US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1356

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001356 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/C, DS/C/PSP, DS/IP AND DS/IP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014 
TAGS: ASEC 
SUBJECT: KINSHASA - GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: STATE 151051 
 
Classified By: RSO JEFF LISCHKE.  REASON 1.4 (G). 
 
1.  (U)  The following from RSO are Kinshasa's responses to 
reftel subparagraphs A-L: 
 
A.  (C)  Physical Security Upgrades - Official Facilities: 
(2) Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated 
to mitigate vulnerabilities.  Kinshasa completed a major 
physical security upgrade project at the Chancery and the 
Joint Administrative Office (JAO) in April of 2002 which 
greatly improved the physical security at both compounds. 
With the involvement of the Ambassador, we also received 
permission to close off Dongo Street which runs along the 
west side of the Chancery and Avenue des Aviateurs which is 
the street located directly in front of the Chancery.  Our 
most vulnerable point is the south-east portion of the 
Chancery where Avenue des Aviateurs passes in front of the 
Portuguese Embassy and then within 8 feet of the perimeter 
wall and 20 feet of the Embassy building.  The Ambassador, 
DCM and RSO met with the mayor of Kinshasa on several 
occasions and requested permission to close off this portion 
of Aviateurs with negative results.  Before approaching the 
Mayor of Kinshasa, we received approval from the Portuguese 
to close off Ave. des Aviateurs in front of their Embassy and 
have a shared vehicle control point.  However, without 
permission from the local government we are unable to do 
this.  Another vulnerability at the Chancery is the Consular 
Section.  After the 1998 bombings and the push for 
co-location, the Consular Section moved from the USAID 
building onto the Embassy compound in early 2000 without 
receiving permission from DS.  During an IG inspection in 
2002, the number one recommendation of the IG was to renovate 
the Consular Section building to make it more secure and 
efficient.  OBO provided funding but DS is holding up the 
funds because a waiver package to co-locate was never 
submitted.  We recently submitted the waiver package and are 
looking forward to a favorable response from DS so the 
project can move forward and address the numerous security 
vulnerabilities the Consular Section currently has.  We also 
requested during the physical upgrade project to have the 
mechanical/hydraulic drop arm located inside the Embassy 
compound moved to the initial vehicle checkpoint on Dongo 
street but were told we could not do it.  More Embassy 
employees park on Dongo street than inside of the compound so 
in our opinion in makes much more sense to have the 
mechanical barrier located on Dongo street and the manual one 
located inside the Embassy compound. 
 
(C)  The JAO compound, located approximately .8 kms west of 
the Embassy, is relatively secure but does not meet the 
setback requirement in the south and south-west portion of 
the main building.  All administrative functions of the 
Embassy are located at JAO - Admin, B&F, GSO, FM, Motor Pool, 
etc.  The Public Affairs Library also does not meet the 
setback standard.  The CAC's and vehicle checkpoints meet DS 
standards and we feel relatively good about the security at 
JAO other than the lack of setback issue. 
 
(C)  The USAID compound is located .4 kms from the Embassy in 
a commercial office space that also has 7 apartments.   USAID 
completed a major physical security upgrade project in the 
spring of 2003 and installed DS standard drop arms and guard 
booths.  We also installed cement planters that increased the 
setback from approximately 30 feet to 60 feet from the main 
street.  One of the most noticeable and disturbing 
vulnerabilities of the USAID building is the uncontrolled 
access to a junk yard/mechanic shop located directly behind 
the facility on the eastern side.  USAID has also grown 
substantially.  In July of 2001 there were 5 direct hire 
American employees.  Now there are 16.  The Center of Disease 
Control also moved into this building in the winter of 2002 
and they have 2 American direct hire staff.  The bottom line 
is that USAID and CDC will run out of office space if they 
continue to expand. 
 
(C)  Other than the Consular Section renovation project, we 
do not have any other physical security upgrade projects 
planned in the near future.  The only way to improve the 
security at all three locations would be to close more 
streets which the Congolese Government will not permit us to 
do.  The good news is that we just located a parcel of land 
and received permission from the Department to sign an option 
to buy contract with the owner for a proposed New Embassy 
Compound (NEC) project that is supposed to start in 2008. 
Unless we received permission to 
 
B.  (C)  Chemical/Biological Protection:  Program is 
necessary element of the overall RSO security program at post 
but is ineffective and requires improvement.  We still have 
not received First Responder training.  It has been scheduled 
several times in the past, but has always been canceled. 
That said, we do feel that the threat of a chem/bio attack in 
Kinshasa is low but would still like to receive the training. 
 Our APO facility can be sealed in the event of a chem/bio 
incident and we are looking forward to receiving the Quick 
Mask 2000. 
 
C.  (C)  Technical Security Upgrades:  Program is highly 
relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates 
important vulnerabilities.  As a result of the major physical 
security upgrade project completed in April 2002, we have 
excellent CCTV coverage at the Chancery, JAO and USAID with 
Intellex capability at all except USAID where the video 
recorder and tapes are being utilized.  We have hard-wired 
and remote IDNS capability at both the Chancery and JAO but 
nothing at USAID in spite of several requests to USAID 
Security to address this issue. 
 
D.  (U)  Armored Vehicle Program:  Program is necessary, 
generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate 
important vulnerabilities. In a post like Kinshasa and as 
events of the recent coup and student/population 
demonstrations proved,  lightly and fully armored vehicles 
are a necessity.  During the recent student demonstrations, 
several of the Embassy LAV's were struck with rocks, bottles, 
etc. and did not suffer any damage.  We currently have a 
fully armored Suburban for the COM and 10 LAV Suburbans.  We 
do believe that Toyota Landcruisers would be a better option 
in Kinshasa because of the reliability, availability of spare 
parts and fuel consumption. 
 
