US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS3140

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, EAID, SU, ET, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: DARFUR: EU STRESSES STRONG GOS ACTION AGAINST 
JINGAWEIT 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 159301 
 
     B. B) SMALL-SCOTT E-MAIL OF 7/23/04 
     C. C) ADDIS ABABA 2300 AND PREVIOUS 
     D. D) BRUSSELS 3116 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR KYLE SCOTT.  REASON: 1.4(B) 
(D) 
 
 1. (C) Summary and Action Request.  Hirep Solana's point man 
on Sudan, Christian Manahl, stressed the importance of 
improving the security situation in Darfur to allow 
humanitarian assistance.  He ridiculed some of the GOS 
actions to date, and urged the arrest of Jingaweit leaders 
and suspension of GOS officials who have cooperated with 
them.  EU continues to believe AU has all the funds it needs 
in short run until EU funds arrive, but said the AU staff 
backstopping the effort was hopelessly understaffed and 
creating a bottleneck for timely transfer of funds to the 
region.  EU not certain of need for air surveillance in the 
region, and asks US views.  End Summary and Action Request. 
 
Need to Get Jingaweit Leaders "Out of Action" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Mission spoke July 23 with Christian Manahl, the 
official in Hirep Solana's Policy Unit tasked with Sudan, to 
relay ref A points and to compare notes on GOS compliance 
with its commitments (ref B).  Ref B points were also passed 
directly to CFSP Director General Robert Cooper.  Manahl told 
us he is convinced the GOS can and should do more.  The 
critical issue, in his view, is disarming the Jingaweit 
militia.  So far, GOS steps have been insufficient.  He said 
the arrests made were actually a ruse: the GOS has taken 
criminals already in GOS custody and declared them Jingaweit. 
 Similarly, Manahl said the GOS was taking equally 
distasteful militia groups from Southern Sudan and placing 
them in Darfur as "policemen" -- a dangerous step more likely 
to exacerbate tensions than solve them. 
 
3. (C) The real test of GOS sincerity, Manahl argued, is 
whether they are prepared to arrest key Jingaweit leaders. 
These people need to be taken out of circulation immediately. 
 He said the list of top leaders the US has provided is 
basically right -- although the EU might consider one or two 
names questionable, and also believes other names should be 
added.  Nonetheless, they should be arrested without delay. 
A second key step should be the suspension of GOS officials 
who have cooperated with the militia leaders.  While 
acknowledging that the evidence may not exist to allow these 
officials to be tried for their activities at this time, 
suspension pending further investigation is the least the GOS 
could do.  By getting militia leaders and their GOS 
supporters out of action, it should help eliminate the 
attacks, Manahl said. 
 
The Situation on the Ground 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The EU believes the problems of humanitarian access 
have been eased, but Manahl argued that sustained pressure is 
still required.  Relaxed GOS regulations have made access 
somewhat easier, but if the security situation does not 
improve it will not matter what procedures are in place 
regarding access. 
 
5. (C) EU understanding is that six monitoring teams should 
be fully deployed by Sunday (with the possible exception of 
the team).  Manahl supported the view we heard yesterday from 
Commission officials (ref D): the EU does not believe that 
cash-flow problems are a constraint on the AU in fielding 
teams.  They have been assured that there is enough cash in 
the bank to keep the AU missions functioning for a few more 
weeks, allowing the time needed before the EC monies arrive. 
The real problem, according to Manahl, is in the AU 
secretariat, where crucial administrative backstopping is 
 
SIPDIS 
slow, causing the AU to have difficulties getting resources 
from Addis out to El Fasher.  He cited in particular the 
staffing gaps in Amb. Ki Doulaye's operation, and called Ki 
Doulaye "a racist" for refusing to allow non-African 
additions to his staff to help facilitate operations.  In 
this regard, he noted that the EU would soon be sending a 
military operations liaison officer similar to the two US 
officials being attached to the AU effort. 
Air Surveillance: Is It Needed? - Action Request 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6. (C) Action Request: Manahl said missions in Khartoum were 
sending conflicting reports on the utility of air 
surveillance in Darfur.  If air attacks had ceased, the need 
for air surveillance would appear to have been overcome. 
Manahl asked for US views in this regard. 
SCOTT