US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1801

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EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE1801
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE1801 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-07-16 15:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 001801 
 
SIPDIS 
 
IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PHUM, KDEM, AORC, NL, CH, UN 
SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: A. STATE 153876 
     B. THE HAGUE 1737 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ANDREW SCHOFER, POLCOUNS, FOR 
REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch are deeply committed to the 
Transatlantic Dialogue, a successful EU Presidency, and 
leadership during the UN General Assembly that values USG 
input if not always agreeing with it.  In discussions with 
DRL PDAS Kozak and IO DAS Lagon on July12 - 13, Dutch 
interlocutors acknowledged Chinese backsliding on human 
rights in the last six months but did not expect this to 
influence EU thinking on lifting the China Arms Embargo. 
Dutch MFA and NGO officials remain "terribly troubled" by Abu 
Ghraib and welcomed USG clarification regarding the status of 
Guantanamo prisoners.  The Dutch agreed to collaborate on a 
US-EU package of agreed language to settle references to 
contentious issues in Third Committee resolutions.  USDel 
signaled new flexibility on UN Commission on Human Rights 
elections, prompting the Dutch to agree to restart WEOG 
negotiations.  Sudan, Chechnya, Iran, Burma, Turkmenistan, 
and Zimbabwe seem likely subjects for Third Committee 
resolutions, while Belarus and Uzbekistan are not.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (U) China, Guantanamo, human rights and a range of United 
Nations issues were the agenda in The Hague, June 12 - 13, 
for DRL PDAS Michael Kozak's and IO DAS Mark Lagon's meetings 
with Dutch MFA officials. MFA interlocutors included Special 
Ambassador for Human Rights Piet de Klerk, Deputy Political 
Director Hermann Schaper, Human Rights Director Adanna Adema, 
and Director of the UN Department Karel van Kesteren. The DCM 
hosted an NGO reception and Lagon briefed a large group of 
university students on U.S. Human Rights concerns and 
multilateral issues generally. 
 
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO AND BACKSLIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
3.  (C) Amb. de Klerk will travel to China soon to review the 
human rights situation.  Schaper reminded USDel that the EU's 
embargo was a specific response keyed to Tiananmen Square. 
It was not intended as retaliation for human rights issues 
generally and was not imposed for military considerations, 
although both concerns now prompt the USG push for 
maintaining the ban.  He admitted Chinese backsliding over 
the last six months caused concern but stressed that this in 
itself was not a sufficient argument for maintaining the 
embargo. 
 
4.  (C) The Dutch said that the next senior EU discussion of 
China in September would focus on the last couple of years of 
Chinese actions.  The EU will examine whether their China 
dialogue has made a difference on the ground.  The Dutch 
shared elements from the EU decision matrix: 
 
a. The EU does not want the embargo to stand in the way of 
overall better relations. 
 
b.  Human rights is but one issue here; the question is more 
than "is the glass half full or half empty.  There are more 
glasses on the table."  There has been recent backsliding, 
but overall the situation has improved over the last 15 
years.  The embargo was a response to Tiananmen Square. 
 
c.  The EU does not expect to export its best weapons to 
China should the ban be lifted, and it does not want European 
weapons to be used or deployed against U.S. forces. 
 
d.  What effect would lifting have on the US presidential 
elections; and would it lead to Euro-bashing that would 
embarrass the Dutch EU Presidency, for example. 
 
5.  (C) PDAS Kozak disputed the Dutch assertions regarding 
China's improved human rights record and shared recent 
examples of China's unfulfilled commitments.  A dialogue 
without results was pointless, he stressed.  Regarding 
Tiananmen, Chinese restraint from running people over with 
tanks in recent years could not justify lifting.  He 
suggested the EU should take a closer look at the status of 
those who were punished for Tiananmen, if resolution of that 
issue is the threshold for lifting. 
 
6.  (SBU) USDel and NGO reps, meeting later at the DCM's 
residence, brainstormed ideas for trying to use public 
opinion to deflect what looks like a pending EU decision to 
lift the ban.  One idea that resonated was to hold a European 
NGO forum on the Chinese human rights situation early in the 
fall. 
 
