US embassy cable - 04ANKARA3728

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2029 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, TU, PINR 
SUBJECT: THE TURKISH MILITARY:  OZKOK TRIES TO STRIKE 
BALANCE AS DECEMBER 2004 APPROACHES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.4 (B and D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Turkish General Staff (TGS) CHOD GEN Ozkok continues 
to balance the promotion of Turkey's EU membership prospects 
by reducing the Turkish military's past position at the 
commanding heights of politics with a desire to ensure that 
the Turkish military is able to intervene in domestic 
politics if/when necessary and appropriate.  While skeptical 
about PM Erdogan's intentions and capabilities, Ozkok 
continues to be reluctantly open to working with Erdogan on 
those reform areas that he deems necessary to give Turkey the 
best shot possible at securing a favorable response from the 
EU in December.  He understands the concern of his service 
chiefs, other senior officers and the rest of the secular 
establishment that PM Erdogan and the AK Party (AKP) aim to 
weaken the "secular" state.  At the same time, he has taken 
measures to control the message by clamping down on the 
service chiefs and other members of the Turkish military, 
including restricting their access to USG officials.  This 
has produced an apparently contradictory attitude by some 
senior military officers and other committed secularists who 
simultaneously attribute AKP's coming to power to 
unwarranted, conspiratorial US support, and are increasingly 
trying to woo US support. 
 
2. (C) We expect these disgruntled senior military officers 
to increase their efforts to reach out to US officials to try 
to express their concerns and possibly undermine what Ozkok 
and Erdogan appear to be doing to make the best case for 
Turkey in December 2004.  We recommend that Washington and 
others, if approached, encourage TGS interlocutors to use 
existing official channels to convey their views to ensure 
that we stay on message and speak with one voice.  End 
summary. 
 
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UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS, BUT (CURRENTLY) NO CHOICE 
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3. (C) TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok and PM Erdogan are not comfortable 
in their relationship with one another.  They continue to 
meet (often one-on-one) as they have since Ozkok became CHOD 
in August 2002.  While their reasons may differ, Ozkok and 
Erdogan share the view espoused by the majority of the 
Turkish public that a Turkey anchored in the West and the EU 
is the best recipe for political and economic success.  Each 
has a segment of his constituency that is wary of the EU and 
does not believe it is in Turkey's interest to make the 
necessary reforms to secure a date for accession talks in 
December.  Yet, there is no love lost between the two, and 
the question remains whether the modus vivendi they appeared 
to have established initially has held up as Ozkok has become 
disillusioned with Erdogan's and AKP's behavior. 
 
4. (C) Erdogan and Ozkok engaged in a complex game of 
maneuver on Cyprus, with Ozkok making it crystal clear in his 
unusual mid-April press briefing that he considered Erdogan 
and the government to have veered away from the 
government-military understanding on Cyprus reached at the 
January 23 National Security Council meeting.  How closely 
the two are coordinating on Iraq also remains an unresolved 
question for us. 
 
5. (C) By all accounts, Ozkok is as ardent a defender of the 
secular republic as any senior military officer and, as such, 
remains highly distrustful of Erdogan and AKP's intentions. 
The recent controversy over a government proposal to reform 
higher education and give graduates of vocational high 
schools (including religious high schools) greater access to 
high education intensified the establishment's suspicion. 
But the divisions between AKP and the secular establishment 
are more than philosophical:  Erdogan, his government and the 
Anatolian heartland they represent threaten the 
establishment's traditional monopoly of control over the 
economy.  Thus, while philosophical controversies like that 
with vocational high schools may be resolved or indefinitely 
postponed, the differences between AKP and the secular elite 
remain profound. 
 
6. (C) Nonetheless, Ozkok is a pragmatist and a realist: with 
AKP firmly in charge of the political landscape in Turkey and 
without an effective political opposition, Ozkok has no 
viable alternative with whom to work.  While some within the 
Turkish military and the public see the military as the only 
existing, functioning opposition to AKP, Ozkok correctly 
recognizes the limitations (some of which have been 
self-imposed by Ozkok) on the military's ability to directly 
govern the country in 2004.  No one is looking for the 
Turkish military to take over running the country, a step 
that would be the kiss of death for Turkey's EU bid and 
likely for Turkey's economy as well. As a result, Ozkok has 
little real alternative but to work with Erdogan to the 
extent he can while allowing the military to look for ways 
indirectly to exploit and exacerbate Erdogan's and AKP's 
manifest weaknesses. 
 
