US embassy cable - 04ANKARA3988

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

TURCO-ISRAELI RELATIONS REMAIN ACTIVE BUT UNDERGOING RECALIBRATION

Identifier: 04ANKARA3988
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA3988 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-07-19 07:19:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV PINS TU IS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU, IS 
SUBJECT: TURCO-ISRAELI RELATIONS REMAIN ACTIVE BUT 
UNDERGOING RECALIBRATION 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; reasons: 1.4 b,d. 
 
1. (C) Summary: July 13-15 visit to Turkey of Israeli Deputy 
PM Olmert demonstrated that Turco-Israeli relations have 
broadened beyond the mil-mil/intel ties that have hitherto 
formed the core of the relationship.  In the Israeli view the 
visit cast in sharp relief the rivalry (which we have 
previously reported) between Turkish PM Erdogan and FonMin 
Gul, with the latter openly deprecating his boss to Olmert. 
At the same time the visit underscored that Israel needs to 
broaden its support in Turkey beyond the narrow slice of the 
Turkish elite and adapt to the new Turkish political dynamic. 
 End summary. 
 
2. (C) In contrast to Turkish press reports which played up 
PM Erdogan's refusal to meet Olmert, the visit was a success 
according to MFA, ruling AK Party (AKP), and Israeli Embassy 
contacts.  Our interlocutors, including MFA DDG for Middle 
East Gokturk, AKP deputy chairman for foreign policy Disli, 
and Israeli Ambassador Avivi, all asserted that relations 
will continue to be active.  Erdogan did not receive Olmert 
partly because of the manner in which Olmert demanded a 
meeting ("We request a meeting with PM Erdogan at x hour on x 
date"), partly for domestic political reasons.  Nevertheless, 
Olmert had a series of highest-level meetings -- 
characterized as warm and constructive by all our 
interlocutors -- with President Sezer, FonMin Gul (including 
a very cordial dinner hosted by Gul), and various ministers. 
 
3. (S) As we understand it, intel and military cooperation in 
specific areas has never stopped, although we have heard from 
one contact with long-standing connections to military intel 
and the national intel organization (MIT) that Turkish intel 
services are increasingly irritated by Israeli pushiness. 
 
4. (C) MFA and Israeli interlocutors told us commercial 
relations have room to grow, despite recent progress on what 
they characterize as mutually beneficial business agreements. 
 We continue to hear from others, however, that the Turks are 
irritated by what they see as Israeli foot-dragging on 
agreeing to purchase water from the Manavgat river in 
southern Turkey, foot-dragging they interpret as part of 
Israel's policy of keeping Turkey dangling. Agriculture and 
irrigation joint venture projects in the GAP region of 
southeastern Turkey also have potential to grow but, judging 
by Olmert's public statements, there appears to be mutual 
distrust regarding faithfulness to contracts and commitments. 
 
5. (C) Avivi said he was struck by what he noted were 
uncharacteristically warm receptions from Sezer and Gul and 
unexpected, deprecating remarks from Gul about Erdogan; 
evidence he asserted further highlighted fissures in AKP. 
Avivi told us "Israel has a great problem with Erdogan" and 
the pendulum effect Erdogan's public statements are having on 
the Turkish population at large.  According to Avivi, Gul 
told Olmert 1) 'Erdogan is not like me, he's a simple person 
with no diplomatic training'; 2) Erdogan's recent statements 
about Israel are not constructive; and 3) 'Erdogan is going 
to damage our relationship'.  Avivi further asserted that 
"Israel will not be a shock absorber for everything Erdogan 
wants to say".  Avivi believes Turks noticed Israeli 
reactions, especially a decrease in tourism, the El-Al 
stoppage and took a lesson on the limits of criticism from 
that. 
 
6. (C) In contrast, Middle East Department DDG Gokturk 
retreated to standard MFA talking points: 1) Erdogan's 
comments should not be taken out of context, particularly 
because GOT actions toward Israel have been positive; 2) 
present and future relations between Turkey and Israel are in 
line with historic friendly relations with Israel; and 3) the 
GOT is aggressively searching for an important role in the 
Middle East peace process.  Despite what Gokturk 
characterized as an "age-old friendship" between Turkey and 
Jews, he noted as hindrances to the relationship 1) Turkish 
concerns about reports that Israelis are operating in 
Northern Iraq and could support an independent Kurdish state 
and 2) public sympathy for the plight of Palestinians. 
Gokturk also highlighted the potential for Turkey to play a 
facilitating role in a Syria-Israel track as an attraction 
creating additional support for the relationship.  Avivi 
indicated that Israel is interested in the Turk's in an 
information role, but he said they had not agreed to their 
efforts to act as a facilitator. 
 
7. (C) The visit also illustrated that political relations 
will continue but be more complex for several reasons: 
 
--Israel has taken its relations for granted and has not 
understood the deep changes in Turkish society.  In this 
regard, Israel has built its relations through (a) Jews in 
Istanbul; (b) Turks from the elite; (c) the Turkish General 
Staff; (d) high bureaucrats. 
 
--Turks across the board favor the underdog and in this case 
they are deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians.  Turks from 
all sectors and political persuasions have been repeatedly 
shocked by the current GOI's actions, even while they ignore 
the similar methods Ankara used against the PKK/Kurds in the 
1990's. 
 
--Whatever is happening in northern Iraq regarding Israeli 
presence or influence, and however questionable Turkish intel 
sources may be, neither the TGS, nor the GOT, nor the man in 
the street believes GOI denials that Israel is training 
peshmergas or organizing a wholesale buy-up of land. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  Turkish Israeli relations have a continuing 
basis of mutual interest in business, military and 
intelligence communities, but those support elements are 
weakening.  It remains to be seen how far they will recede 
and whether a basis can be established with the emerging 
power elements in AKP.  Developments in the region beyond 
Turkish-Israeli issues likely will have a significant impact. 
DEUTSCH 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04