GUANTANAMO AND OTHER DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
7.  (C) Dutch MFA officials and NGO reps remained "terribly 
troubled" by what happened at Abu Ghraib and were clearly 
hungry for the latest information on the status of all 
detainees (ref b).  Discussions of the new Cuba resolution in 
ECOSOC (ref b) led to thinking about how to a discussion of 
how improve Dutch and EU public opinion, including 
development of new public affairs products or informal visits 
to Guantanamo by an EU or EU Presidency rep.  USDel did not 
commit to these proposals but promised to study options. 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
8.  (U) UN Priorities for 59 UNGA 
 
The USG's UNGA priorities paper has inspired the EU to devise 
a concise working paper of their own, the Dutch told us. 
They promised to study our UNGA priorities (septel) and 
offered to review the EU list with us later in the week as 
well (septel). 
 
9.  (C) Working together at the UNGA - Third Committee 
 
USDel committed to sending the EU a draft package of agreed 
language to settle references in resolutions to contentious 
issues in the Third Committee, including how to refer to the 
International Criminal Court, the death penalty, and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.  The 
Dutch agreed to vet our draft at the EU's September COHUM 
(working group on human rights) and to arrange a bilateral 
meeting, if needed, to work out problems.  This might be in 
Brussels on or about October 1, or in Warsaw around the same 
time. 
 
10. (C) Country specific issues included: 
 
- Sudan: We agreed to wait to see what the Security Council 
would do before considering Third Committee action to follow 
on the UNCHR resolution.  (Sudan is discussed in more detail 
below). 
 
- Burma:  We agreed there is a need to have Third Committee 
action. 
 
- Turkmenistan:  The EU wondered if it made sense to table 
another resolution this year.  Not doing so might send the 
wrong signal.  On the other hand, we are trying to streamline 
the UN agenda.  The EU suggested we could run one last 
resolution and announce that henceforth we would focus on 
action in the UNCHR. 
 
- Zimbabwe:  USDel offered to support any British action in 
New York if they want to have a resolution there. 
 
- Belarus and Uzbekistan:  We agreed that there is no need 
for Third Committee action since rapporteurs have been 
already been assigned. 
 
UN REFORM 
 
11.  (C) Reformed and better UN 
 
Geopolitical reality and strategic practicality inspire the 
Netherlands' "devotion to the multilateral system with an 
active, constructive, and reformed UN at the center," Schaper 
said.  The upcoming review of the Millennium Development 
Goals is a natural deadline for UN reforms.  DAS Lagon 
assured him that the US is as committed to building up the UN 
as we have been to reforming it, however we cannot 
single-handedly reach the goal of a UN living up to its 
original purposes. 
 
12.  (C) The Dutch do not want UN reform to stall over 
Security Council enlargement.  They favor, eventually, one EU 
seat.  The MFA working level, however, opposes Germany's SC 
seat bid, but publicly the MFA has had to go along for now. 
On voting, the Dutch have proposed to SYG Annan a voting 
weight system as follows:  1/3 based on being a member of the 
UN; 1/3 based on population; and 1/3 based on the total 
amount of assessed and voluntary contributions to the UN. 
 
13.  (U) Community of Democracies/Democracy Caucus 
 
In courting the wary Dutch to become involved, we reassured 
them that the Democracy Caucus (DC) would augment, not 
compete, with traditional, long-standing groups.  Admitting 
the idea has theoretical merit, the Dutch remained curious 
about how the Caucus would admit borderline members.  We 
noted that UN PermRep Danforth cited the DC in his 
confirmation hearings and thought it a useful tool not 
limited to use in human rights but also good for development 
issues, UN reform, and so on. 
UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACTION FOR COUNTRY SPECIFIC 
CONCERNS 
 
14.  (C) UNCHR Elections 
 
We signaled U.S. readiness to restart negotiations over an 
agreed WEOG slate for UNCHR elections, with new flexibility 
on forgoing membership for two years, rather than one, out of 
21.  Van Kesteren, co-chair (with the Canadians) of earlier 
negotiations on this issue, agreed to explore restarting 
negotiations based on this welcome information.  He added 
that the U.S. might end up having to relinquish three years 
to get a deal.  He added that, after the Security Council, 
membership on the UNCHR was a valuable prize for many 
states.  DAS Lagon reported the French seemed prepared to 
work it out so WEOG could focus on substance and discourage 
the current practice of vote trading with undesirable 
countries from other regions.  Finally, van Kesteren fingered 
Austria as a problem country that insisted on maintaining 
their position based on the established pattern of Commission 
membership. 
 
