US embassy cable - 04ANKARA4131

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 004131 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2029 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PINR, PTER, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ, THE TURKS AND US 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. ROBERT DEUTSCH, REASONS 1.4 B AND 
 D. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (S) After four years in Ankara as the Iraq 
watcher/Operation Northern Watch POLAD, and seven TDYs to 
Iraq before, during and after the war, Embassy PolMilOff 
offers the following observations about dealing with Turkey 
on matters relating to Iraq.  Working with the Turks on Iraqi 
issues can be frustrating and worse, but our engagement with 
Ankara on these matters gets us access to facilities and 
resources unavailable elsewhere, keeps Turks from acting on 
less helpful instincts, gives them an important (but not 
sufficient) sense of inclusion in our regional strategy, and, 
as the accolades and warm send-off Turkish officials offered 
our Iraq watcher demonstrate, is deeply appreciated by 
Turkish policy makers. 
 
2. (S) On the macro level, both the US and Turkey want a 
unified, democratic Iraq at peace internally and with its 
neighbors.  To engage successfully with Turkey on Iraq 
issues, we need to recognize that at more detailed levels, we 
and the Turks often differ about what can/should happen in 
northern Iraq, that Turkey's actions and views about Iraq 
will be strongly influenced by the continuing presence of PKK 
elements there, and that Turkey views northern Iraq and its 
Kurds through the prism of Turkey's long, bloody struggle 
against Kurdish separatism in its own southeast.  While the 
US thinks of northern Iraq as the most stable area in the 
country, and the Iraqi Kurds as friends and partners in 
building the new Iraq, the Turks see the region as fraught 
with threats to Turkish interests.  US support for democracy 
and federalism in northern Iraq will result in Kurdish 
(probably KDP and PUK) leadership and administration of the 
three northern governorates for the foreseeable future, an 
outcome Turkey hoped to avoid and is only grudgingly coming 
to terms with.  We need to help the Turks do so by showing 
them the benefits to Turkey of developments in northern Iraq 
(like the enormous financial gains to Turkey from the GLOC 
and Turkish trade with and investment in the north), as well 
as focusing them on the broader relationship with the central 
authorities.  We should encourage cooperative Iraqi-Turkish 
relations and more direct contact, including with the Iraqi 
Kurds, but without the US as a middleman or address of first 
resort for the Turks on Iraq issues.  And we should try to 
get both Turks and Iraqi Kurds to see that their own 
interests are best served by putting their adversarial past 
behind them, taking each others legitimate concerns into 
account, and that we are prepared to help them create 
cooperative, friendly and neighborly relations - because that 
is in US interests.  End Summary. 
 
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Getting Turkish Contributions - Hard But Worth the Effort 
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3. (S) We can get the Turks to make helpful contributions in 
Iraq (witness Operations Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, our 
Ground Line of Communication with northern Iraq (GLOC) and 
use of Incirlik to support OIF), but closing such deals with 
Turkey is always difficult and time consuming - and can be 
downright maddening.  Those of us working these issues often 
ask ourselves if it is worth the effort.  Both because we 
need Turkey for these things that no one else in the region 
can provide - and because the engagement gives the Turks a 
sense of informed inclusion that tempers the ability of those 
with less helpful instincts to interfere, it is clearly worth 
the effort.  But US expectations of the Turks must be 
realistic.  We cannot force Turkey to do what we want in Iraq 
(just as we are not willing to let them force us there) or in 
their relations with Iraqis.  Turkey will do what it believes 
is in Turkey's interest based on its assessments of northern 
Iraq, assessments that often exaggerate the threat posed to 
them by Iraqi Kurds and the size and competence of the 
Turkmen.  Our differences are frequently based on different 
sources of information or on the credibility we and they 
attach to these sources; often, neither of us has been right. 
 Likewise, we must always keep squarely in mind US interests. 
 Often, as in the past, there will be a certain contradiction 
between what seems right to us vis-a-vis Iraq and what will 
advance us towards our objectives on a wider front. 
Therefore, on many issues related to northern Iraq, we will 
continue to differ with the Turks on what constitutes a 
positive outcome. 
 
