US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1217

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, CG, MONUC 
SUBJECT: PLAYING THE TROOP NUMBERS GAME 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1131 
 
Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government and rebel groups in the east 
are prone to inflate the number of troops they deploy, but 
clearly there is a build-up of troops going on in the east. 
As of July 1, the FARDC probably has about 14,000 regular 
soldiers in eastern Congo, including MLC components.  These 
forces appear to be mobilizing for an attack against Nkunda's 
positions in Kalehe and Minova (in the northern part of S. 
Kivu province).  Possible total rebel forces (troops loyal to 
Nkunda and possibly local defense forces loyal to Serufuli 
and some ex-ANC troops nominally loyal to Obed) are estimated 
at 6,000-11,000.  On June 21, dissident commander Mutebusi 
and about 300 armed troops crossed from Kamanyola into 
Rwanda, where they were taken into custody and disarmed by 
Rwandan authorities.  FDLR, Mai Mai, ex-ANC (RCD/G military 
wing) troops in Goma and possible external involvement from 
Rwanda, along with ongoing rebel recruiting are largely 
unquantifiable wildcards. END SUMMARY. 
 
S.Kivu Update 
------------- 
2. (C) On June 21, Mutebusi and about 300 armed troops 
crossed from Kamanyola into Rwanda, where they were taken 
into custody and disarmed by Rwandan authorities. Their 
current official status and what will happen to them next are 
unknown; the GOR is making no effort to restrain their 
movements nor to feed them.  As of July 1, the area around 
Kamanyola appeared calm and was under the control of the 
FARDC and associated Mai Mai. Mutebusi's withdrawal to Rwanda 
and his subsequent disarming are positive developments. There 
are unconfirmed reports of speedboats landing at Kalehe, 
however, and some S. Kivu residents believe that Mutebusi's 
'flight' was a trick to allow him to transit to Rwanda to 
join fellow dissident General Laurent Nkunda in the area of 
Kalehe or Minova, in northern South Kivu. There were 
unconfirmed reports that rebel forces reinforced troops in 
Nyabibwe via Numbi (these two villages are located between 
Minova and Kalehe) with the aim of attacking Government 
troops deployed to Kalehe. It is likely that the FARDC 
commander in the area of Kalehe/Minova exercises very little 
control over his troops (ex-ANC troops who until recently 
were part of N. Kivu's military region). 
 
N. Kivu Update 
-------------- 
3. (SBU) Goma remains relatively calm for the moment, but 
civil society reports suspicious boat traffic on Lake Kivu 
and alleges that Jerome Kakwavu Bukande, leader of the Armed 
Forces of the Congolese People (FAPC) currently based in the 
Ituri towns of Aru and Mahagi, and Nkunda may be working 
together. (Note: Rumors of Jerome and Nkunda have been 
circulating for some time, including an unconfirmed report 
that the two met in Kampala. End note.) Nkunda's exact 
whereabouts are unknown, but he appears to move freely in N. 
Kivu and has been seen in both Minova and Rutshuru in the 
past several days. In late June, MONUC military sources 
reported fighting in and around Walikale between two 
battalions of Mai Mai (about 1000 troops) who were sent by BG 
Padiri from the Orientale Military Region and ex-ANC soldiers 
who appear to be loyal to N. Kivu Military Commander BG Obed. 
On June 21, a MONUC military source reported attacks by the 
Interahamwe in Virunga Park. 
 
The Numbers Game 
---------------- 
(Note: All numbers are estimates, based mostly on information 
from MONUC and MOD sources. End Note.) 
 
4. (C) As of July 1, the FARDC probably has about 14,000 
regular soldiers in eastern Congo, including 2,900 FARDC 
troops MONUC military sources reported had moved from 
Mbandaka between June 16 and June 25. However, the MOD 
reports that the 3,000 soldiers in the Ituri Brigade who are 
still in Kisangani will not be moved. Most troops transited 
the Bangoka airport in Kisangani en route to other cities in 
eastern DRC. The garrisons at Beni, Kisangani, Kindu and 
Kalemie have about 2,000 soldiers each, and Bukavu has about 
1,500.  This estimate includes about 5,000 soldiers sent east 
by the MLC. It does not include the possible involvement of 
up to 4-5,000 Mai Mai; should they decide to involve 
themselves on the government's side (or take sides at all), 
that would push the total number of potential pro-government 
combatants to nearly 20,000. (Note:  In trying to determine 
exact government field strength it is important to keep in 
mind the Congolese military tradition of exaggerating - and 
sometimes doubling - numbers.  DAO estimates about 14,000 
total pro-GDRC forces in eastern Congo, to include 2 
battalions of Mai Mai at Walikale. End Note.) Troop 
discipline for all groups (with the possible exception of the 
GSSP) continues to be a serious problem. Although the FARDC 
did send foodstuffs, uniforms, and equipment with some 
troops, its track record in terms of ongoing troop support is 
very poor. 
 
