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| Identifier: | 04ROME2885 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ROME2885 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rome |
| Created: | 2004-07-26 12:41:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PARM KNNP IT NPT |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002885 SIPDIS FOR NP/MNA, AC/ISN, VC/FO; USUN GENEVA FOR AMB. SANDERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014 TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, IT, NPT SUBJECT: GOI RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III REF: STATE 139286 Classified By: (U) Political Minister-Counselor Tom Countryman for Reas on 1.4 b/d. 1. (C) Summary. Italy judged PrepCom III as failing to deliver on both substantive and organizational issues. The GOI welcomed US explanations of the US Article VI record, but suggests that the US now should also seek more concrete steps to convince Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries of its progress in disarmament. For priorities at the 2005 RevCom, Italy will work within EU channels to advocate strengthening verification and seeking effective means of enforcement. End Summary. 2. (U) Following reftel request, Pol-Mil Officer called on Counselor Piero Sardi of the Italian MFA's Office for Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation on July 23. The meeting's purpose was to sound out Italy's response to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom III) for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCom) of the NPT. Points below respond to questions posed at the end of Reftel, Para. 7. 3. (C) Sardi, who attended PrepCom III, stated that the session had been, on the whole, a failure. He had expected at least some progress on substantive issues, but there was absolutely none. Sardi did not believe that there was an adequate discussion of ways to strengthen the NPT, nor did he feel that the PrepCom led to a clear understanding of substantive priorities for the 2005 RevCom. Sardi also expressed surprise and dismay at the PrepCom's failure to agree on all but a few organizational issues in preparation for the RevCom. This overall lack of progress, according to Sardi, reflected deep differences between states and groups of states. 4. (C) Sardi welcomed the USG's explanations at PrepCom III of its Article VI record, but he suggested that taking more concrete steps would also be helpful. Italy itself does not see the US record on disarmament as problematic. For NAM countries, however, the story is different. Sardi explained that NPT's effectiveness rests on three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. NAM countries expect their cooperation in non-proliferation to be balanced by N-5 progess in disarmament. The USG explanations, while certainly helpful, are not by themselves enough to answer NAM countries' objections over the US arsenal. The USG should look for concrete steps that it might take to strengthen its Article VI record and so convince the NAM countries that everything possible in the way of disarmament is being done. 5. (U) In accordance with EU non-proliferation policy, Italy believes that proliferation concerns related to Iran's nuclear program should be addressed, as well as non-compliance by the PRK. 6. (C) Italy adheres to EU non-proliferation policy and will participate in RevCom on that basis. Looking ahead to the RevCom, Sardi said that Italy will advocate a unified EU position in two priority areas: 1) strengthening verification; and 2) seeking effective means for enforcement. Italy believes that more states need to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocols. Italy shares the US position that export of Nuclear-Suppliers Group-controlled items should be allowed only to those states in which the Additional Protocols are in force. It will be important, Sardi added, to avoid discriminating against states seeking nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes. 7. (C) The RevCom must also seek progress on the matter of enforcement, Sardi said. Ability to enforce the NPT is the necessary complement to better verification; hence we must find a way of interpreting the NPT that allows us to deal effectively with non-compliance. Visit Rome's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m SEMBLER NNNN 2004ROME02885 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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