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| Identifier: | 01ABUJA2073 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 01ABUJA2073 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2001-08-17 17:24:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | EFIN KTIA NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 171724Z Aug 01
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002073 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN, KTIA, NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO U.S. COMMENTS ON DRAFT BILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT REF(S): (A) STATE 140051 (B) ABUJA 1914 (C) ABUJA 1374 AND PREVIOUS 1. On August 15, EconOff met with Debt Management Office Director-General, Akin S. Arikawe, to discuss USG reactions to Nigeria's proposals for the bilateral debt rescheduling agreement as described Ref A. Arikawe read through the entire document with EconOff and provided immediate reactions to almost all paragraphs. The following contains his preliminary comments and do not necessarily reflect the formal reply that will be forthcoming in the next 2 - 3 weeks. 2. Arikawe admitted that, although "they were worth a try," he had not expected the USG to agree to the proposed fixed interest rate of 4 percent, the application of payments first to interest and then to principal, or to reciprocal language on termination of agreement. However, Arikawe felt other issues warranted closer attention by the USG. 3. Per Ref A, USG wants to retain Article IV, Paragraphs 1 and 2, which discuss comparable treatment. Arikawe said this would be no problem as long as the USG understands that Nigeria will likely receive more favorable terms from other creditors. Arikawe commented, for example, that he expects Nigeria to receive a fixed interest rate from an Euro- based country (he did not specify which one). He stated that under the comparable treatment clause, the USG could be bound to offer a comparable interest rate. 4. Arikawe did not accept the USG's refusal to delete Article IV, Paragraph 4 because, he said, the USG holds no other claims other than those included by the Agreed Minute. EconOff pointed out that, if the U.S. holds no other claims, then the paragraph does no harm. However, Arikawe continued to assert that there is no need to include this paragraph. Arikawe explained that with some creditors, such as Germany, this clause is necessary because they hold debt not covered by the Agreed Minute. 5. On the accrual of Additional Interest, Arikawe exclaimed that the USG was being "very harsh." He named five or six European countries, including Norway and Germany, that had already agreed to grace periods of between 15 and 45 days. Arikawe explained that grace periods were sometimes necessary for political reasons; the National Assembly may delay approval for debt payments in order to maintain political leverage. He commented that USG refusal to provide any grace period also failed to meet the comparable treatment terms described in the Agreed Minute. 6. Regarding debt swaps, Arikawe was surprised by the USG's negative response since Embassy officers had recently met with him to raise such a possibility (reported in Ref C). Arikawe believed there was strong interest on the part of third parties to buy Nigerian debt. He provided an example of a private power company that had expressed interest in assisting Nigeria in reducing gas flaring through such an arrangement. Arikawe promised to deliver EconOff a letter providing more detailed information on these third parties. 7. The following reactions pertain to Annex G of the draft agreement: -- Arikawe said the GON could not accept the accrual of interest on payments due on a non-business day if the payment is made on the following business day. He explained that if a payment is due on a day that happens to be a U.S. bank holiday, for example, then Nigeria's payment could not be transferred into the appropriate account until the following day. Nigeria should not be held accountable for determining which days in the U.S. are "non-business days," he stated. -- Arikawe had no immediate comment regarding Annex G, Paragraphs B.4, C, or D. -- Regarding sovereign immunity, Arikawe explained that the proposed language would be unacceptable if the draft terms are more onerous than the original contract terms. -- Regarding Events of Default, Arikawe said he could accept this clause only if it applies to a default on Nigeria's U.S. debt, not if it applies to a default on debt held by any other Paris Club member. -- Regarding Disposition of Indebtedness, the GON requests that they be notified before the USG takes action to dispose of Nigeria's debt. The reason, Arikawe said, is that if the USG proposes to sell to a hostile third party that would impose more onerous repayment terms, then the GON should be informed and have the right to refuse. -- Regarding Expenses, Arikawe explained, the courts, not the agreement, should decide whether Nigeria is to be held responsible for any costs associated with a judicial claim. 8. Before concluding the meeting, EconOff emphasized to Arikawe that the process for negotiating bilateral debt agreements in the United States is bureaucratic, not political; the USG's cookie-cutter approach makes Nigeria's requested changes difficult to obtain. Arikawe understood, commenting that this was a problem Nigeria was encountering in many countries, particularly Germany where the negotiations are done completely by a private financial institution on commission from the government. 9. Post will forward the GON's formal reply to Ref A as soon as it is made available. JETER
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