E.  (U)  Guard Programs:  Program is necessary, generally 
effective, can be updated to better mitigate vulnerabilities. 
 Our contract guard service provided by USDS is excellent in 
spite of the low salaries paid to the guards.  As anyone who 
has served at an Embassy is well aware, the local guards are 
our first line of defense and play a critical role in the 
security of both facilities and residences.  The problem is 
that guards are usually woefully underpaid and receive 
minimal medical and retirement benefits by the guard contract 
companies because they want to maximize their profit margins. 
 I have always been a strong advocate of a FSN/LES guard 
force where the guards work directly for the Embassy so we 
can guarantee a basic salary that is paid on time and ensure 
that the guards receive adequate family medical benefits 
which is paramount for their morale.  How can we expect a 
guard to be loyal to the Embassy and give up his life if he 
feels he is underpaid, receive limited medical benefits and 
are not respected?  Additionally, guards in a post like 
Kinshasa (and many others in Africa), they cannot comprehend 
the fact that they do not work for the Embassy but rather for 
a company that has a contract with the Embassy. 
 
F.  (U)  Surveillance Detection Program:  Program is highly 
relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates 
important vulnerabilities.  Our SD program is effective and 
we feel that it should continue. 
 
G.  (U)  Residential Security:  Program is necessary, 
generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate 
vulnerabilities.  Residential security is critical in 
Kinshasa.  All residences have safehavens alarms that are 
connected to a Central Alarm Monitoring System (CAMS), grills 
on all windows and doors that are reasonably accessible, good 
perimeter security lighting, a perimeter wall with 
concertina/razor wire and 24-hour guards.  As a result, we 
have not experienced one residential break in for several 
years.  I am not sure whether or not SRWF is required for all 
residences.  It is necessary for key officers' residences, 
but I do not believe that SRWF is necessary on every single 
residential window.  That said, the majority of our 
residences have SRWF and those that do not will have it 
installed. 
 
H.  (U)  Soft Targets:  Program is highly relevant, operating 
effectively, well supported and mitigates important 
vulnerabilities.  I have worked closely with the 
Administrator from The American School of Kinshasa (TASOK) to 
ensure that we took advantage of the funding offered by the 
Department for the different phases of the security upgrade 
programs at Overseas American Schools.  TASOK now has a PA 
system that enables the Administrator to give emergency 
instructions to students throughout the campus and the class 
rooms, a 25 watt mobil radio that enables him to communicate 
effectively with Post # 1 and SRWF on the majority of class 
room and office windows.  Most recently, we requested and 
received $70,000.00 to improve the perimeter wall and place 
concertina/razor wire on the entire wall. 
 
(U)  We do have an issue with security at the Congo American 
Language Institute.  We would like to improve their security 
by adding hard-line doors, a proper screening area and some 
other security upgrades but are having a problem with 
funding.  Is PD or DS responsible for providing funding? 
Please note that there are no Americans who work at the 
facility, but we consider it a soft target. 
 
I.  (U)  Briefing Program:  Program is highly relevant, 
operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important 
vulnerabilities.  We have an excellent briefing program for 
permanent and TDY American personnel, FSN/LES staff and the 
private American community.  We included the checklist sent 
by the DS as a result of the Larry Foley Accountability 
Review Board in our briefing.  We regularly give security 
advice to Embassy personnel at our All American Staff meeting 
that is held every other Friday.  We also brief members of 
the private American community at Town Hall meetings held at 
the Ambassador's residence.  We also provide newly hired 
FSN/LES with a security/CI briefings. 
 
J.  (U)  ATA Program:  Program is a necessary element of the 
overall RSO security program at post, but is ineffective and 
requires improvement.  It has been my experience as RSO that 
unless the country you are serving in is on the foreign 
policy map - Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, etc. - there is no 
opportunity to take advantage of this incredible program.  I 
have, however, worked closely with our Public Affairs Officer 
and sent several Congolese Police and Security Officials back 
to the States under the International Visitors (IV) Program. 
 
K.  (U)  Emergency Management Program:  Program is highly 
relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates 
important vulnerabilities.  In a post like Kinshasa that has 
been evacuated 5 times in the last 10 years, emergency 
planning is paramount.  I provide a briefing to all pertinent 
members of the Embassy on their responsibilities in the event 
of an evacuation.  The CLO and I recently held a briefing for 
all Embassy and USAID employees and their dependents on what 
to expect in the event of an evacuation.   Additionally, the 
Crisis Management Exercise (CME) conducted by the Department 
also helps prepare Embassies for crisis situations.  One 
comment on the EAP:  DS/SPP needs to clarify the 
incorporation of the Section 1500 completed by the Integrated 
Survey Teams and with what the Section 1500 is supposed to 
have. 
 
L.  (U)  RSO and RSO/IS Training:  Program is necessary, 
generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate 
vulnerabilities.  Both of the ARSO's serving in Kinshasa 
arrived well-trained and ready to handle the challenges a 
post like Kinshasa offers.  That said, there is not much 
opportunity for a RSO who has been in the field for 2-3 posts 
to receive any RSO/IS training. 
 
2.  (U)  POC is RSO Jeff Lischke at 243-81-88-44608 (cell) or 
934 ext. 2207 (IVG). 
 
 
SCOTT