US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS3059

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 003059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2009 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, MOPS, ETRD, MASS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: US-EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LOOK AT UPCOMING ISSUES 
FOR DUTCH PRESIDENCY 
 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C)  Summary.  US-EU Political Director consultations in 
Brussels on July 13 discussed a broad agenda including summit 
follow-up, and compared notes on Russia, Ukraine, Moldova 
and Central Asia.  EUR A/S Jones told the EU now is not the 
time to lift its arms embargo on China, and urged the EU, in 
its July 16 meeting with Russia, to raise the need for Russia 
and Georgia to "engage politically and disengage militarily." 
 The EU, led by Dutch MFA Political Director Hugo Siblesz, 
briefed on Iraqi FM Zebari's very positive July 12 visit and 
discussed the need 
for the EU to raise its "visibility" in Iraq.  The EU is 
frustrated by Israel's refusal to work with the Quartet, and 
looks to the US to reiterate with Israel the Quartet's 
importance.  The EU is reluctant to promote reform in the 
Middle 
East through joint action with the US.   On security issues, 
the EU wants a dialogue with NATO on more than just Berlin 
Plus issues; Turkey objects.  The EU also wants to clarify 
control of strategic reserve for its upcoming Bosnia takeover 
of SFOR. The EU may send a high level delegation to Sudan; it 
also asked for US views on out of country voting by Afghans 
in Iran and Pakistan.  End Summary. 
 
 
Next six months:  Elections, EU constitution 
---------------- 
2. (C)  A/S Jones opened the meeting by noting that there was 
much work for the US and EU to do following June's productive 
US-EU summit.  The next six months would also be a period of 
change, with elections in Europe, the US, in many of Europe's 
neighbors, and beyond.  She congratulated the EU for the 
"huge 
accomplishment" in drafting a constitution, and asked the EU 
to help the US understand the process as the constitution is 
implemented.  Dutch European Correspondent Joep Wijnands 
noted the constitution will be signed October 29 in Rome; 
entry into force is expected in 2006 or later.  The EU wanted 
to move 
ahead with planning for an EU Foreign Minister and a 
supporting diplomatic corps, but did not want to pre-judge 
the ratification process.  He also noted that a new 
Commission at 25 would take over in November. 
 
Russia: Difficult Issues Remain 
------ 
3.  (C)  Dutch PolDir Hugo Siblesz noted that gaining Russian 
acceptance of EU enlargement, and the extension of the 
EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), had 
been difficult.  Siblesz expected all the issues raised by 
Moscow -- e.g. Kaliningrad and the ethnic Russian minorities 
in EU accession 
countries -- to be dredged up again by the Russians.  On July 
16, the EU will hold it PolDirs meeting with Russia in 
Moscow, and Siblesz will raise Chechnya, media freedom, and 
Yukos, and the "near abroad."  On Chechnya, the EU noted the 
need to keep pressure on Moscow over human rights abuses and 
the need for 
access by humanitarian organizations.  On the near abroad, 
Siblesz said the EU sees a common obligation with Russia to 
promote stability through democracy and free markets; Russia 
does not share this view.  Commission Deputy DG Valenzuela 
said that although Russia considered the EU's European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to be beneath it, and therefore is 
not interested in an ENP Action Plan, many of the ENP 
elements are in fact applicable, and the EU will use 
"roadmaps" for each of the four agreed "common spaces" to 
force Russia to work on specific issues. 
 
EU:  Yukos Case is Troubling 
--------------- 
4.  (C)  Valenzuela and Siblesz cited the Yukos case several 
times as particularly damaging for potential investors.  A/S 
Jones shared U.S. concerns that while Putin wants strategic 
engagement, all the "value issues" were going the wrong way 
inside Russia.  She cited FM Lavrov's recent false claims 
that 
Secretary Powell did not raise Yukos in their most recent 
 
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meeting, at which point Council Foreign Policy Director 
Robert Cooper quipped, "I guess we better make sure to raise 
Yukos on Friday." 
 
Ukraine and ENP 
-------------------- 
5.  (C)  Siblesz briefed on the July 8 EU-Ukraine summit, 
which he noted the press had termed a "disaster" because of 
the failure to agree on a joint "Action Plan" under ENP.  In 
fact, he said, the discussions were very frank, and Kuchma 
engaged on EU concerns about democracy, media freedom and 
rule of 
law.  Valenzuela said Ukraine was unwilling to negotiate an 
Action Plan, hoping the summit might result in some 
indication from the EU on eventual membership for Ukraine. 
In the end, he said, the EU expects Ukraine to negotiate an 
Action Plan --"it's not Russia, after all" -- although the 
political reform elements of the plan won't be popular with 
Kiev. 
 