15.  (C) Sudan 
 
The Dutch felt the time was ripe for a SC resolution on 
Sudan.  There were serious problems with both sides and 
sanctions might be appropriate.  In reviewing the earlier, 
troublesome Geneva negotiations on the Sudan resolution and 
what to do in the Third Committee, the Dutch predicted New 
York discussions would again be a triangle between the U.S., 
EU and African Union (AU).  USDel urged the EU to avoid 
surprises like the deal it cut with the AU behind our backs 
on the last day of talks in Geneva.  We agreed it would be 
useful to try to split the AU members by peeling off South 
Africa and other AU members chafing under the AU's "lowest 
common denominator" protection of Sudan.  There was consensus 
not to let discussion of the "genocide" question delay or 
thwart more immediate action. 
 
16.  (SBU) NGOs suggested that finding a political solution 
should be much higher on the agenda.  The rep from Doctors 
Without Borders complained that the NGOs are under new 
threats because both government and rebels object to their 
perceived sharing of information from the field with the 
outside world.  PDAS Kozak regretted that information sharing 
caused problems, and said it is important for the GOS to know 
we are collecting facts so as to hold them accountable. 
 
17.  (SBU) Chechnya 
 
NGOs believed the international community has increasingly 
abandoned Chechnya and that the situation has become more 
criminalized in the last four years.  Dutch MFA officials had 
earlier admitted that the EU has a "bloody nose" on this 
intractable issue.  PDAS Kozak reassured NGOs that we raise 
Chechnya with the Russians "all the time" and have not let 
terrorism get in the way of promoting human rights. 
 
18.  (C) Iran 
 
The Dutch reported a meeting the EU had in Teheran three 
weeks ago where academics and officials discussed police, 
prisons, and the legal system.  Discussions were "much more 
uni sono" than half a year ago since opposition 
parliamentarians were absent.  There are serious questions 
now whether to continue the dialogue and there will be a 
decision by early October, they told us.  The Dutch reminded 
USDel that they see the non-proliferation issue as part of a 
broader relationship with Iran that includes expanding 
business opportunities. 
 
MEETING WITH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
 
19.  (U) DAS Lagon had a cordial dialogue with 25 student 
leaders from Dutch universities who asked about the U.S.'s 
lack of participation with the ICC, its support of Israel in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its perceived unilateral 
approach to the war in Iraq, and its treatment of human 
rights in the broader war on terrorism.  Praising the EU's 
culture of dialogue as a model for other nations, Lagon 
cautioned that American realpolitik is a reaction to a belief 
that the rest of the world has a less mature approach to 
international relations.  Lagon warned that that an extended 
process of seeking consensus often delayed urgent action. 
Rejecting allegations of U.S. unilateralism, Lagon described 
America's involvement in many multilateral efforts.  Public 
diplomacy could reverse impressions of American unilateralism 
and build greater consensus for U.S. actions.  He suggested 
exchange programs, greater awareness by American politicians 
of their global audiences, and discussions such as the one he 
was currently having were important elements in such a 
strategy. 
 
COMMENT 
 
20.  (C) Commitment to the Transatlantic Dialogue underlies 
much of the Dutch UN agenda during their EU Presidency. 
Their exchanges with the USDel were productive, showed 
flexibility and receptiveness to US ideas, and a drive to 
find consensus while doing their duty for national and EU 
positions.  Their promise to work more closely on the Sudan 
human rights resolutions in New York was welcome and signaled 
good intentions on the wider range of issues.  On the other 
hand, their narrowing of the China arms embargo debate to 
Tiananmen Square left us little room to argue the larger 
human rights and military points of the issue.  Immediately 
on Guantanamo and longer term in general, the Dutch public 
remains receptive to fresh public diplomacy efforts providing 
information they can use to justify alignment with U.S. 
positions. 
RUSSEL 

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