US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1777

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NETHERLANDS/SUDAN: DUTCH CONTINUE TO LEAD ON SUDAN/DARFUR

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE1777
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE1777 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-07-15 15:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM PREF PARM MOPS AU SU NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, EUR/UBI, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, PARM, MOPS, AU, SU, NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SUDAN: DUTCH CONTINUE TO LEAD ON 
SUDAN/DARFUR 
 
REF: (A) THE HAGUE 1721 (B) STATE 153857 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
Dutch Embrace Role of International Leadership 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
1. (C) As reported in ref A, the Dutch government is fully seized of th 
situation in Sudan/Darfur at all levels, and is actively engaging Europ 
colleagues to increase contributions.  The Dutch have already pledged o 
25 million euros in bilateral assistance toward Sudan/Darfur, as well a 
an extra million euros, two observers, three helicopters and 
fuel/transport to the AU protection force.  The Dutch EU Presidency 
continues to press for increased contributions from European partners, 
remains interested in engaging further with the U.S. and UN to jointly 
pressure the GOS to comply with its commitments. 
 
2. (C) Poloff discussed ref B message with Africa desk officer Beate 
Gerlings July 15.  Gerlings reaffirmed ongoing intensive Dutch bilatera 
and multilateral efforts, including support for the AU protection force 
but noted that further bilateral contributions were not possible "for t 
moment" considering other pressing needs and the already significant Du 
pledge.  She expressed interest in the idea of a broader AU protection 
force, which was new to her.  She noted, however, that since the Dutch 
Presidency had begun intensive engagement with EU colleagues on 
Sudan/Darfur, the Dutch would defer to an EU collective response and 
follow-up (including encouraging African leaders).  Gerlings promised t 
pass the message to colleagues in Addis Ababa and Khartoum, but could n 
predict what decision would be reached. 
 
EU Presidency to GOS: Sanctions a Real Possibility 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (C) Gerlings reported that the Dutch had pressed European colleagues 
for more efforts toward the humanitarian situation in Sudan at the July 
General Affairs and External Relations Committee (GAERC), especially 
focusing on "those partners who could do more."  Regarding the plan of 
action, EU colleagues had agreed to benchmarks substantively similar to 
those maintained by the US, and had specifically avoided setting a 
particular timeframe in order to minimize separation from US and UN 
efforts.  The next step, she said, was to begin to consider possibiliti 
for sanctions.  Gerlings noted the Dutch had delivered a follow-up 
demarche yesterday to the GOS wherein they asserted they "will not 
hesitate to apply sanctions, however limited their effect might be." 
Gerlings commented that sanctions might be difficult to define since so 
little business and engagement occurs with the GOS.  Gerlings declared 
that it was high time to take action on Sudan, and suggested that a sys 
of "smart sanctions" allowing for the release of development funding in 
response to progress might be one possibility. 
SOBEL 

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