US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS2838

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002838 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, STATE PLEASE PASS DOJ FOR BURROWS AND 
SWARTZ, PLEASE PASS DHS FOR A/S VERDERY AND U/S HUTCHINSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT'S CALL ON AMBASSADOR 
SCHNABEL 
 
REF: A. A) LISBON 1047 
 
     B. B) BRUSSELS 2794 
     C. C) USEU TODAY 06/28/04 
     D. D) BRUSSELS 2518 
     E. E) BRUSSELS 2360 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a June 30 call on Ambassador Schnabel, 
outgoing European Parliament (EP) President Pat Cox defended 
his decision to ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to 
annul the U.S.-EU agreement on PNR data sharing, and denied 
that his press statement on that decision, released in 
Ireland on the eve of the Dublin U.S.-EU Summit, was unduly 
critical of the U.S.  Cox also discussed Portuguese Prime 
Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso's "good, but not certain" 
chances of receiving EP approval of his appointment as 
European Commission President (ref C).  Cox said Barroso 
would spend much of July drumming up EP support, 
concentrating on the Socialist Group (PES) and the Liberal 
Democrats (ELDR), both of whom were likely to play "hard to 
get."  The EP vote on Barroso's nomination -- which we expect 
Barroso will win -- is scheduled for July 22.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
PNR: COX DEFENDS HIS DECISION 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Ambassador Schnabel told Cox his announcement that 
he would initiate an ECJ challenge to the U.S.-EU PNR deal 
hours before the President,s arrival in Ireland, as well as 
his calling U.S. Homeland Security efforts 
&extraterritorial8 was poorly received in Washington.  On 
the timing Cox said that given the vote of the EP Legal 
Affairs Committee the previous week, he, as EP President 
could either decide to announce the Parliament,s demands 
when he did or wait to bring the matter again before the next 
EP plenary session the week of July 20-23 (which will be the 
newly elected EP's first plenary session).  He had spoken 
with party leaders, none of whom had changed their decision, 
and decided it would be better to announce the action when he 
did rather than open a new plenary debate at the next session 
involving many new members who would be very unfamiliar with 
the issue, as well as a crush of new business including the 
selection of new committees and the votes on the new 
Commission and Parliament Presidents. 
 
3. (SBU) Cox defended his use of the term 
&extraterritorial8 as an accurate description of U.S. 
legislation that was also completely justified, and he added 
that European data protection legislation was just as 
extraterritorial.  Completing the defense he called for 
improved legislator-to-legislator dialogue to provide early 
warning on issues such as this, perhaps through the 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue. 
 
4. (SBU)  On the case itself, Cox contradicted reports USEU 
has received from Commission, Parliament, and Council lawyers 
by noting that the Parliament,s best chance for success 
comes from its action against the Council for concluding the 
International Agreement with the U.S. as part of the PNR 
deal. 
 
----------------------------- 
BARROSO STILL FACES EP HURDLE 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Cox then moved on to an analysis of Jose Manuel 
Durao Barroso's chances of receiving EP confirmation as 
Commission President.  The requisite EP approval of his 
appointment, by a simple majority vote, is scheduled for July 
22.  Barroso, from the center-right, will likely receive 
nearly unanimous approval of the largest party group, the 
center-right European People's Party (EPP-ED), which will 
have approximately 279 members, or 38 percent of the 732 EP 
seats. (NOTE: Negotiations on party group membership are 
ongoing -- each party group's number of seats could change as 
a result; negotiations will probably continue until sometime 
in mid-July.  END NOTE.)  However, leaders of the EP 
Socialist Group (PES), the second largest party group in the 
EP with an estimated 199 seats (27 percent), have publicly 
criticized Barroso's nomination.  They have said the PES 
would vote on the basis of Barroso's qualifications for the 
job, and that Barroso does not appear to meet those 
qualifications.  Members of the third largest party group, 
the Liberal-Democrats (ELDR), which will form the core of a 
new "centrist" group called "Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe" of approximately 80 seats (11 percent) 
after party realignment negotiations are finished (refs D-E), 
have also expressed misgivings about Barroso. 
 
6. (C) Cox said that both the PES and the ELDR would play 
"hard to get" for a while, but that most of the members of 
these groups would likely end up voting for Barroso.  Cox 
said Barroso would meet with EP party groups and their 
leaders in Brussels during the week beginning July 12.  On 
July 15, Barroso, Cox and EP leaders will be in The Hague to 
kick off the Dutch EU presidency.  There, Cox said, he might 
arrange further meetings between Barroso and EP leaders.  Cox 
said he expected Barroso to gain significant support within 
the PES and the ELDR as a result of both the Brussels and the 
Hague meetings.  Cox said he expected the PES ultimately to 
support Barroso for two reasons: (1) there will be pressure 
to do so from center-left heads of government, such as German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who support Barroso; and (2) 
the PES will likely cut a deal with the EPP-ED on the EP 
presidency, with a PES member becoming EP President for the 
first half of the coming five-year term; this deal will make 
it difficult for the PES to turn around and refuse to support 
Barroso, the EPP-ED candidate for Commission President.  The 
ELDR, said Cox (who is himself an ELDR member), may prove a 
tougher nut to crack.  Cox said the fourth and fifth largest 
groups in the EP, the Greens and the far-left EUL/NGL (with 
an estimated total of 79 seats -- 10.8 percent) are likely to 
vote against Barroso. 
 
--------------------------------- 
BARROSO'S FRANCO-GERMAN CHALLENGE 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Cox also commented on Germany's and France's attempts 
to claim specific Commission portfolios.  Cox lauded 
Barroso's response that the assignment of Commission 
portfolios would be his (Barroso's) decision, despite the 
German push to appoint Guenter Verheugen (current Enlargement 
Commissioner) as "super Commissioner" for economic reform, 
and France's desire to give Jacques Barrot (current 
Commissioner for Regional Policy) the Competition portfolio. 
Cox said that, with the Franco-German push publicly known, 
Barroso now already faced a crucial first challenge to his 
authority: he would be seen as being "in the Franco-German 
pocket" if he acquiesced. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
COX ON VERHOFSTADT, PATTEN AND EU "JIHADISTS" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Cox said the aspirations of Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt and outgoing External Relations Commissioner 
Chris Patten for the Commission presidency had been doomed 
from the start by the "jihadist" way the EU goes about 
choosing a Commission President.  He said Verhofstadt's 
misfortune was being known as the Chirac-Schroeder candidate 
-- the UK would not accept that; Patten, as the UK 
alternative to Verhofstadt, met with the inevitable rejection 
of France and Germany.  Thus, said Cox, "they both had to be 
taken out back and shot."  Cox said he had talked to both men 
during their "candidacies."  Verhofstadt, said Cox, fully 
expected to get the nod.  Verhofstadt was "devastated" when 
his candidacy was rejected.  Patten, on the other hand, was a 
"very relaxed" candidate who allowed others to throw his hat 
into the ring but never expected, nor necessarily wanted, to 
get the job. 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: On PNR, Cox was probably correct when he told 
the Ambassador he had limited ability to affect the decision 
to take our PNR deal to the ECJ, but his criticism of U.S. 
Homeland Security policy as &extraterritorial,8 as well as 
his choice of the place and timing of the announcement were 
clearly under his personal control.  On Barroso, we share 
Cox's analysis.  We believe that Barroso will be approved by 
the Parliament, and that his handling of the Franco-German 
push for key Commission portfolios will be an initial acid 
test of his Commission presidency.  END COMMENT. 
 
SCHNABEL