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OZKOK:  IN CONTROL, TIGHTENING THE REIGNS 
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7. (C) Ozkok continues the process of strengthening his 
control over the TGS and the services he began at his first 
High Military Council meeting as CHOD in August 2003.  Many 
of the three-star generals who ran divisions at TGS were then 
retired or reassigned, and replaced by individuals with 
similar backgrounds and outlooks as Ozkok.  Ozkok's 
preference for officers with broad international experience, 
including assignments at NATO and deployments to Bosnia and 
Kosovo, can be seen down to the 06 (colonel) branch chief 
level in TGS.  Ozkok is expected to strengthen his control 
over TGS and the services through the annual promotion and 
assignment process this August.  For example, we do not 
expect him to have difficulties with First Army Commander 
(and former TGS deputy) GEN Buyukanit if the latter becomes 
Land Forces Commander this summer (as expected), since 
Buyukanit wants to succeed Ozkok as CHOD. 
 
8. (C) Ozkok also has re-instituted the monthly TGS press 
conference, where TGS deputy Basbug ("the face of TGS," 
according to one well-connected MFA official) delivers 
lengthy statements on important foreign policy (Iraq and 
Cyprus) and domestic issues, and takes questions from the 
press.  The purpose of these press conferences is two-fold: 
to remind governing AKP and the Turkish public that the 
military is following closely the many important foreign and 
domestic policy issues that confronting Turkey; and two, to 
let the same group know that TGS -- as opposed to the service 
chiefs or retired generals -- speak for the Turkish military. 
 Two recent signs of efforts by Ozkok and Basbug to control 
access (and thus the message) involve us:  one, TGS (through 
the MFA) denied the Ambassador's request to meet with the 
Service chiefs (we had requested the appointments after 
hearing from well-connected contacts that the Service chiefs 
were feeling neglected); and second, TGS declined an 
invitation from the Deputy Chief of Mission to host TGS J5 
Lt. Gen. Babaoglu and his J5 general officers for a working 
lunch.  This kind of limited access was more the norm before 
the Iraq War; reinstituting these restrictions increases 
Ozkok's control over the content and timing of messages 
emanating from the military.  At the same time, Ozkok and 
Basbug continue to make themselves readily accessible to 
visiting US officials and the Ambassador, and, in a departure 
from their predecessors, Ozkok and Basbug also meet with the 
UK Ambassador here. 
 
9. (C) The service chiefs and other senior members of the 
military remain highly suspicious of AKP and are convinced 
that Ozkok is selling out the military and the Republic 
through his reluctant willingness to work with Erodgan to 
move the country forward.  Most of these individuals were 
selected by Ozkok's predecessors, do not possess his 
international experience or Western outlook, and question 
whether secular Turkey and the Turkish military will be 
better off with Turkey as a member of the EU.  While a number 
of senior military officers attribute AKP's coming to power 
to unwarranted, conspiratorial US support, they paradoxically 
also appear to be searching for unconventional ways (i.e. 
conferences in Europe) to get their message across to 
sympathetic senior US official officials. 
 
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DECEMBER 2004 
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10. (C) We expect Ozkok and Erdogan to continue warily to 
work together during the next six months to take the 
necessary steps to secure an EU accession negotiation date 
from the EU in December.  While Ozkok's hand is likely to be 
further strengthened by the retirement of two of the most 
outspoken service chiefs (Land Forces Commander GEN Yalman 
and Jandarma Commander GEN Eruygur) this summer, he is still 
likely to face some opposition within the military as he 
attempts to move the military and the country forward.  The 
remaining two service chiefs and other senior military 
officers who are distrustful of Ozkok's perceived 
accommodation with Erdogan and fearful that the military's 
sacred place in Turkey's society might be weakened by 
Turkey's drive for entry in to the EU can be expected to 
complicate Ozkok's efforts.  We expect these disgruntled 
senior military officers to increase their efforts to reach 
out (both directly and through intermediaries) to US 
officials to try to express their concerns and possibly 
undermine efforts by Ozkok and Erdogan to secure a favorable 
decision from the EU this December.  We recommend that 
Washington and others, if approached, encourage GOT officials 
to use existing official channels to convey their views to 
ensure that we stay on message and speak with one voice. 
EDELMAN