US embassy cable - 04RANGOON914

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE BURMA MEETING AT 
UNGA 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 862 
 
     B. KUALA LUMPUR 2765 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Leon de Riedmatten, UN Special Envoy 
Razali's representative in Rangoon, says that UNSYG Kofi 
Annan hopes to organize a consultative group meeting on Burma 
on the margins of the upcoming UNGA to discuss next steps and 
strategies.  The UNSYG will most likely invite traditional 
consultative partners on Burma--including the U.S., EU 
members, and Japan--as well as other "influential" countries 
such as China.  An invitation to the GOB is being considered, 
but is not certain.  Meanwhile, de Riedmatten says it is 
highly unlikely that the GOB will allow Razali to return to 
Burma in the near future, perhaps not even before the end of 
2004.  De Riedmatten, usually a source of optimism and 
energy, says he is frustrated by the unresolved stalemate in 
Burma and has run out of potential solutions.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Following a July 19 Martyr's Day commemoration at NLD 
headquarters (septel), COM and P/E chief met with Leon de 
Riedmatten, local representative for UN Special Envoy for 
Burma Razali Ismail.  De Riedmatten had recently returned 
from a trip to Bangkok where he joined Razali for 
Burma-related meetings on the margins of the international 
AIDS conference. 
 
3. (C) De Riedmatten said that he and Razali had met with 
UNSYG Kofi Annan in Bangkok to discuss developments in Burma 
and to consider a U.N. strategy for next steps.  According to 
De Riedmatten, the SYG was "very well briefed" on Burma and 
used the meeting to press Razali to be more proactive with 
his diplomatic efforts, rather than simply react to 
SPDC-controlled events inside Burma.  Implementing this 
advice, Razali and de Riedmatten flew to Vientiane to meet 
with the GOL and found the Lao "well informed about the SPDC 
version of events, but nonetheless inquisitive about all 
developments in Rangoon." 
 
4. (C) The UNSYG also encouraged Razali to support Thailand's 
diplomatic efforts to engage the regime.  Razali subsequently 
met with PM Thaksin and found the RTG enthusiastic about 
pursuing the Bangkok process, despite being "burned" by the 
regime in April when the GOB pulled the plug on the Bangkok 
II meeting. 
 
5. (C) According to de Riedmatten, UNSYG Annan was receptive 
to Razali's pitch to organize a Burma meeting among 
interested foreign ministers in late September on the margins 
of the upcoming UNGA (ref B).  In fact, de Riedmatten said, 
the UNSYG committed to using UN Secretariat resources to pull 
the consultative meeting together.  The UNSYG would likely 
invite not only traditional participants in previous Burma 
meetings--including the U.S., EU members, and Japan--but 
would also reach out to other "influential" countries such as 
China and perhaps others in the region.  De Riedmatten said 
that an invitation for Burmese participation was not yet 
certain. 
 
6. (C) Turning to the Burmese political stalemate, de 
Riedmatten said it was unlikely the SPDC would allow Razali 
to visit Burma anytime soon, perhaps not even before the end 
of 2004.  He observed that the generals are "very 
comfortable" with the status quo and are not feeling any 
particular international pressure.  To the contrary, de 
Riedmatten said, ASEAN's tepid statement at the ARF had given 
the GOB a free pass (Note: De Riedmatten said he had seen an 
early draft of the ASEAN statement which was "fairly hard 
hitting" until the GOB succeeded in getting a watered-down 
final version.  End note.) 
 
7. (S) De Riedmatten said he continued to be perplexed by the 
lack of communication from Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains 
under house arrest but has an ongoing, proven ability to 
communicate clandestinely.  De Riedmatten, a long-time 
confidant of ASSK's, said he regularly sends in briefing and 
background papers, but in recent months has rarely heard 
anything in response.  "She shows no sign of impatience or 
frustration," said de Riedmatten, "and perhaps I even detect 
resignation."  He noted that he had at one point in the last 
few months recommended that ASSK consider civil disobedience 
as a tool to apply internal pressure on the regime.  ASSK 
turned down the option because in her view the NLD would not 
be able to secure widespread support for any acts of 
disobedience. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  De Riedmatten, usually optimistic about new 
possibilities and options, was unusually downbeat during our 
July 19 meeting.  "I've completely run out of ideas," he 
said, "and I am at a loss about we can do next."  He was 
particularly frustrated with the NLD CEC, observing that 
their decision to take a pass on the National Convention was 
"perhaps a sound and strategic decision, but in the interim 
they have done nothing and have failed to present any 
alternative strategy to the NC process."  He opined that the 
consultative meeting in New York could "help to reinvigorate 
an international consensus" but quickly added that such a 
meeting would not likely produce any meaningful results 
inside Burma.  End Comment. 
Martinez