US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1288

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PREF, PHUM, IN, BH, NP, UN, U.S-Nepali Relations 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON FOREIGN SECRETARY 
ACHARYA 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1080 
     B. KATHMANDU 1147 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Moriarty made his first official 
call on Foreign Secretary Madhu Acharya on July 8.  Acharya 
stated that the UN offer to mediate with the Maoists was 
appreciated, but third-party mediation from any quarters 
would not be accepted for the time being.  Meanwhile, India's 
help with the insurgency was increasing and improving, but 
India's reluctance to become involved with the Bhutanese 
refugee issue was regrettable.  On the Bhutanese refugees, 
Acharya indicated that the GON would not allow a UNHCR 
socio-economic survey to proceed, adding that the Nepali 
government strongly resisted any ideas that might distract 
from the voluntary return of the refugees to Bhutan.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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THE INSURGENCY 
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2. (C) Acharya opined that now that a government had been 
formed in Nepal, the foremost priority was a peace process 
with the Maoists, if talks were possible.  Nepal could learn 
lessons from other countries' experiences with insurgency, 
such as Columbia or Peru, Acharya agreed.  (NOTE:  Acharya 
himself has extensive UN experience, and served in South 
Africa, Cambodia and Liberia during conflict resolution 
efforts.  END NOTE.)  However, Acharya made clear that at the 
present the GON was not interested in UN or other third-party 
mediation in any eventual peace process.  Acharya explained 
that the GON would keep the possibility of UN mediation as an 
option, but was loathe to risk legitimizing the Maoists, or 
making them co-equals by introducing a third party. 
Meanwhile, the GON appreciated the offer, and did want UN 
"assistance and understanding" in some areas.  For example, 
the GON had "created space" for the UN in development 
efforts, and was expecting to sign an MOU with UNCHR for 
assistance to Nepal's National Human Rights Commission and to 
allow the UNCHR a role to monitor human rights in Nepal.  The 
Maoists, however, were a homegrown problem, and a homegrown 
political solution was possible, Acharya stated.  Of course, 
UN assistance in areas such as disarmament and reintegration 
might be needed, once a peace agreement was in place.  The 
Ambassador assured Acharya that U.S. support for the GON's 
efforts to ameliorate the effects of, and to end, the 
conflict would continue. 
 
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INDIA'S ROLE 
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3. (C)  Turning to India, the Foreign Secretary agreed with 
Ambassador Moriarty that India had been increasingly helpful 
to Nepal in the past months.  Acharya explained that, while 
there was always some cooperation from India, India's 
concerns vis-a-vis the effects of the Maoist insurgency on 
its own security had drawn India's eyes northward.  Thus, on 
the official level, India was better vocalizing its support, 
helping with equipment and training for the Royal Nepal Army 
(RNA) and arresting Maoists in India.  Acharya noted that 
while stronger Indian political will to help existed, because 
of corruption and the fractured nature of the Indian 
political system, improvements were less visible on the 
operational levels (police, border security, etc.).  But 
India was sending warning messages to the Maoists in 
political meetings, and even targeting its intelligence 
assets against the problem, Acharya believed.  Acharya added 
that, since the Maoists had targeted Indian businesses, 
schools and transporters (after the arrests of 12 Maoists in 
Bihar State on June 2), much of the Indian support was being 
carried out quietly, so as to avoid Maoist retaliation.  The 
Indianswere, for example, quietly allowing Nepali access to 
arrested Maoists and in some cases, renditions to Nepal. 
 