Georgia and Moldova/Transnistria 
------------ 
6.  (C)  A/S Jones noted concern about rising 
Georgian-Russian tensions over South Ossetia, and proposed as 
a practical step that both the EU and US push Georgia and 
Russia to "calm down, engage politically and disengage 
militarily."  The US was sending it's Special Negotiator to 
Tbilisi to press 
Georgia and Russia to address contentious issues on South 
Ossetia; the EU might want to consider doing the same.  On 
Transnistria, A/S Jones expressed US disappointment with 
Moscow's complete failure on its Istanbul commitments to 
withdraw arms.  She said the US was thinking of adding names 
to the list of Transnistrian officials banned from travel to 
the US and EU countries, and would be providing the EU soon a 
proposed list.  Both sides expressed concern about the 
possibility that Russia would spring  a "Kozak II" unilateral 
settlement proposal in the fall -- or even sooner. 
 
OSCE:  Moving East and CIS Ideas 
----------------- 
7.  (C)  The EU asked about US views on the recent CIS summit 
proposal to strengthen the OSCE secretariat.  A/S Jones said 
the concern was that Russia's goal was not a stronger OSCE, 
but one that Russia could better control by seeking a key 
role in an expanded secretariat.  Cooper said the EU was 
puzzled; 
the OSCE's economic dimension was moving toward the EU (with 
nearly half the members now in the EU too) while the security 
component was moving closer to NATO.  Both sides agreed that 
moving some OSCE events further east made sense; 
Valenzuela noted that Slovenia has proposed taking such a 
decision in principle, but leaving implementation to the 
future.  A/S Jones said that might make sense; it was 
unrealistic to think Georgia or Tajikistan could host a huge 
OSCE event next year.  Siblesz said it made sense for the 
OSCE to look at new 
threats such as trafficking in persons and narcotics, but it 
is important the OSCE not move away from its core 
achievements in human rights, political freedoms and election 
monitoring.  Cooper said the EU was working on a paper to 
define what the OSCE could best do now to promote stability, 
security and 
reform. 
 
Central Asia 
------------ 
8.  (C)  A/S Jones described US relations as being good 
bilaterally.  U.S. military use of bases in the region for 
resupply of the Afghan effort is important, but the U.S. 
keeps "all issues" on the table.  She commended US-EU 
cooperation, especially in the area of border security, 
reviewed Tajikistan's 
desire for Russian border guards to depart, and called on the 
EU to help train Tajik border forces.  She outlined US 
training and election assistance in the region, noted Deputy 
Secretary Armitage's trip to the region, and said the U.S. 
 
SIPDIS 
was facing a difficult decision on whether or not to continue 
security 
assistance to Uzbekistan, which had not come through on any 
its promised political reforms.  Siblesz briefed on EU 
ministerial meetings earlier in the day with Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, where the sides had discussed elections, media 
freedom, and rule of law.  The EU saw progress in Kazakhstan 
(A/S Jones agreed, but noted one outstanding issue -- the 
imprisonment of former official Zhakianov for political 
reasons) and Valenzuela said they planned to sign a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Tajikistan 
in the fall.  At Kazakhstan's request, EU High Rep Solana mayattend the 
September regional security CICA ministerial in 
Almaty as an observer.  EU assistance to the 
region has increased to 120 million euros, but this probably 
is a cap, Valenzuela said, indicating that additional funds 
for border guards was problematical.  A/S Jones offered to 
provide US assistance figures, and noted the benefit of the 
image of the US and EU pushing the same agenda in the region. 
 
Sudan 
----- 
9.  (C)  Siblesz said the EU saw eye to eye with the US on 
Sudan and the EU's July 12 ministerial conclusions tracked 
closely with the US position.  The EU is not present in 
Khartoum, but provides about half the aid.  The EU agreed the 
draft UNSCR was useful to keep pressure on Sudan, but noted 
importance of 
keeping policy consistent with North-South talks.  Siblesz 
said this was like "squeezing both an egg and a tennis ball 
in the same hand."  Cooper said the last sentence of the EU's 
ministerial conclusions is key -- "if no progress is made, 
the EU will consider other measures."  A/S Jones said the US 
is working closely with UNSYG Annan; security issues are key 
and EU should also coordinate closely with UN.  Siblesz said 
visibility is key and the EU may send a high level envoy to 
Darfur; German FM Fischer was just there but was told by the 
Sudanese government there is no problem, which is nonsense. 
 
