US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1357

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CG, UG, US, (GHONDA,, ANTOINE)(BEMBA JEAN-PIERRE) 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY ATTEMPT TO ENSURE THAT FOREIGN MINISTER 
GHONDA REMAINS IN OFFICE 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In demarches to both President Kabila's 
Chef de Cabinet and Vice President Bemba, the Embassy argued 
that FM Ghonda was a key element in the success of the July 
14 and 15 meetings in Washington.  Given the importance of 
his likely contribution to future such negotiations, we 
argued that he be retained in office.  The Chef de Cabinet 
said President Kabila was anxious to do so, but Bemba, who 
controlled the appointment in accordance with the Sun City 
Accords, was determined to replace him.  We later argued our 
points with Vice President Bemba, but he seemed adamant in 
his decision to see Ghonda replaced.  However, the decision 
has not yet been announced, so the question may perhaps still 
be open. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On July 16 the Embassy received a request from AF/DAS 
Yamamoto that we approach senior GDRC officials to urge that 
Foreign Minister Ghonda be retained in office.  This followed 
a number of reports, in the press and in our conversations, 
indicating that FM Ghonda's removal was being demanded of 
President Kabila by Vice President Bemba.  This was 
reportedly at the urging of Uganda President Museveni who was 
displeased with Ghonda's attitude during the recent meetings 
in Abuja. 
 
3. (C)  Seizing an opportunity during a meeting already 
scheduled with President Kabila's Chef de Cabinet, Evariste 
Boshab, Charge' raised the issue of Ghonda's future.  Boshab 
listened to our view that Ghonda had been particularly 
helpful in bringing the meetings at the Department on July 14 
and 15 on increasing peace and stability in the Great Lakes 
region to a successful conclusion (especially favorable to 
the interests of the DRC) and that his continued 
participation in follow-on negotiations was important to 
their success.  Boshab said that Vice President Bemba had 
indeed insisted that President Kabila dismiss Ghonda - as was 
Bemba's right given that the Foreign Ministryship is one of 
the positions which the MLC (Movement for Congolese 
Liberation) controls as agreed to in the Sun City Accords. 
 
4. (C)  President Kabila resisted this, and was especially 
unhappy with Bemba's proposed replacement, Raymond Ramazani 
Baya, formerly Ambassador to Paris.  Kabila had gone so far 
as to say he would not work with Mr. Baya even if he were 
required to appoint him. 
 
5. (C)  Boshab said he would take our views to the President 
immediately (there was a cabinet meeting in session).  He 
suggested we see Bemba and also Speaker of the House Kamitatu 
who, he thought, could influence Bemba. 
 
6. (C)  We had, in fact, already meant to see Bemba who 
finally got back to the Charge' at about 8:30 p.m. on the 
16th.  The Charge' and the Political Counselor drove to 
Bemba's residence and were received by him in his living room 
where he had been watching television (and which he continued 
to do sporadically out of the corner of his eye during our 
presentation.) 
 
7. (C)  The Charge' complimented Bemba on the high quality of 
the ministerial appointments he had offered to the 
Government.  We noted that not least of these was Foreign 
Minister Ghonda who had been a key element in the success of 
the talks in Washington.  The State Department at the highest 
levels had been impressed and hoped that he could continue in 
that office since further delicate negotiations were coming 
up.  The USG was committed to supporting peace and stability 
in the region, something very much in the interests of the 
GDRC, and hoped that, while acknowledging that ministerial 
appointments were entirely a question for the sovereign 
authorities to consider, our views as friends of the DRC 
would be taken into account. 
 
8. (C)  Bemba was distincly not impressed.  Without ever 
mentioning Museveni as a factor in his decision, he said that 
he had already asked President Kabila to discharge Ghonda. 
The Minister was incompetent and treated his reposnsibilities 
with culpable lack of serious attention.  Dossiers were not 
prepared, the MFA was not properly administered, Cabinet was 
left without analytical position papers, and Ghonda, like 
some student who neglected his studies and tried to cram at 
the last minute, went off to conferences without having done 
his homework.  Bemba could not let such conduct continue. 
 
9. (C)  We countered that at least we hoped that in 
consideration of our views and the excellent results of the 
State Department meetings any decision could be put off until 
Ghonda returned with his report. 
 
10. (C)  Bemba refused.  He then launched into a speech about 
his six years of political activity meant entirely for the 
good of his country, and the high esteem in which he had been 
held by, among others Ambassador Richard Holbrook "who always 
took my telephone calls, even when he was in a meeting." 
This was in contrast to the fact that he had never met the 
Secretary of State and that he had yet to receive an official 
 
SIPDIS 
invitation to Washington.  True, he had been told by 
Ambassador Yamamoto that he would always be welcomed, but 
that was not the same thing as a proper invitation with all 
that such implied. 
 
11. (C)  The press reports that Ghonda returned to Kinshasa 
late on 7/19.  Since the  decision to fire him has not been 
announced, there is some chance it will be reversed.  But 
Bemba's unyielding attitude does not bode well.  Given the 
delicate relations Bemba has with Olivier Kamitatu, we 
decided not to pursue that path, it being our judgment it 
could well cause more harm than good. 
SCOTT