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BHUTANESE REFUGEES 
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4. (C) However, Acharya continued, when it came to the 
approximately 103,000 Bhutanese refugees in eastern Nepal, 
India remained reticent to become involved, perhaps in part 
because of the presence of other ethnic Nepali populations in 
India itself.  Although India was becoming more concerned 
about Maoist infiltration of the camps, and what that might 
mean for Indian security, the Foreign Secretary lamented 
India's mantra that the problem required a bilateral 
solution; Acharya asserted that Indian involvement could lead 
to a quick, durable and equitable solution.  Giving the 
Ambassador background on recent events, Acharya explained 
that the GOB had yet to formally respond to Nepal's report on 
the December 22 Khundunabari incident (when Bhutanese members 
of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) had been pelted with 
stones).  Acharya noted that, in its report of the incident, 
the GON said they would give the JVT more security in the 
future, but had also included a paragraph asking the GOB to 
be more liberal in its interpretation of the conditions of 
return.  This paragraph appeared to be the sticking point for 
the GOB, Acharya believed. 
5. (C) Acharya stated that he had met with the seven camp 
secretaries (refugee representatives) on June 25, and that 
 
SIPDIS 
the GON and the secretaries had agreed on three main points. 
First, there must be some international observer with a 
protection mandate in Bhutan to monitor the return of the 
refugees, be it UNHCR, ICRC or another body.  Second, 
refugees that had been forced to abandon land in Bhutan 
should be able to return to their homes, not merely to move 
from one refugee camp to another.  Thirdly, both the GON and 
refugee representatives hoped that the GOB would agree to a 
liberal interpretation of Bhutanese law; after all, Acharya 
added, since Bhutan traditionally had such good legal 
documentation, most refugees had clear evidence of one form 
or another of property ownership or even citizenship. 
Ideally, the GOB would be liberal in accepting such evidence, 
and would be willing to give back citizenship to those who 
were forced out of Bhutan, rather than making them live for 
two years in a camp while their citizenship status was 
"considered."  Thus, if the refugees were willing to take 
some risks, the GON would firmly support their desire to 
return to their homes in Bhutan.  (NOTE:  Under the JVT 
exercise, of those 12,183 refugees considered in the 
Khundunabari Refugee Camp, only 2.4 percent are considered 
"Category 1" and entitled to receive full citizenship upon 
their return to Bhutan.  "Category 2" refugees make up 70.55 
percent of the camp; they would be allowed to return but 
would have to live in a camp in Bhutan for two years while 
their appeals for citizenship were considered -- based on 
numerous conditions.  END NOTE.) 
 
6. (C) Acharya reacted strongly to the suggestion that UNHCR 
be allowed to undertake a socio-economic survey of the camps. 
 (NOTE: UNHCR-Nepal forwarded a proposal for an "Individual 
Profiling Exercise" to the Nepali Foreign Secretary on July 
1.  END NOTE.)  Acharya feared the survey would muddy the 
waters, in that it implied eventual absorbtion of some of the 
refugees into Nepal.  This might lesse the pressure on the 
GOB to take back the refugees.  Voluntary repatriation is the 
solution, and the refugees want to go back, Acharya opined. 
Thus, while the GON was reviewing UNHCR's proposal for the 
survey, it was unlikely to give its consent.  Acharya pointed 
out that the GON had sent its report on the December 22 
incident only to the GOB, and yet sections of the report had 
been quoted to Acharya by Indian officials during Indian 
Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's recent visit. India was 
clearly in the loop with the GOB and could be the key to 
moving the whole process forward, Acharya implied. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT:  Foreign Secretary Acharya was clearly 
pleased to welcome Ambassador Moriarty to Nepal and stressed 
the positive tone of U.S.-Nepal relations.  Acharya similarly 
stressed the GON's decision to put off for now UN offers to 
mediate with the Maoists.  This buttresses the assertion that 
PM Deuba made to the Charge on June 10 that elections would 
be the first priority for his government: the influence of 
the UML in the cabinet could at some point, however, shift 
the priority to the peace process (Ref A). 
 
8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Meanwhile, as noted Ref B, the 
notion of local integration and third-country resettlement 
for the Bhutanese refugees will be an uphill battle here in 
Kathmandu, and will be an issue that we will have to revisit. 
 As for improving the terms of voluntary repatriation with 
the GOB, Acharya's comments on GOB flexibility seemed more 
wistful than optimistic during the meeting with the 
Ambassador.  Indeed, in a meeting later the same day with the 
DCM, Acharya responded unequivocally in the negative when 
asked specifically whether he sensed any positive movement 
from the GOB. END COMMENT. 
MORIARTY