Iraq: Good Zebari Visit 
---- 
10.  (C)  Siblesz said Iraq FM Zebari's lunch the day before 
with EU FM's went well; Zebari focused on what the EU could 
do to help with the political process, reconstruction, with 
the UN, and on training for police and judicial officials. 
Cooper said Zebari was "extremely credible," and left a good 
impression as willing to assert independence from the U.S., 
recognizing the 
challenges ahead, and determined to meet them.  He called for 
a "visible" EU presence on the ground, and for direct EU aid, 
not through the UN.  Zebari also spoke cynically about 
relations with neighboring countries, recalling that when he 
was in the opposition, the only way to smuggle arms into Iraq 
was with the 
help of neighboring regimes, implying the same was true in 
today's Iraq.  Siblesz noted that Solana may attend a July 
meeting in Cairo to talk with Iraq's neighbors.  The EU side 
had made a major issue about the death penalty; Zebari 
explained it was needed as a deterrent, and may not need to 
be applied. 
 
Iraq Next Steps:  EU "visibility" 
------------------ 
11.  (C)  Siblesz said the EU agreed with Zebari to continue 
the political dialogue, perhaps with a high level visit to 
Baghdad.  The Commission has opened an office in Amman and 
will travel to Baghdad but there is no timeline for opening a 
Baghdad office -- that depends on the security situation. 
Cooper said the EU held an initial technical meeting July 12 
to canvas member states 
on their bilateral programs in Iraq; the EU is looking at 
whether turning them into EU-wide programs would add value. 
Once the EU has come to some conclusions, Brussels will 
consult with the US.  The key point, Cooper summarized, is 
that the EU is "moving forward" on Iraq. 
 
Middle East:  Summit Followup 
--------------------- 
12.  (C)  A/S Jones proposed that Senior Level follow up to 
the US-EU summit statement on the Broader Middle East and 
Mediterranean (BMENA in the US-EU context) should be 
discussed in the US-EU Task Force that would meet July 14. 
She also suggested additional US-EU digital video conferences 
on assistance, coordination on the ground between US and EC 
missions in the region, and how to work with the G8's 
Forum for the Future as topics for the Task Force to 
consider.  Siblesz said the EU was focusing on summit 
followup; some steps would be procedural, some would be 
substantive, but the EU and US were looking at the same 
agenda and the same goal and was conducting a 
country-by-country assessment of its programs in 
the region.  Valenzuela urged senior level follow-up to 
coordinate US-EU assistance, but urged clarifying our goals 
before "rushing to the region," noted that the US and EU 
still disagree over WTO access, and added that the EU was 
also looking at how to engage with the Gulf countries and at 
the linkage to 
its policies toward Iraq and Iran.  Siblesz said the EU 
wanted to compare notes on Saudi Arabia; A/S Jones said we 
would welcome a dialogue.  Cooper noted that this summit text 
was the "most difficult text the EU has ever negotiated;" it 
remains a "delicate" subject for the EU. Differences remain 
between the US 
and EU -- the EU, for example, does not view WTO access as a 
reward; rather, it has a transforming effect that empowers 
NGO's and civil society. Viewed this way, he said, "it cannot 
be a bad thing to have all countries in the region in the 
WTO, and this is an EU policy goal." 
 
EU Still Smarting over Israeli Snub to Quartet; ICJ opinion 
-------------------------------- 
13.  (C)  Siblesz expressed frustration with Israel's 
continued unwillingness to engage the Quartet, referring to 
Israel's refusal last week to meet with Quartet envoys to 
discuss their concerns about the Gaza withdrawal plan.  The 
EU would appreciate US support to underline to Israel the 
importance of the Quartet as the main instrument for 
international engagement in the peace process.  Cooper said 
the G8 reiterated support for the Quartet, but Israel just 
refuses; should the EU just give up on the Quartet?  A/S 
Jones reiterated US support for the Quartet as the mechanism 
to push the parties toward a negotiated solution. She noted 
that, rather than leave the Quartet, the EU should offer its 
own ideas for greater Quartet effectiveness.  Cooper urged 
close contact on this point between EU  High Rep Solana and 
Secretary Powell. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
14.  (C)  On the ICJ advisory opinion on Israel's security 
fence, Siblesz said that while the EU was not persuaded a 
ruling was appropriate, the substance of the decision handed 
down was in line with the EU view -- that any departure from 
the Green Line was contrary to international law.  Now, he 
said, we must 
assess the implication of this isolated legal opinion for the 
political process, which needs to be reinvigorated.  The EU 
expects the Palestinian Authority to propose a draft UN 
resolution.  A/S Jones urged the EU to consider voting 
against, or, at a minimum, abstaining on a UN resolution; the 
ICJ ruling does not help 
move ahead with the roadmap.  Siblesz replied that the EU 
position will depend on what's in the resolution; the EU 
cannot ignore the ICJ opinion. 
 
