US embassy cable - 04MAPUTO945

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000945 
 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2009 
TAGS: MASS, MARR, PREL, KPKO, BY, MZ, ACOTA 
SUBJECT: HELPING MOZAMBIQUE BECOME AN EFFECTIVE 
PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTOR 
 
Classified by Amb Helen LaLime; Reasons: 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (U) This is an action request -- see paragraph 8. 
 
2. (C) Summary: Mozambique continues to seek a more active 
role in peacekeeping, especially in Africa. Despite very 
limited resources, the Mozambican Armed Forces have worked 
effectively at reinforced company strength in the Africa 
Union's PKO in Burundi. As that mission comes under U.N. 
control, Mozambique has been asked to increase its presence 
to battalion strength. The U.S. and Mozambique are closely 
engaged in meeting Mozambique's long-term training 
requirements for peacekeeping through the ACOTA program. 
Mozambique, however, also needs short-term equipment support 
to equip itself for the Burundi operation. Having proven 
itself effective at conflict prevention and resolution in the 
diplomatic realm, Mozambique should be considered for 
assistance to also give it military peacekeeping 
capabilities. End Summary 
 
3. (C) Mozambique seeks to become a peacekeeping nation: 
Under the direction of President Chissano, Mozambique is 
seeking to increase its capabilities to serve in peacekeeping 
operations. Mozambican political leaders have described this 
policy as a logical extension of Mozambique's increasingly 
effective diplomatic engagement in conflict prevention and 
resolution. During his presidency of the Africa Union, 
President Chissano engaged effectively in the Great Lakes, 
Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sao Tome. Mozambicans are 
proud to cite their own history of effective conflict 
resolution, including the UN PKO in Mozambique, as a model 
they can share with other countries struggling to come out of 
conflict. 
 
4. (C) Initial PKO Steps: The Mozambicans have frequently 
engaged in peacekeeping but at a modest level. Small 
contingents were deployed to East Timor, the DRC and the 
Comoros. The Mozambicans this month deployed five military 
to Darfur to help plan for AU deployment needs (Mozambique 
does not presently plan to send a contingent to any long-term 
Sudan PKO). In 2003, Mozambique undertook its most ambitious 
PKO initiative by deploying a 220-person reinforced company 
to participate with South African and Ethiopian units in the 
AU's Burundi PKO. Meeting the equipment and funding 
requirements for that PKO was a daunting task. The British 
provided over $5 million in equipment and budget support to 
make it happen. Prior to their deployment, observers in the 
field were frankly skeptical that the Mozambicans would 
provide any value-added to the mission given their poor 
resources and lack of experience. Half a year into their 
deployment, we are told the Mozambicans have greatly exceeded 
expectations and are performing creditably their assigned 
tasks. 
 
5. (C) Gearing Up for More: Following the decision that 
the U.N would assume the peacekeeping mission in Burundi, the 
Mozambicans were asked to not only maintain their presence in 
Burundi but to increase their deployment to an 850-man 
battalion level. President Chissano took the political 
decision to comply with the request leaving the military 
struggling to meet the standard equipment requirements the 
U.N. has set for the battalion. The Mozambicans are in close 
negotiations with the U.N. to determine what type of 
equipment and funding support will be available. At the same 
time, they have approached donors to seek equipment support. 
Among the standard items the U.N. has specified for any 
battalion participating in a PKO, the Mozambicans have 
highlights as critical gaps the following: 
-- 50 KVA Generators (2) 
-- 30 KVA Generators (7) 
-- APC (1) 
-- Armored Command Vehicle (1) 
-- Armored First Aid Vehicle (1) 
-- Armored Ambulance (1) 
-- Ambulances (4) 
-- Jeep-type 4x4s (15) 
-- Radio Jeeps (10) 
-- 2.5-5tn Transports (16) 
-- First-aid truck (1) 
-- Maintenance Truck (2) 
-- Water Trucks (3) 
-- Fuel Trucks (2) 
-- Refrigerator Truck (1) 
-- Bucket Loader (1) 
-- Forklifts (2) 
-- Cargo trailers (20) 
-- Water Trailers (12) 
-- Fuel Trailers (12) 
-- 100 Watt Radio (3) 
-- 20 Watt Radio (21) 
-- 5 Watt Radio (45) 
The Mozambicans also shares a preliminary budget of support 
costs for the first 60 days of the Mission of $1.9 million. 
 
6. (C) Where the U.S. is helping: The USG was unable to 
provide direct support to Mozambique for its 2003 deployment 
to Burundi. What limited assistance was available was 
instead directed to the Ethiopian contingent. Since that 
time, the USG has engaged the Mozambicans on the ACOTA 
program with the expectation that we will be able to help the 
Mozambicans develop the training capacity over several years 
to prepare troops for peacekeeping operations. Negotiations 
to date have been positive and ACOTA has proposed holding a 
strategic meeting in September with some 30 Mozambican 
military, political and diplomatic experts to clarify their 
long-term training needs. It is hoped that training of 
Battalion Officers and military trainers can start in January 
2005 if not earlier. The ACOTA team is looking initially to 
train up four companies to meet Mozambique's stated desire to 
have at least one trained battalion ready for peacekeeping 
operations. In addition to he training, the ACOTA program 
will provide some unit equipment including field hospital, 
communications and water treatment material. ACOTA 
specifically will not provide vehicles or lethal equipment. 
While the Mozambicans welcome this contribution to the 
long-term capabilities of their military, they are aware this 
training will have little or no impact on their current 
operational requirements. 
 
7. (C) Where the U.S. can help more: We are aware the USG 
will not be in a position to meet the extensive list of 
equipment requested in paragraph 4. If the U.N. really want 
Mozambique to expand its presence in Burundi they will have 
to work with them to meet their equipment needs or scale back 
the equipment list by reducing the complexity of the mission 
order or pairing Mozambique with a better equipped partner. 
That said, we believe it is in U.S. security interests to 
support Mozambique's efforts to contribute immediately in 
Burundi and, over the longer term, in the region. The 
Mozambicans would be extremely appreciative of any tangible 
support that can be given to their immediate operational 
needs. 
 
8. (C) Action Request: Embassy requests that the 
Department, in conjunction with DoD, identify items that 
could be provided to meet some of the Mozambican equipment 
requirements for the Burundi Mission. If EDA proves the best 
avenue to meet some of these needs, we would welcome a DoD 
team to come discuss the program with the Mozambicans and to 
work out FMF financing to cover any make-ready or shipping 
costs. We underline that while we have been applauding 
Mozambique's increasingly active and effective peacekeeping 
initiatives over the past several years -- we have yet to 
provide any tangible support for these efforts. It's time to 
do something. 
 
9. (U) Minimize considered. 
LA LIME