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Differing Views of Northern Iraq 
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4. (S) US and Turkish perspectives about northern Iraq and 
the role of Iraqi Kurds there and in Baghdad are largely 
divergent.  The northern Iraq most Turks imagine is an 
ethnic-based autocracy run by Kurdish war lords (Barzani and 
Talabani), with more than a million Turkmen who are deprived 
of their rights by heavy-handed Kurds.  Ankara has been 
reluctant to recognize Barzani and Talabani as legitimate 
Iraqi politicians and regularly refers to them as tribal 
leaders (including in meetings with us).  There is a chance 
that Turkey may develop a more sympathetic and (in our view) 
realistic appreciation of northern Iraq, but this will take 
time, much more travel by Turks to northern Iraq, and a 
considerable effort by Turkish leaders to re-shape Turkish 
public opinion, an effort that we have yet to see.  Turkey 
insisted in the years leading up to the Iraq War and until 
the passage of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that 
the KDP and the PUK's administrations were de facto only and 
had no legitimate authority.  Much of the Turkish unhappiness 
with the TAL was because it made the KDP and PUK's Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) the legal authority in the north. 
Until Spring 2004, the Turks were loathe to relinquish their 
view, but began to shift in May and June (although as Turkish 
MFA Special Rep for Iraq Koruturk told Barzani and Talabani, 
Turkey's support for federalism in Iraq would only be made 
public over time so that Turkish officials could prepare 
public opinion for this "about-face.").  Through this shift, 
the Turks appear to be adapting their policy to the emerging 
reality of post-war northern Iraq.  Elections may force the 
Turks to further accept KDP and PUK roles in Iraqi politics 
as democratically legitimate, but the Turks will continue to 
view Iraqi Kurds with suspicion through the prism of their 
own bloody decade-long struggle against Kurdish separatism in 
Turkey's southeast.  The Turkish reasoning is that if the 
Iraqi Kurds get autonomy or independence (or maybe even 
federalism), this would revive separatist sentiment in 
southeast Turkey.  The continuing presence of the PKK 
compounds the problem of developing a positive Turkish view 
of northern Iraq.  The Iraqi Kurds also provoke reactions in 
Turkey when they cater to their Kurdish constituency: All of 
the greater Kurdistan rhetoric (including pursuit of a 
"Kurdish" Kirkuk, KRG published maps of a Kurdistan that 
includes parts of Syria, Iran and Turkey) raises Turkish 
insecurity about their own territorial integrity and 
security, and cries out for public response. 
 
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PKK Poisoning the Equation 
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5. (S)  Perhaps the greatest impediment to a smoother 
relationship for us with the Turks on Iraq and for the Turks 
with the Iraqi Kurds is the persistent presence of the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq.  So long as these terrorists 
are present in the area, northern Iraq will be a source of 
concern for the Turks.  This will keep alive disappointment 
with the US for not fulfilling our pledge to end the 
safehaven for terrorists in Iraq and will hamper Turkey's 
ability to accept and cooperate with the new Iraq, 
unless/until the new Iraq takes action to close down the PKK 
and its front organizations.  In addition, the Turks will 
perpetually be tempted to cross the border and go after the 
PKK themselves (as they have on a pretty regular basis for at 
least 15 years), with all the problems that suggests.  And 
the 1500 Turkish troops in northern Iraq will not be 
withdrawn until a solution is found to the PKK problem. 
Their presence will remain an irritant with the Iraqis and a 
sore point in Turkey-Iraq relations.  It remains very much in 
US interests to find a way to eliminate the PKK presence in 
northern Iraq because they are a festering terrorist threat 
against Turkey and Iraq in territory where we provide the 
overarching security, for the good of US-Turkish relations, 
for Turkish-Iraqi relations, and because, given the GWOT and 
our role in Iraq, it is just the right thing to do. 
 
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Turkey's Sense of Exclusion on Iraq 
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6. (S) Turks have complained to us since the war that they 
feel excluded from meaningful consultation with us on issues 
regarding the future of Iraq.  This sense of exclusion may be 
unavoidable both due to the Turks' decision not to join the 
fight against Saddam and because the Turks set the bar 
impossibly high, as reflected in a remark made jokingly by an 
MFA official when we asked what would satisfy Turkey in Iraq. 
 The official replied, "When half the Iraqi cabinet are 
Turkmen."  We can help reduce Turkey's sense of exclusion by 
keeping the Turks well-briefed on our view of and vision for 
Iraq, as well as what we are doing on the ground there, and 
by stressing that Iraqis, not Americans, control what is and 
will be happening in Iraq.  Even when we have done this, the 
Turks have been disappointed that US policy often did not 
seem to reflect views and concerns the Turks shared with us. 
We should ensure the Turks understand that by taking an 
antagonistic approach toward the coalition and the Iraqi 
leaders who were working with us, the Iraqi Turkmen Front and 
Turkey's support for them cost Turkey influence with us and 
among the nascent Iraqi leadership. 
 
