US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1196

S E C R E T COLOMBO 001196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR SA, SA/INS AND S/WCI LTC MILLER; SECDEF FOR 
SO/LIC ASD O'CONNELL 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07/20/14 
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, PHUM, PINR, MV, CE, Maldives, Human Rights 
SUBJECT:  RETURN OF MALDIVIAN DETAINEE AT GUANTANAMO 
 
REF: (A) PARTO 00012 (B) COLOMBO 842 (C) USDAO COLOMBO IIR 
6 816 0114 03 (8/27/2003) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASONS 1.5 
B, D. 
 
1. (C/NF) On July 1 Secretary Powell met with Maldives 
Foreign Minister Jameel and discussed the issue of 
Maldivian detainee at Guantanamo Ibrahim Fouzy (Ref A). 
The Secretary noted that "the Department of Defense is 
reviewing the case carefully and would be in touch soon to 
discuss terms of return and how the detainee would be 
monitored by Maldivian officials once he returned." Jameel 
replied that his government would be ready to discuss 
details of return at any time. As noted in Ref B, the 
Maldives has made it clear to us that it supports us in 
the Global War on Terrorism and is prepared to assist us 
in whatever way possible.  Given this attitude, it would 
be extremely helpful if we could resolve the matter of the 
detainee as quickly as possible. 
 
2. (S/NF) We understand that there is some difference of 
opinion as to whether Fouzy is being cooperative or 
deceptive.  We only note that our DATT visited Guantanamo 
in August 2003 accompanying two Maldivian police officials 
to interview Fouzy (Ref C).  At that time the DATT was 
told that "Fouzy has been very cooperative and has not 
hesitated to answer any questions." Obviously, it would be 
useful to clarify this matter. 
 
3. (S/NF) We also understand that there is some concern 
that the Maldives suggestion of "monitoring" is so vague 
that it is not possible to determine whether it would 
negate any threat posed by Fouzy. It is not surprising 
that the Maldivian offer is vague since they have few 
details to work from.  The cannot at this point tell us 
that they would detain or try Fouzy since they do not know 
what the evidence against him would be.  They have told us 
several times they are willing to present concrete 
proposals for handling Fouzy when he returns, once they 
have a clearer idea of the evidence against him. 
 
4.  (C) The Maldivians'distaste of radical militant 
Islamic views is quite profound, however, and we need not 
fear they will be lenient on Fouzy.  The last thing they 
want is for an injection of Islamic militancy into their 
conservative Muslim society.  Even "monitoring" has a 
different meaning in the Maldivian context. "Monitoring" 
would probably mean forced residence on a small and remote 
island.  In such an environment, Fouzy's every act would 
be noticed, and his ability to absent himself would be 
almost non-existent. 
 
5.  (C) The main point, however, is that the Maldivians 
can't do or promise anything unless we talk to them about 
the situation.  We can do that, if Washington sends us 
instructions, or we would be pleased to facilitate 
visitors who would do so. For the discussions to be 
productive, they would need to have enough detail to allow 
the Maldivians to make some concrete proposals. The 
Maldivians have told us they have checked out Fouzy's case 
and are satisfied he poses no threat. If there is evidence 
to the contrary, we should let them know. 
 
7. (S/NF) As we said earlier, this is not just about this 
individual.  Maldives is helpful to us on military issues 
(overflights, emergency landings, etc), and has expressed 
its desire to help us in areas such as tracking suspected 
terrorists who might transit Maldives. The continued 
detention of the Maldivian at Guantanamo is an irritant in 
that potentially fruitful cooperation. Unless there is 
evidence to the contrary, we should try to remove it as 
soon as possible. 
 
LUNSTEAD