US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI977

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DJIBOUTI: RESPONSE TO GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI977
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI977 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-07-18 06:41:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: ASEC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

180641Z Jul 04
UNCLAS DJIBOUTI 000977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/C, DS/C/PSP, DS/IP, DS/IP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: RESPONSE TO GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: STATE 151051 
 
1. (SBU) Per REFTEL, RSO submits the following responses for 
American Embassy Djibouti.  Narratives are keyed to paragraph 
four.  Criteria ratings are denoted in parentheses. 
 
A. Physical Security Upgrades (1) ) Post has recently 
increased its physical security posture by using concrete 
barriers and delta anti-ram barriers, but the lack of setback 
still remains the primary vulnerability.  Post is due to 
break ground on a new NEC in 2007.  Due to Post,s small 
size, all agencies are collocated on the Embassy compound. 
 
B. Chemical/Biological(C/B) Protection (1) ) Post has taken 
protective measures in accordance with Department 
regulations.  RSO recommends that the department research and 
invest in a standard and portable mail-handling container. 
 
C. Technical Security Upgrades (2) ) RSO has no technical 
recommendations.  However, RSO would like to recommend 
baseline technical training for RSOs assigned to lock and 
leave facilities.  Most lock and leave facilities are 
constituent Posts for SEOs and when systems fail it takes 
time for the SEO to arrive to Post leaving the facility 
vulnerable.  In addition, there are many small technical 
issues that an RSO could probably fix on his or her own with 
just a little training subsequently saving the USG, the 
Department, Post, the RSO and SEOs time and money. 
 
D. Armored Vehicle Program (3) ) Post has sufficient armored 
vehicle assets.  Unfortunately, current assets are inadequate 
for environments in underdeveloped countries. Extreme weather 
conditions, poorly maintained roads, non improved surfaces, 
narrow streets, lack of properly trained technicians and lack 
of replacement parts all add up to a vehicle platform that is 
used approximately 50% of the time.  RSO recommends that an 
alternative to the Suburban 4X4 armored platform be fielded 
in the same manner in which the Department acquired and 
fielded the armored BMW sedans. 
 
E. Guard Programs (2) ) Although the Guard Program is by far 
the best security investment Post has, it is also by far one 
of the most time and money consuming programs the RSO 
manages.  Without constant supervision and motivation the 
Guard Force loses its effectiveness and becomes a 
vulnerability rather than a security measure.  RSO recommends 
that at a Post where there is no ARSO a local program manager 
be hired at a grade level commensurate with the intelligence 
and experience required to handle the complexities of the 
culture and the logistics and administrative issues.  This 
would free up the RSO to concentrate on greater security 
concerns such as Emergency preparedness, counter-intelligence 
and counter-terrorism. 
 
F. Surveillance Detection (2) ) RSO recommendation in 
paragraph &E8 would also apply to the SD program. 
 
G. Residential Security (2) ) Although the Residential 
Security program has been effective in mitigating a criminal 
threat, the regulations and applications of security measures 
should be updated to take into consideration the increasing 
threat of terrorism against residential targets. 
 
H. Soft Targets (1) - RSO has no specific recommendations. 
 
I. Briefing Programs (1) ) Post supports arrival and 
refresher briefings. 
 
J. ATA assistance programs (1) ) Without a doubt, the best 
counter-terrorism initiative at Post. 
 
K. Emergency Management Programs (2) ) RSO has no specific 
recommendations other than those already being addressed. 
 
L. RSO Training (2) ) RSO recommends training as outlined in 
paragraph &C8. 
 
2. (U) POC Is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95. 
RAGSDALE 

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