Breakdown of Government forces 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Since early June, the government has moved troops, 
cash, supplies, weapons and ammunition eastward via 
commercial, private and MLC airplanes. From June 16-25, 2,900 
FARDC troops left Mbandaka, Equateur for the east. They have 
also been deployed from Kinshasa, Western Kasai, and may be 
gearing up to move out of Gbadolite. FARDC troop movements in 
S. Kivu, Maniema and Katanga continue.  The GDRC has sped up 
formal integration of Mai Mai elements in Katanga. 
 
S. Kivu:  About 1,500 FARDC soldiers// 2,000 Mai Mai 
 
N. Kivu:  About 2,000 FARDC soldiers 
Maniema:  About 2,000 FARDC soldiers// 1,000 Mai Mai 
 
N. Katanga: About 2,000 FARDC soldiers// 1,000 Mai Mai 
 
Orientale: About 2,000 FARDC soldiers 
 
Rebel Numbers 
------------- 
6. (C) Total Rebel Estimated Forces:  POSSIBLE (and we 
emphasize this) 6,000 ) 11,000 
 
S. Kivu:  2,000 troops loyal to Nkunda 
 
N. Kivu:  2,000 ex-ANC troops//5,000 Governor Serufuli's 
Local Defense Force 
 
Maniema:  100-500 ex-ANC troops 
 
N. Katanga: 100-500 ex-ANC troops 
 
Orientale: 100-500 ex-ANC troops 
 
FDLR Numbers 
------------- 
7. (U) As of January 2004, MONUC estimated FDLR strength at 
6-7,000 in N. Kivu and 6,000 in S. Kivu. 
 
The Wildcards 
------------- 
 
FDLR 
-------- 
8. (SBU) FDLR troops in N. and S. Kivu have remained 
suspiciously quiet throughout the recent buildup. There are 
limited reports of Mai Mai/ FDLR collaboration in S. and N. 
Kivu, but no reports of FDLR massing at the border or 
mobilizing for any military operations. It was widely 
reported that a small number of FDLR worked with Mai Mai in 
the Kamanyola campaign. Although there are a large number of 
FDLR elements in N. Kivu, their current activities and 
loyalties are completely unknown. 
 
Mai Mai 
---------- 
 
9. (SBU) Mai Mai units' quality and reliability depend on the 
quality and interests of their commanders. They tend to have 
local interests and concerns, bad equipment, little training, 
and no discipline. In addition, certain commanders continue 
to work very closely with their former FDLR allies. 
 
Rebel Recruiting 
--------------------- 
10. (SBU) Nkunda has been recruiting in N. Kivu and in 
refugee camps, which makes it difficult to pin down his 
numbers. Human rights sources have reported recruitment at 
the Cyangugu refugee camp. The new recruits were reportedly 
being sent to Butare Training Camp in Rwanda.  In addition, 
UNHCR reports that things in the camp are 'not normal,' UNHCR 
has limited control, and some Banyamulenge refugees who 
wished to return were not allowed to return by extremist 
elements within the camp. Nkunda has also visited at least 
one camp in Rwanda for unknown purposes, and the whereabouts 
of the 157 troops loyal to Mutebusi (including 12 officers) 
who were brought to the Cyangugu Transit Center June 8 is 
unknown. MONUC Child Protection sources report that certain 
Mai Mai groups and troops loyal to Nkunda and Mutebusi have 
forcibly recruited children. At the same time, some FARDC 
units in Katanga and Equateur have demobilized children 
before deploying. 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C)  In the midst of a very fluid and unclear situation, 
trying to figure out who has what support where and how 
solidly they might be commited to the mission is extremely 
problematic.  What this exercise does demonstrate, however, 
is that this is the most significant movement of government 
forces (and allied elements) to and within the East in almost 
two years.  We remain concerned that despite professed good 
intentions of avoiding war, having this many poorly trained 
troops in a relatively small area during this tense period 
could all too easily lead to a confrontation. 
HOOKS