US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1353

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ODIP, PGOV, PINS, PTER, PHUM, NP 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: KING OFFERS VIEWS AT AMBASSADOR'S 
CREDENTIALS CEREMONY 
 
REF: A. STATE 82853 
     B. KATHMANDU 1097 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a 20-minute one-on-one after I presented 
my credentials on July 16, Nepal's King Gyanendra told me 
that he wanted to be a constitutional monarch, and would take 
a "hands-off" approach now that Prime Minister Deuba had 
formed a government.  The King described ongoing U.S. 
assistance to Nepal as "invaluable."  While unsure whether it 
was time for negotiations with the Maosists, the King 
promised to keep us informed of any major shifts in policy. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C)  After presenting my credentials to Nepal's King 
Gyanendra on July 16, I spent approximately 20 minutes in a 
one-on-one meeting with the King.  King Gyanendra began by 
passing his regards to President Bush and expressing thanks 
for the "invaluable" U.S.-provided development and 
insurgency-related assistance to Nepal, which he hoped would 
be continued or or even increased.  I responded that indeed 
the USG was looking at additional ways of supporting Nepal; 
in that context, however, it would be very important that 
credible claims of human rights abuses by the security forces 
be transparently and thoroughly investigated.  The King 
agreed. 
 
3. (C) India and China were also being helpful, the King 
noted.  Three years earlier, he recalled, he had warned India 
regarding the security threat the Maoists posed to both Nepal 
and India, but the Indians had dismissed his concerns.  Now, 
though some in Nepal believed India was not doing enough on 
its side of the border, India had visibly increased it 
cooperation with and assistance to Nepal. 
 
4. (C)  Turning to the domestic political scene, the King 
explained that he "stepped back" because he genuinely wished 
to be a constitutional monarch.  Noting the numerous 
in-country trips he had taken in the past year, the King 
explained that he had hoped his visits to different parts of 
the country would spur development.  However, perhaps because 
the parties pushed against his efforts, or because of the 
inefficiency and the inability of Nepali government services 
to follow in his wake, it had not worked.  Nevertheless, he 
stepped back just the same: Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba, shrewd enough about Nepali politics to "know how he 
has been used by those above him," had shown sufficient skill 
and wherewithal to put together a four-party coalition.  I 
commended the King for bringing four of the five major 
legitimate political parties back into the governing process, 
and asked whether he thought Koirala could be convinced to 
join his Nepali Congress Party to the government.  The King 
responded that Dueba was "running things now;" whether 
Koirala would join the coalition was a question for the Prime 
Minister.  Meanwhile, the King thought Deuba was doing well, 
and only worried that Deuba sometimes appeared to be in too 
much of a rush to "fix things." 
 
5. (C) When I asked whether the time was ripe for 
negotiations, the King responded that it was very hard to 
tell.  Negotiations before the Maoists were sincere and ready 
to make concessions would be a mistake, the King offered, and 
it was not clear whether the Maoists had reached that point. 
 
6. (C) The King stated he had a very positive relationship 
with my predecessor and frequently sought Ambassador 
Malinowski's advice.  The King hoped that sort of close 
relationship could continue with me.  To that end, the King 
stated that he would inform me of any planned major shifts in 
policy, and that I should feel free to contact him at any 
time. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT:  King Gyanendra appeared bright, charming and 
genuinely appreciative of U.S. support.  Gyanendra's 
political machinations over the past few years clearly 
contributed to the political instability which the Maoists 
have exploited.  Still, he was not forced to reinstate Prime 
Minister Deuba; another palace appointed Panchayat-era Prime 
Minister could have easily been the choice.  His decision is 
therefore a positive sign of his intent to see whether the 
political parties can resume governing.  And while the King 
does not have all of the answers to ending Nepal's 
insurgency, he at least appears to want to do right for 
Nepal.  END COMMENT. 
MORIARTY