcement that the 
suspected Zarqawi plotters in April had entered from Syria 
angered Damascus, prompting the Syrians to retaliate on the 
trade front.  Jordanian companies wishing to export products 
to Syria must now certify that their products contain no 
Israeli content.  (Ironically, trade figures show the 
political wrangling has not affected booming Syrian-Jordanian 
trade which will be reported septel.) 
 
6.  (S/NF)  Personal enmity between some Jordanian and Syrian 
officials seems to also be playing into this dynamic.  For 
example, GID Chief Saad Kheir and his Syrian counterpart 
Hassan Khalil barely speak.  The King's advisors quote him as 
describing Bashar as "useless," unable or unwilling to 
improve the situation, despite assurances to the contrary. 
The Jordanians complain that their requests for information 
on suspected terrorists often are ignored or only partially 
answered, compiling the frustration and suspicion over Syrian 
activities. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (S/NF)  The GOJ's outstanding $400 million request for 
border security assistance undoubtedly plays into its desire 
to raise border security issues at every opportunity, but the 
Syria-al-Qa'ida/Zarqawi issue remains a major source of 
anxiety for Jordanian officials.  Lax Syrian border 
enforcement (at best) and Syrian safehaven and logistical 
support for Zarqawi operatives -- confirmed or not -- is a 
valid worry.  As the April bomb plot, and more recently an 
infiltration attempt into Israel (ref e), demonstrates, 
Jordan's border security concerns are substantial.  GOJ 
officials believe that al-Qa'ida and Zarqawi are undeterred 
by multiple disruptions of their activities in Jordan, and it 
is just a matter of time before they try again.  Jordanian 
officials express some mystification about Syrian objectives 
in permitting these al-Qa'ida/Zarqawi activities but have no 
doubt that if Syria chose to put an end to them, it could. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
HALE