US embassy cable - 04AMMAN5894

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: UNAMI TO REDUCE STAFF IN AMMAN 
 
REF: USUN 1592 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b), (d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  According to Interim Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General for Iraq (A/SRSG) Ross Mountain and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator 
Malloch Brown, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq 
(UNAMI) plans to reduce its staff profile in Amman slightly 
for reasons of political perception, not security.  The new 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq will 
go to Baghdad with a small team, and will depend on the Iraqi 
Interim Government (IIG) and multi-national forces (MNF) for 
"life support".  Despite the planned reduction in staff, 
Amman will continue to host the bulk of the UN presence until 
the security situation improved significantly.  These 
reductions affect less than a quarter of UNAMI staff and, 
therefore, are unlikely to have much impact, positive or 
negative, other than to UNAMI efficiency.  End Summary. 
 
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UNAMI STAFF REDUCTION IN AMMAN 
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2. (C) Malloch Brown, in a July 11 meeting with chiefs of 
mission of donor states participating in the International 
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), said UNAMI 
planned to reduce its staff profile in Amman, from 274 to 
224, for reasons of political perception, not security. 
According to Brown, Amman would continue to host the bulk of 
the UN presence.  Brown said that Amman would remain the 
principal center as it was easiest to bring Iraqis to Jordan 
and a natural convergence point.  However, there was a medium 
term political consideration which weighed in favor of some 
dispersal in the region. 
 
3.  (C) Brown worried that a large, conspicuous UN presence 
in Amman might become a source of friction among Iraqis and 
others in the region, critical that UN personnel were sitting 
around in Jordan and not doing much for Iraq.  He said that 
to avoid getting too big, the election component would be 
placed in Kuwait and the infrastructure development unit in 
Cyprus.  Though the initial Jordan reaction had been to 
express concern that this decision reflected fear about 
Jordanian security, Brown said there were no pressing 
security concerns in Jordan.  He also said this was not a 
reaction to Iraqi pressure.  The Iraqis preferred that all UN 
operations be set up there, but they recognize that Amman is 
the most viable place to do business. 
 
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NEW SRSG, SMALL TEAM TO BAGHDAD; PERMANENT OFFICES IN IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
4. (C) Brown said the new SRSG (ref) would go to Baghdad with 
a small team of between 15-25 persons.  The group would 
depend on the IIG and MNF for "life support" while there. 
 
5.  (C) According to Brown, if the security situation for UN 
personnel improved significantly, UNAMI would be able to set 
up permanent offices in Baghdad, Mosul and Irbil over the 
remainder of 2004.  A Basra facility could open in late 
September and Irbil in November.  UNAMI was still looking for 
a suitable Baghdad site, so it would probably be the end of 
the year before an office could be set up.  He said that 
UNAMI would plan to have 260 international staff in Baghdad, 
and 65 each in Mosul and Irbil.  As many of these people 
would be security personnel, the "substantive" staff would 
number 35-50 in Baghdad and 10-15 in Basra and Irbil each. 
He stressed that actual deployment of these numbers of 
personnel depended upon the threat directed toward them. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  These officials evaded questions about the 
specific number of personnel that would remain in Amman, but 
Charge noticed Ross Mountain had in hand a table reflecting a 
UNAMI staffing reduction from 274 to 224.  We do not see this 
reduction as having any particular political impact, negative 
or positive, although it runs counter to a strong trend among 
Embassies, NGOs, contractors and others to locate substantive 
"back office" operations in Amman pending improved security 
in Iraq. 
 
7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
HALE