US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1796

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, PHUM, CH, NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO:  MEETING WITH 
ASIAN ALLIES; GONL BRIEFING REQUEST 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1779 
 
     B. DEAN/REIDHEAD EMAIL 07/09/04 
     C. KVOLKER/ASCHOFER EMAIL 07/15/04 
     D. THE HAGUE 1660 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DANIEL RUSSEL FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B AND D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  PolCouns and PolMilOff met on July 16 with 
representatives from the Australian, Japanese and Korean 
Embassies in The Hague to discuss the EU's China arms 
embargo.  Of the three, the Japanese have made the strongest 
approaches to the GONL on this issue.  The Australians have 
raised it in a "measured" way and the Koreans have not 
discussed the matter with the Dutch in The Hague.  EmbOffs 
outlined recent Embassy discussions on this issue with the 
GONL.  EmbOffs also addressed USG concerns with respect to 
inadequacy of the EU Code of Conduct on arms transfers as a 
possible substitute for the embargo.  Separately, Dutch MFA 
officials have recently expressed interest in a bilateral 
briefing on USG concerns with regard to specific weapons 
systems the Chinese seek to acquire.  Post understands that 
an interagency team will brief PSC reps in Brussels on July 
22 and may be able to brief in The Hague.  Post strongly 
supports possible travel of this team to The Hague.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) PolCouns and PolMilOff hosted Australian, Japanese and 
Korean EmbOffs to discuss the EU China arms embargo on July 
16.  Japanese First Secretary Osumi said the GOJ was 
emphasizing with the GONL its regional security concerns 
posed by a possible embargo lift.  He noted the visit of UK 
FCO PolDir Sawers to Tokyo this month presents another 
opportunity for the GOJ to engage on this issue with European 
partners.  Osumi also said the GOJ is internally reviewing 
the possible impact of an embargo lift.  Australian Embassy 
Counselor Hart said the embargo had not been "on the top" of 
the GOA's agenda with the Dutch.  The last time GOA officials 
had raised it with the Dutch was prior to their current EU 
Presidency when GOA officials were in Brussels for Asia 
bilaterals.  Hart said Dutch MFA Asia Director Milders and 
Deputy PolDir Schaper argued that an embargo lift would not 
make much of a difference in "substance."  Korean Embassy 
Counselor Lee said that while it was possible the ROKG had 
addressed the matter with the Dutch Embassy in Seoul, it had 
not done so in The Hague. 
 
3. (C) EmbOffs outlined recent Embassy discussions with the 
GONL on the EU China arms embargo issue in general terms, and 
noted high-level USG interest in the matter including A/S 
Jones' July 13 meeting with EU PolDirs.  EmbOffs also shared 
recent Department Public Diplomacy talking points on the 
embargo with interlocutors.  EmbOffs outlined U.S. problems 
with the concept of the EU Code of Conduct on arms transfers 
as a possible substitute for an embargo.  Our interlocutors 
agreed to report details of our conversation to capitals. 
Japanese First Secretary Osumi said he did not envision any 
high-level Japanese mission to The Hague on this issue. 
 
4. (C) As indicated ref A, GONL officials continue to pull 
out all arguments to attempt to convince us that a decision 
to lift has already been made.  Nevertheless, in recent 
discussions MFA interlocutors have told us the GONL would be 
interested in receiving on a bilateral basis a briefing 
regarding specific USG concerns about weapons systems the 
Chinese seek to acquire (ref B).  We understand from ref C 
that Washington plans to send an interagency team to Brussels 
on July 22 to brief the PSC on this issue, and that the team 
might also be available to brief in The Hague.  Post strongly 
supports such a briefing.  MFA arms transfer policy Director 
Paul van den IJssel told PolMilOff on July 16 that MFA 
Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems (the Dutch "T" 
equivalent) would be able to host the team either July 21 or 
23.  Given the Netherlands' generally strong record in 
supporting our mutual nonproliferation goals, we judge it 
would be helpful to address specific nonproliferation 
concerns related to an embargo lift (i.e. potential Chinese 
re-engineering and re-export of EU origin systems) in 
addition to human rights and regional stability concerns. 
RUSSEL