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Be Frank From the Start 
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7. (S) The Turks react badly when they suspect they are being 
misled or told only half the story.  The Turks believe the US 
made promises about Iraq that we have not kept (principally 
regarding the PKK, but also to include more and better 
Turkmen in Iraqi leadership structures, to prevent 
uncontrolled Kurdish migration to Kirkuk and to put borders 
and peshmerga under Baghdad's control).  Also, we are better 
served being frank from the start, even if it means giving a 
message that the Turks do not want to hear.  For example, if 
the coalition had no intention of going after the PKK 
militarily, we should have said so.  But once the President 
told the Turks we would eliminate the PKK safe-haven in 
northern Iraq, we became obliged to do something meaningful, 
which to date we have not.  This comes back to bite us on 
everything we want the Turks to help with in Iraq, from 
improving relations with the KDP and PUK, to operations of 
the Habur Gate for transport of material from Turkey needed 
by the coalition.  Our continued inaction on the PKK in Iraq 
gives those in Turkey who are not fans of the US, including 
in the press and the public at large, a bigger club with 
which to beat up on us.  We may have allowed unrealistic 
expectations to grow.  This is true for both sides - though 
the Turks were blunt with us much more frequently than we 
were with them. The perception that the US is unreliable when 
it comes to Iraq has damaged our ability to get the Turks on 
a more helpful line and to support our Iraq objectives in 
general. 
 
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Get the Turks Dealing Directly With Iraqis 
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8. (S) Until the transfer of sovereignty, and possibly still, 
many Turkish civilian and military officials approached Iraq 
with the assumption that the US controlled events there, and 
that if the US took Turkey's concerns seriously, we would 
force the Iraqis to do as the Turks asked.  That we were 
neither willing nor often able to wield such power in Iraq 
was a great disappointment to the Turks.  Even now, Turkish 
officials contact the US Embassy in Ankara rather than go to 
the Iraqi Embassy here for matters as mundane as information 
on Iraqi visa requirements.  In such cases, we direct them to 
the Iraqi Charge, whom they approach reluctantly if at all. 
At the end of the day, we must recognize - and try to get the 
Turks to appreciate - that while Turkey has legitimate 
interests in Iraq, especially in the north, it is the right 
of the Iraqis to make their own decisions about the shape of 
their political future (not to mention the routes of their 
road networks and the names they give to their regions).  We 
should urge the Turks to engage with the Iraqis about their 
concerns on a civilian, government-to-government level, and 
to avoid making public threats.  We should also continue to 
urge the Iraqi Kurds to refrain from making provocative 
statements about Turkey.  The US should increasingly take 
itself out of the middle of disputes between Iraqis and 
Turks, and force the two sides to deal directly with each 
other.  But at the same time we should coach both toward a 
more neighborly relationship.  To that end, having an Iraqi 
Ambassador in Ankara will be a good beginning. 
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Change is Coming - Turkey Doesn't Like Change 
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9. (S) Turks are uncomfortable with change in Iraq and have 
trouble accepting that Iraq has and is changing and that 
Turkey cannot control it.  Like many Iraqis they still see 
this multi-ethnic nation in terms of social engineering. 
Slowly and unhappily Turkey is coming to accept that there 
will be a federal Iraq, and that maybe that is OK for Turkish 
interests.  The Turks have recently stated that there should 
be no change in the demographics of Kirkuk.  For Turkey, the 
Iraq war brought unwelcome change by unleashing Kurdish power 
and reducing Turkish influence in northern Iraq.  Now the 
Turks are faced with a situation they very much wanted to 
avoid - Barzani and Talabani as legitimate, recognized 
national leadership figures.  We should work to help the 
Turks react to the coming changes in a cooperative fashion 
rather than with shoe-thumping bluster.  The way they react 
will determine how their relationship with Iraqis of all 
stripes will develop for years to come. 
 
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It's Got to Be About US Interests - Not Turkish or Iraqi 
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10. (S) Some Turks see northern Iraq much as we do, (perhaps 
many more than let on) but Turkish policy makers will not 
quickly move off of their hard line stances regarding 
northern Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds.  We see some signs that 
progress is being made on this front, but as readers of the 
Turkish press know, there is a long way to go before Turkey 
and the Iraqi Kurds have friendly relations and before Turkey 
will be pleased with US policy toward northern Iraq.  The 
best thing we can do is avoid pandering to either Turkey or 
the Iraqi Kurds on Iraq issues, but keep US interests (which 
may sometimes pull in different directions) squarely at the 
forefront of our approach. 
 
11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
DEUTSCH