US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1339

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MONUC EXPECTATIONS OF TASK/SIZE INCREASE

Identifier: 04KINSHASA1339
Wikileaks: View 04KINSHASA1339 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2004-07-19 14:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KPKO CG UN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO - J.W. SWIGERT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPKO, CG, UN 
SUBJECT: MONUC EXPECTATIONS OF TASK/SIZE INCREASE 
 
REF: A. A. STATE 150717 
 
     B. B. E-MAIL SANDERSON-EASTHAM 7/8/04 
     C. C. KINSHASA 1050 
     D. D. KINSHASA 1109 
 
Classified By: Poloff Edward Bestic for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  SRSG William Swing says MONUC needs more 
troops, and that UNSYG Kofi Annan is likely to support such a 
request.  According to a mid-level MONUC source, the 
organization plans to ask for an additional 25,000 troops, 
increasing the annual cost to an estimated $2.2bn.  The 
source said UN authorities in New York oppose such a large 
increase and think MONUC should focus on its core tasks, but 
MONUC officials have something closer to "maximalist" views. 
Swing is a realist, therefore we think his likely goal is to 
reach 15-18,000 troops, enough to strengthen the Kivus and 
Ituri brigades, the Neutral Force in Kinshasa, and give MONUC 
a rapid-reaction force.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Swing:  "We Need More Troops" 
----------------------------- 
2. (C) Emboffs met with MONUC SRSG William Swing on July 8, 
to deliver talking points reftel.  According to Swing, 
although his mission's mandate has expanded during the past 
year, its resources have not.  Recent fighting in the Kivus 
demonstrated that MONUC cannot handle two crises at once. 
UNSYG Kofi Annan is likely to support a MONUC request for 
additional troops and police trainers, he said, in order to 
"avoid having to lower Congolese and international 
expectations of MONUC."  Swing did not give specifics on the 
additional forces MONUC might request. 
 
 
New York, MONUC Debate Size/Tasks 
--------------------------------- 
3. (C) A mid-level MONUC source told poloff July 16 that 
MONUC military staff drafted a "very unrealistic" plan that 
asks for 25,000 additional troops, raising the mission's 
annual cost to an estimated $2.2 billion.  (Note:  MONUC's 
current authorized troop strength is 10,800.  End note.) New 
York opposes so large an increase, and thinks MONUC should 
focus on essential peacekeeping tasks only.  MONUC senior 
leaders, however, want to take something closer to a 
"maximalist" approach;  the 25,000 requested increase is 
sincere, it is not simply a bargaining position.  Speculating 
on MONUC leaders' thinking, the source said that many in the 
mission had previously served in Kosovo, and "don't realize 
they're no longer in the Balkans."  Another factor is simply 
bureaucratic inertia and the tendency for organizational 
empire-building. 
 
4. (SBU) The source confirmed that a team from DPKO arrived 
in Kinshasa July 15, to help prepare the Secretary-General's 
report on MONUC to the Security Council.  (Note:  DATT met 
with the team on July 15, and will report septel.  End note.) 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
5. (C) Swing is a realist, therefore we find it unlikely he 
himself seriously expects to triple MONUC's strength.  A more 
likely goal is to reach 15-18,000 troops, enough to 
strengthen the Kivus and Ituri brigades, the Neutral Force in 
Kinshasa, and give MONUC a rapid-reaction force.  In our 
view, the additional troops are necessary, but it is even 
more important for MONUC leaders to address long-standing 
problems such as poor internal communications, weak 
management in key field offices, and widely-differing levels 
of ability and motivation among the various troop contingents 
(see ref's C and D).  END COMMENT. 
SCOTT 

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