ESDP:  Turkey and EU-NATO dialogue 
----------- 
15. (C) Cooper commended EUR DAS Bradtke's efforts to work 
with the EU and NATO on security issues, and pointed to the 
recent EU approval of operation "Althea" in Bosnia as proof 
of the results.  Cooper noted there is an outstanding issue 
related to Berlin Plus and Turkey.  Because EU members Malta 
and Cyprus do not have a security relationship with NATO, any 
discussion with NATO of NATO classified information must be 
done at 23, not 25.  Turkey maintains that any EU-NATO 
contact must therefore be done at 23.  This, Cooper said, is 
not possible for the EU.  Malta and Cyprus, for example, are 
engaged in EU defense capability projects, which the EU would 
like to discuss with NATO.  If Turkey insists on its 
position, though, there can be no EU-NATO dialogue except on 
Berlin Plus issues.  This is an emerging problem, he 
concluded, but he questioned whether this was in the interest 
of the EU, NATO or even Turkey, and 
asked if the U.S. could raise this with Turkey. 
 
Bosnia Reserve and Berlin Plus 
---------------- 
16.  (C)  Cooper also wondered whether Berlin Plus is really 
working.  There is still a problem with the common reserve 
forces for the Bosnia mission.  The reserve is a common 
strategic reserve, and it is understandable that the NAC 
would want to approve any decision to call it up.  But the EU 
cannot understand why the reserve, if called up to support 
EUFOR, would not then be under EU control, since it is an EU 
mission and the troops in questions would all be 
European.  This needs to be clarified in a logical manner. 
Cooper said his goal is to have the EU look to SHAPE as its 
military HQ, and have SHAPE do the planning for the EU, not 
the EU doing it for SHAPE.  A/S Jones noted that this issue 
was still under review, but perhaps could be discussed in 
more detail at the September 27 US-EU PSC Troika. 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
17.  (C)  Valenzuela said that recent EU Council decisions 
would allow direct trade with Northern Cyprus, and are part 
of an effort to end Turkish Cypriot isolation.  A/S Jones 
said the US welcomed these EU steps, wanted to work with the 
EU for a Cyprus settlement, and hoped to work together for a 
strong UN 
resolution to support UNSYG Annan's Mission report.  Cooper 
reported that the Cypriot Ambassador to the EU was fired the 
night before, reportedly for not blocking the EU decisions toopen up trade with 
Northern Cyprus. 
 
China Arms Embargo 
---------------- 
18.  (C)  A/S Jones said now is not the time for the EU to 
lift the embargo; the human rights situation is deteriorating 
and listed numerous instances; this is important to the 
Administration and to Congress.  Siblesz said China put the 
issue on the EU's agenda; no decision has been taken; there 
are two angles to consider -- human 
rights and regional stability.  The EU judges the human 
rights situation as better than in 1989; the Chinese argue 
the embargo puts them in the same category as Zimbabwe or 
Burma.  The current arms embargo allows sales and does not 
cover dual use technology transfer; the EU is looking at 
enhancing its code 
of conduct so that levels of sales do not increase.  Can this 
be done?  The jury is still out.  There is no deadline, but 
the summit with China in December will increase pressure. 
The EU wants to maintain a dialogue with the US on this, and 
appreciates a frank exchange of views.  A/S Jones noted this 
was 
important; she also noted that there are draft bills in 
Congress that would sanction entities that sell arms to China. 
 
Non-Proliferation 
------------ 
19.  (C)  Siblesz noted the US-EU summit produced good 
results.  The EU was looking at working with third countries: 
 agreements concluded with Tajikistan, and under negotiation 
with Syria, Pakistan and MERCOSUR all have non-proliferation 
clauses in them.  The EU wants US support for including all 
ten new EU members in existing non-proliferation regimes. 
They will have 
access to the technology as EU members; they should therefore 
be in the regimes.  A key EU goal shared with the US is 
strengthening the IAEA.  Iran and Syria are areas where the 
US and EU may diverge.  The US is sanctioning Syria; 
EU policy is engagement.  On Iran, not clear where things are 
headed; will the US insist on taking it to the UNSC?  A/S 
Jones thanked the EU for close cooperation with us in June in 
the IAEA on Iran.  The US remains concerned by Iran's 
response -- continuing enrichment and not ratifying the 
Additional 
Protocol.  The international community needs to make clear 
that this is unacceptable.  If there is no Iranian 
compliance, the UNSC is the next step.  The US and EU need to 
stay in touch. 
 
Afghanistan Elections 
-------------- 
20.  (C)  Siblesz raised the decision to split the 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections, noting that this 
includes accepting out-of-country voting.  His understanding 
is that this has been agreed with Iran, but only on the 
condition that Pakistan also agrees, and asked for the US 
view.  A/S Jones promised to look into the issue and get the 
information to the EU. 
 
21. (U) A/S Jones has cleared this cable. 
 
McKinley