US embassy cable - 04MADRID2492

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2014 
TAGS: CU, ETTC, PREL, PHUM, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III WAIVER REVIEW 
 
REF: A. STATE 135512 
 
     B. MADRID 2315 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission J. Robert Manzanares, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The previous Spanish government under 
President Jose Maria Aznar was long in the forefront within 
the EU and on its own in criticizing Cuban human rights 
abuses, lack of movement toward democracy and absence of 
fundamental rights for Cuban citizens.  The current 
government under Socialist President Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero, who took office in mid-April this year, has not 
softened Spain's position on Cuba but neither has it overtly 
continued Aznar's strident criticism.  The past six months 
saw a continuation of Spain's actions and policies advocating 
a tough stance against the Castro regime.  Although it is 
difficult to predict Zapatero's policies and actions toward 
Cuba, the absence of a Title III suspension might encourage 
the GOS to soften its position on Cuba both bilaterally and 
within the EU.  Moreover, Spain would likely claim the U.S. 
has violated the common understanding reached with the EU 
concerning the Libertad Act (the Act) in May 2000.  End 
summary. 
 
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SPAIN TOWARD CUBA UNDER AZNAR 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Embassy provides this review of Spain's recent Cuba 
policy in response to ref A.  Jose Maria Aznar's government 
was a strident critic of the Castro regime practically until 
the day Aznar departed office in mid-April 2004.  Aznar was a 
prime force behind the hardening of the EU's position on Cuba 
after the Castro regime arrested more than 70 dissidents in 
March 2003.  In June 2003, the EU announced that as a result 
of the arrest and sentencing of these dissidents, it would 
encourage member states to limit bilateral high-level 
government visits, reduce their participation in cultural 
events, and invite Cuban dissidents to national day 
celebrations.  The EU also threatened to re-examine the EU's 
common position on Cuba.  The Aznar government pushed hard 
for these measures and firmly supported them from the time 
the measures were announced until it handed over power to the 
Socialists in April.  The Aznar government condemned the 
Castro regime multiple times in that period for its human 
rights abuses, lack of democratic reforms and failure to 
guarantee fundamental rights for its citizens.  As a result 
of Spain's hard line, the Castro regime shut down Spain's 
binational cultural center in Havana. 
 
3.  (C) In addition, at the USG's urging, the Aznar 
government in April 2004 pressed Honduras to sponsor this 
year's UNCHR resolution on Cuba.  Honduras eventually did 
sponsor the resolution (after considerable reluctance).  The 
Aznar government was also a key player in the EU's eventual 
decision to oppose Cotonou membership for Cuba, forcing the 
Castro regime to withdraw its application.  In sum, the Aznar 
government did much to advance democracy, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Cuba while it was in power. 
 
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ZAPATERO GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO CASTRO REGIME 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C) Since taking office in mid-April, the Zapatero 
government has not taken any actions or announced policy 
modifications that change Spain's Cuba policy as it existed 
under Aznar.  As Embassy has previously reported (ref B), 
Foreign Ministry officials have told us Spain will maintain 
its tough stance on Cuba, saying Castro has done nothing to 
merit softening of the strong stand Spain and the EU have 
taken against the regime's human rights violations and 
refusal to allow democratic reforms.  The officials have 
said, however, that the GOS would prefer to tone down the 
rhetoric that went back and forth between Castro and Aznar, 
and if possible, return to some form of dialogue with Cuba. 
In the end, given Cuba's intransigence, they viewed this as 
highly unlikely.  They have also said they do not plan to 
take the same leadership role Aznar did on Cuba within the EU 
and would opt to be minimally involved in formulating or 
influencing EU policy on Cuba. 
 
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IMPACT ON COOPERATION WITH SPAIN IF WAIVER NOT RENEWED 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
5.  (C) The GOS, like the EU, has always bristled at the Act 
as a piece of extraterritorial legislation which is probably 
contrary to the WTO and represents the imposition of U.S. 
foreign policy on its friends and allies.  Spain is also 
bound by EU and subsequent Spanish implementing legislation 
forbidding nationals or companies from cooperating with 
foreign legislation such as that embodied in the Act. 
Companies or nationals that do cooperate with foreign 
governments to implement such measures will be prosecuted and 
fined under Spanish law, and the GOS will be obliged to 
report these events to the EU.  Spain presumes the U.S. is 
still acting under the May 2000 understanding with the EU 
concerning enforcement of the Act and pursuit of a waiver. 
 
6.  (C) Despite Spain's opposition to the Act, the attitude 
of the Aznar government toward the Castro regime was the 
closest to ours of any Spanish government previously and one 
of the closest, if not the closest, of any of our allies that 
have ties to Cuba.  While the Zapatero government may not be 
as openly critical of Cuba as was its predecessor, it has 
taken no action to soften Aznar's hard line.  Were the waiver 
not renewed, we expect the Zapatero government to contend the 
EU-U.S. understanding on the Act had been broken. 
Non-waiver would also give the GOS cover to seek 
normalization of dialogue with Cuba, whatever that would 
entail.  Given Spain's long-standing hard line against Cuba 
and the fact that by all appearances the Zapatero government 
plans to continue that hard line (even if it does not plan to 
be as critical as Aznar), the USG would have little to gain 
and much to lose in achieving its foreign policy goals by not 
renewing the waiver. 
 
ARGYROS