US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT2050

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 002050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE 
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/I, NEA/ARP, T, PM, S/CT, S/WCI 
TEL AVIV FOR DCM LEBARON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 AND X4 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PTER, PGOV, KJUS, KISL, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S 
VISIT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1227 (NOTAL) 
     B. KUWAIT 1380 (NOTAL) 
     C. KUWAIT 1500 (NOTAL) 
     D. KUWAIT 1731 (NOTAL) 
     E. KUWAIT 2018 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASONS 1.6X1 and X4, 1.4 ( 
A, B, D). 
 
1.  (S/NF) Mr. Secretary, Welcome back to Kuwait.  MFA is 
working to arrange a meeting with Information Minister 
Mohammed Abulhassan, who is expected to be the Acting Foreign 
Minister at the time of your visit (both the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister are expected to be out of the country). 
Abulhassan is a liberal and the only Shiite in the Cabinet; 
as longtime PermRep in New York, he worked closely with Prime 
Minister Shaykh Sabah, who was Foreign Minister for nearly 
forty years until a year ago.  Since your last visit April 
19(refs A, B), there has been movement on several issues 
pertinent to the bilateral relationship:  DNSA Fran Townsend 
delivered a strong message May 4 on the need for more 
aggressive action against extremists; the GOK informed us 
June 30 that from now on it will charge us for fuel supplied 
to our forces for Iraq operations; the GOK submitted the 
Article 98 agreement to the National Assembly for 
ratification but promised to ratify it by Amiri decree when 
the parliament recessed for the summer; the GOK welcomed a US 
offer to transfer one Kuwaiti detainee from Guantanamo, but 
wants all twelve back; Kuwait welcomed our transfer of 
sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government; and Kuwaitis 
were reminded again of the benefits of our strong bilateral 
cooperation when Saddam Hussein and top figures from his 
regime appeared in an Iraqi court. 
 
2.  (S/NF) COUNTER-TERRORISM:  the GOK has been slow to grasp 
the extent of the threat from Kuwaiti Sunni extremists, some 
of whom are reportedly funding insurgents in Iraq and even 
recruiting young Kuwaitis to go fight.  Kuwait State Security 
(KSS) currently suffers from weak leadership and remains 
constrained by legal restrictions (although the GOK has been 
fully cooperative with US and UN requests to freeze bank 
accounts suspected of involvement in terrorist finance, 
funding insurgents abroad is not yet seen as being a crime in 
Kuwait).  The Prime Minister was not happy to receive Ms. 
Townsend's message; he insisted that the GOK is following the 
right approach by monitoring extremists and trying to 
persuade them to eschew violence.  The GOK even arranged a 
face-to-face meeting between an Embassy officer and a 
prominent extremist whom Ms. Townsend had mentioned by name; 
the extremist claimed to oppose violence in Kuwait but made 
it clear that he would be prepared to harm Americans under 
certain circumstances (ref D). 
 
3.  (S/NF) FUEL FOR OIF:  In addition to providing the 
indispensable platform for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
Kuwait has supplied free-of-charge unlimited fuel for OIF 
forces:  over $450 million worth in 2003 (compared to $8 
million in 2002), and continuing at the rate of approximately 
1.2 million gallons/day.  Following the transfer of sovereign 
authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, the GOK informed 
us that it would keep supplying fuel for OIF but would charge 
us for it starting June 29, 2004 (ref E).  Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Rodman has recommended to SecDef that 
 
SIPDIS 
the Iraqi Interim Government be requested to ask the GOK to 
continue providing the fuel free-of-charge on its behalf.  We 
strongly doubt the GOK would respond positively to such a 
request.  Kuwaitis still remember all too well what happened 
the last time they acceded to an Iraqi request to provide oil 
on its behalf. 
 
4.  (C) ARTICLE 98:  the Prime Minister told you April 19 
that the Article 98 agreement signed on June 18, 2003 could 
be brought into force without parliamentary ratification (ref 
B).  However, since then, the Cabinet Legal Committee has 
concluded that parliamentary ratification is required, and 
the agreement has been submitted to the National Assembly. 
Parliament adjourned without acting on the matter. 
Nonetheless, the Foreign Minister had promised us that the 
GOK would bring the agreement into force by means of an Amiri 
decree during the parliamentary summer recess, which began on 
June 30.  We are awaiting that decree.  (NOTES: (a) any such 
decree will need to be submitted to the National Assembly for 
approval once it reconvenes in October; there is no deadline 
for the Assembly to act on it; (b) we treat the existence of 
the agreement as Confidential, because it has never been 
publicly confirmed by the GOK.  END NOTES.) 
 
5.  (C) GUANTANAMO:  Twelve Kuwaitis are among the detainees 
at Guantanamo, and one of them is a party in a case that made 
it to the US Supreme Court, which ruled that detainees have 
the right to challenge their detention in the US courts. 
Washington recently informed the GOK that it was prepared to 
transfer one of the Kuwaitis to GOK custody; the GOK wants 
them all back, and says it would be prepared to prosecute 
them. 
 
6.  (C) IRAQ:  the GOK continues to be a strong supporter of 
the Iraqi political transition process.  Despite being irked 
that Prime Minister Allawi omitted Kuwait from the list of 
countries he thanked for their support, Prime Minister Shaykh 
Sabah made clear that would not be allowed to mar relations. 
The appearance in an Iraqi court of Saddam Hussein and 
several other top officials of the former regime, including 
"Chemical Ali," reminded Kuwaitis of the threat that regime 
had posed and the service we have done to their country and 
the region by eliminating it.  A Kuwaiti lawyer appointed by 
the GOK is assisting the Iraqi Special Tribunal process. 
 
7.  (SBU) IPR:  In his capacity as Information Minister, 
Abulhassan shares responsibility for IPR protection.  Kuwait 
has one of the worst IPR records in the Gulf, according to 
industry sources and USTR.  At the Embassy's recommendation, 
Kuwait was placed on the Special 301 Priority Watch List this 
year.  It would be helpful if you stressed that effective 
protection of IPR is central to the success of the Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) signed in March, which 
both sides see as the first step towards a Free Trade 
Agreement.  Minister Abulhassan told the Ambassador July 5 
that the GOK is committed to getting off the Priority Watch 
List this year. 
JONES