US embassy cable - 04HARARE1201

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GIRDS FOR TREASON TRIAL VERDICT 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1157 (B) HARARE 1149 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The MDC is preparing for the possibility 
that its President, Morgan Tsvangirai, will be found guilt 
of treason in a verdict scheduled to be issued July 29. 
Tsvangirai told the Ambassador July 19 that the party woul 
 
SIPDIS 
boycott elections and not negotiate with the ruling party 
should he be convicted; mass action was a possibility.  If 
found guilty, Tsvangirai faces the death penalty and could 
be incarcerated for a lengthy period while his appeal is 
heard.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Tsvangirai told the Ambassador that he had recentl 
met with the MDC leadership to discuss contingencies in 
connection with the scheduled July 29 announcement of a 
verdict in his treason trial.  If a guilty verdict is 
would likely boycott next March's scheduled parliamentary 
election and would refuse to negotiate with the ruling 
party until the conviction were overturned.  The party 
already was taking soundings regarding a possible 
mobilization for mass action in response to a conviction. 
Tsvangirai emphasized that he did not plan to go into exil 
 
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to save himself from imprisonment or a possible death 
sentence.  The party was in touch with others in the regio 
and intended to send a delegation to Mauritius to meet wit 
other government representatives on the margins of the SAD 
summit next month.  (NOTE: We understand that MDC 
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube is planning to attend the 
 
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Democratic National Convention and participate in a world 
leadership forum and that Shadow Minister of Justice David 
Coltart has been in Washington this week.  END NOTE.) 
 
3.  (C) According to Tsvangirai, a conviction might be 
followed by consideration of mitigating circumstances 
before final sentence were pronounced.  It was difficult t 
predict how long such consideration could take, or how lon 
an appeal to the Supreme Court would take.  However, the 
state could incarcerate Tsvangirai upon rendering a guilty 
verdict and could hold him without bail. 
 
4.  (C) Turning to electoral reforms, Tsvangirai reported 
that Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa and Ncube had 
spoken a few days earlier.  Chinamasa indicated that the 
GOZ wanted the MDC's support for proposed electoral 
reforms.  Tsvangirai said he feared that the bishops and 
civil society (ref A) may be giving the GOZ the impression 
that they and the MDC would be satisfied with narrow 
electoral reforms without normalization of the election 
environment by ending restrictions on public assembly and 
expression.  Tsvangirai emphasized that the party might 
support the reforms as necessary steps but regarded them a 
wholly inadequate to the task of correcting Zimbabwe's 
fundamental imbalance of power.  He was concerned that the 
ruling party would exploit civil society's and some MDC 
members' positive statements on the reforms to walk back 
from key issues such as the repeal of laws repressive of 
basic freedoms. 
 
5.  (C) Tsvangirai said he had seen a second draft to the 
SADC election principles being honed for adoption in 
Mauritius.  He reported that they were largely consistent 
with the original norms and standards adopted by the SADC 
commit more to each government's discretion.  He said that 
the GOZ would be working hard to nail key provisions down 
to its advantage in a gathering scheduled in Victoria Fall 
next week. 
 It would be important for NGOs and the 
international community to keep SADC's feet to the fire on 
these matters. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT: A guilty verdict -- possibly compounded b 
a death sentence -- next week could force a decisive 
challenge on the opposition.  The MDC and civil society 
have been unable to get traction with the public on effort 
to stimulate mass action since the "final push" more than 
year ago.  A provocative trial verdict would spark outrage 
particularly among a restive and youthful party rank and 
file.  Whether such outrage would overcome the apathy, 
disillusionment, and alienation that have overtaken the 
Zimbabwean populace at large over the past year, though, 
remains problematic.  Though not lacking in intellectual 
firepower and grass roots support, the party lacks a leade 
of national stature to take Tsvangirai's place as a 
presidential figure. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): A sham conviction also would mar 
the ultimate blow to Zimbabwe's once respected judicial 
system.  Judges and legal scholars have told us for the 
last several years that the one blow the judiciary would 
not take would be to convict a clearly innocent person of 
capital crime.  In recent months these same legal scholar 
have been less certain that this remains the case. 
8.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): Shackling Tsvangirai with a 
conviction, incarceration, and even execution, would be 
consistent with President Mugabe's overarching priority to 
crush the opposition at all costs and his current disdain 
for western opinion.   Provoking an MDC boycott, which 
would offer some in the region cover to endorse the resul 
of a meaningless election, may be precisely what the 
ZANU-PF leadership has in mind.  At a minimum, a convicti 
would disqualify Tsvangirai as a presidential candidate f 
all purposes and, with the opposition in disarray, might 
allow the ruling party to move the presidential election u 
from 2008 to a combined presidential-parliamentary electi 
in 2005, as reportedly pushed by South Africa and the MDC 
itself.  Such a choreographed affair would be in keeping 
with historical ZANU-PF tactics of aggressively building 
political chips to cash in later when the GOZ perceives t 
Tsvangirai's fear of mixed signals, we are satisfied that 
 
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the bishops and civil society attach appropriate priority 
on the insufficiency of proposed electoral reforms.  We do 
not discount the possibility, however, that the ruling 
party would disingenuously distort and exploit their 
balanced critiques to party advantage, particularly in 
exchanges with South African and regional players. 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D) The GOZ's efforts to influence th 
AU (ref B) on human rights and SADC (ref A) on election 
standards underscore the importance it attaches to regiona 
opinion.  Indeed, its follow-through on a Tsvangirai 
verdict may yet be influenced significantly by regional if 
not domestic reaction. 
SULLIVAN