US embassy cable - 04ROME2885

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GOI RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III

Identifier: 04ROME2885
Wikileaks: View 04ROME2885 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2004-07-26 12:41:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PARM KNNP IT NPT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR NP/MNA, AC/ISN, VC/FO; USUN GENEVA FOR AMB. SANDERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, IT, NPT 
SUBJECT: GOI RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III 
 
REF: STATE 139286 
 
Classified By: (U) Political Minister-Counselor Tom Countryman for Reas 
on 1.4 b/d. 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  Italy judged PrepCom III as failing to 
deliver on both substantive and organizational issues.  The 
GOI welcomed US explanations of the US Article VI record, but 
suggests that the US now should also seek more concrete steps 
to convince Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries of its 
progress in disarmament.  For priorities at the 2005 RevCom, 
Italy will work within EU channels to advocate strengthening 
verification and seeking effective means of enforcement.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Following reftel request, Pol-Mil Officer called on 
Counselor Piero Sardi of the Italian MFA's Office for 
Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation on July 23. 
The meeting's purpose was to sound out Italy's response to 
the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom III) 
for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCom) of the NPT.   Points 
below respond to questions posed at the end of Reftel, Para. 
7. 
 
3.  (C)  Sardi, who attended PrepCom III, stated that the 
session had been, on the whole, a failure.  He had expected 
at least some progress on substantive issues, but there was 
absolutely none.  Sardi did not believe that there was an 
adequate discussion of ways to strengthen the NPT, nor did he 
feel that the PrepCom led to a clear understanding of 
substantive priorities for the 2005 RevCom.   Sardi also 
expressed surprise and dismay at the PrepCom's failure to 
agree on all but a few organizational issues in preparation 
for the RevCom.  This overall lack of progress, according to 
Sardi, reflected deep differences between states and groups 
of states. 
 
4.  (C)   Sardi welcomed the USG's explanations at PrepCom 
III of its Article VI  record, but he suggested that taking 
more concrete steps would also be helpful.  Italy itself does 
not see the US record on disarmament as problematic.  For NAM 
countries, however, the story is different.  Sardi explained 
that NPT's effectiveness rests on three pillars: disarmament, 
non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.  NAM 
countries expect their cooperation in non-proliferation to be 
balanced by N-5 progess in disarmament.  The USG 
explanations, while certainly helpful, are not by themselves 
enough to answer NAM countries' objections over the US 
arsenal.  The USG should look for concrete steps that it 
might take to strengthen its Article VI record and so 
convince the NAM countries that everything possible in the 
way of disarmament is being done. 
 
5.  (U) In accordance with EU non-proliferation policy, Italy 
believes that proliferation concerns related to Iran's 
nuclear program should be addressed, as well as 
non-compliance by the PRK. 
 
6.  (C)  Italy adheres to EU non-proliferation policy and 
will participate in RevCom on that basis.  Looking ahead to 
the RevCom, Sardi said that Italy will advocate a unified EU 
position in two priority areas: 1) strengthening 
verification; and 2) seeking effective means for enforcement. 
 Italy believes that more states need to sign and implement 
the IAEA Additional Protocols.  Italy shares the US position 
that export of Nuclear-Suppliers Group-controlled items 
should be allowed only to those states in which the 
Additional Protocols are in force.  It will be important, 
Sardi added, to avoid discriminating against states seeking 
nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes. 
 
7.  (C)  The RevCom must also seek progress on the matter of 
enforcement, Sardi said.  Ability to enforce the NPT is the 
necessary complement to better verification; hence we must 
find a way of interpreting the NPT that allows us to deal 
effectively with non-compliance. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
	2004ROME02885 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


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