US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1408

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR XDORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014 
TAGS: Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: ARMY CHIEF'S READ-OUT ON THE INSURGENCY 
 
REF: STATE 153894 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pyar Jung 
Thapa told the Ambassador and ODC Chief on July 22 that while 
the security situation in Nepal had stabilized, changing 
Maoist tactics, such as assassination squads in the Kathmandu 
Valley, were a cause for concern.  The Royal Nepalese Army 
(RNA) was taking human rights issues seriously and was 
investigating alleged violations of rules of engagement 
during combat operations.  The COAS stated that he supported 
providing RNA troops to protect the UN in Iraq, but a 
decision by the cabinet would be required before such a 
mission could be executed. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) COAS General Thapa described the security situation in 
Nepal as having stabilized.  The Government of Nepal (GON), 
the monarchy and district headquarters were all intact, and 
the economy was growing.  However, the RNA had released 1,600 
prisoners during the last cease-fire, and the inability of 
the judicial system to bring Maoists to trial due to judges, 
fears of retribution remained a significant problem.  Thapa 
noted that former Attorney General Sushil Kumar Pant had 
suggested using the Special Court provision of "faceless 
judges" as a possible means of overcoming this hurdle. 
 
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RNA DOCTRINE 
============ 
 
3. (C) The COAS stated the GON had given the RNA the mission 
to disarm the Maoists and bring them back into mainstream 
politics, but not necessarily to defeat them militarily.  To 
date, most Maoists had died while attacking the RNA, not 
during RNA attacks.  The RNA had successfully repelled a 
Maoist attack on the Myagdi District Headquarters of Beni on 
March 20, 2004 despite the failure of the INSAS rifles during 
the 30 or so human wave attacks launched by the Maoists. 
(NOTE: The defensive obstacles placed by engineers within the 
barrier plan made the critical difference during this battle. 
 Lack of confidence in the INSAS family of weapons led RNA 
soldiers to retain their old self-loading rifles (SLRs) even 
after being issued with INSAS rifles.  END NOTE)  The RNA 
lacked local intelligence prior to the attack, and Thapa 
emphasized that the citizens of Rolpa, Rukum and other 
districts had told him that they could not offer the RNA 
support due to fear of Maoist retribution.   Meanwhile, the 
COAS believed development projects like roads would drive out 
the Maoists, and the RNA is employing civilian workers under 
RNA management for the approximately 15 ongoing road projects. 
 
4. (C) The COAS stated insufficient numbers of troops had led 
to the RNA,s inability to maintain security with a forward 
presence.  RNA soldiers were currently under tremendous 
stress; in addition to being in combat, Maoists were 
threatening RNA family members. (NOTE: The RNA consisted of 
approximately 46,000 soldiers in 2001; current strength is 
72,000 with 6,000 more currently in training.  3,000 are 
outside Nepal on UN peacekeeping missions.  END NOTE.)  The 
RNA supported the idea of village defense committees (VDC) to 
offset the lack of manpower.  However, the Europeans had 
convinced the GON that VDC's were a bad idea. 
5. (C) The security situation in the Kathmandu Valley was of 
particular concern, the COAS indicated.  To date, the RNA had 
caught a handful of Maoist Special Task Force (STF) 
assassination teams (consisting of 25 members each from the 
student wing of the Maoists) in the Valley, and had defused 
many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well.  The RNA 
believed a Maoist battalion (estimated strength: 300 to 400 
people) lined the valley rim in support of these STFs. 
 
6. (C) The COAS stated that the written materials captured 
from the Maoists indicate that cease-fires, peace talks and 
the notion of a constituent assembly were "merely talk," and 
that the Maoists would resume fighting if they did not get 
their demands.  The Maoists were getting substantial 
financial support through extortion, especially in the 
Kathmandu Valley.  The COAS believed that the Europeans 
hesitated to pressure the Maoists because of U.S. 
involvement, but he did not understand why Nepal,s "oldest 
friend," the UK would not offer more help, as Nepal had 
fought alongside the UK in many wars. 
 
============ 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
============ 
 
7. (C) The COAS explained that he had given instructions to 
let Maoists escape if it meant saving the life of innocent 
civilians.  The RNA had tried 20 to 30 soldiers to date via 
court martial for violations of military law.  The COAS 
believed if a civilian was killed by mistake, then 
compensation should be offered; if a killing appeared 
intentional, then the RNA would investigate and raise charges 
if required.  (NOTE: Compensation has been awarded in many 
cases.  END NOTE)  Meanwhile, while the RNA was taking flak 
for alleged human rights abuses, the RNA was the only GON 
entity attempting to take accountability for abuses, and much 
progress had been made, the Chief argued. 
 
8. (C) Grateful for U.S. military assistance thus far, the 
COAS acknowledged the need to keep assistance low-key to 
allay Indian concerns.  While M-16s combined with Belgian 
Minimis had proven extremely successful, the RNA needed more 
mobility and firepower.  The RNA would be interested in U.S. 
M-249 Squad Automatic Weapons (SAW) to offset the canceled 
delivery of additional Minimis, if funding could also be 
provided.  The COAS also noted the need for more 
mine-protected vehicles (MPVs) to counter the frequent Maoist 
roadside IED attacks on the security forces. 
 
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IRAQ 
==== 
 
9. (C) When Ambassador Moriarty raised the idea of the RNA 
sending troops to Iraq to guard UN sites, the COAS affirmed 
that the RNA supported the mission "to help to pay back the 
U.S. for assistance given to Nepal."  The COAS had spoken 
with the Prime Minister on the issue, and was waiting for the 
cabinet decision to go forward.  The COAS also stated the 
draft Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was 
stuck in the bureaucracy (Indian concerns were also a 
factor), but that he would look into it.  The COAS 
recommended ADM Fargo bring up both the Iraq and ACSA issues 
with the PM and King during his visit in August 2004. 
 
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COMMENT 
======= 
 
10. (C) The fact that the Chief of Army Staff raised human 
rights in the meeting -- without prompting -- is a positive 
sign.  All indications, to include observations made by U.S. 
members of a recent Defense Institute for International Legal 
Studies (DIILS) seminar, indicate the RNA is serious about 
establishing and following rules of engagement during combat 
operations based on Nepalese and international law. 
 
11. (C) Lack of mobility remains a major issue for the RNA, 
but until the GON directs the RNA to conduct offensive 
operations to defeat the Maoists, fear will continue to grip 
Nepal.  No question exists that U.S. assistance thus far has 
made a big difference in the security situation; if the 
Engineer company at Beni had only been armed with unreliable 
INSAS rifles, Beni might very well have been the first 
district headquarters in Nepal to fall to the Maoists. 
However, the current level of US security assistance funding 
falls short of exploiting the success we have already 
witnessed and opens the possibility of a protracted and 
destructive counter-terrorist campaign.  In coordination with 
the UK and particularly with India, resources front-loaded 
provide the best hope of giving the GON the momentum 
necessary to force Maoist leaders into meaningful dialogue 
and a political solution to the insurgency. 
MORIARTY