US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI2177

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2005 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT 
SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST 
 
Ref: (A) State 134750, (B) Abu Dhabi 1826 
 
Classified by Richard A. Albright, Charge d'Affaires, 
a.i., reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Post briefed Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officials on details of USG plans to offer 
Iraq's ministries development assistance (see ref A), 
and asked whether the UAEG was contemplating similar 
assistance to Iraq's ministries.  The response was 
generally positive, although our interlocutors doubted 
that the UAE would consider sending government 
technical experts to Iraq until the security climate 
improves.  They also admitted that many of their own 
ministries are short-staffed and would be hard-pressed 
to loan personnel to an Iraqi ministry.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Polchief discussed the possibility of 
development assistance for Iraq's new ministries with 
a number of MFA contacts and received a relatively 
positive response.  "We will do whatever we can to 
contribute to Iraq's ministries and the country's 
reconstruction," Yacub Al-Hosani, Director of 
International Organizations, said on June 30.  "What 
we need to know are Iraq's priorities so that we can 
identify which experts to send.  We need a roadmap for 
Iraq." 
 
Security concerns paramount 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Al-Hosani said concerns about the security of 
Emirati personnel in Iraq remain paramount for his 
government.  The uncertain security climate is the 
major reason the UAE has offered to host training for 
Iraqis rather than sending UAE government experts to 
Baghdad, he added.  The UAE (Abu Dhabi police training 
institute in Al Ain) hosted more than 200 Iraqi 
criminal police in March and in April this year (ref 
B). 
 
4. (C) The UAE Central Bank has provided substantial 
assistance to the Iraqi Central Bank, including 
training for a group of approximately 30 Iraqis on 
banking supervision and examination techniques in 
November 2003.  The training took place in Abu Dhabi, 
and the UAE Central Bank Governor has declined 
previous USG requests to send staff to Iraq because of 
security concerns.  He has noted to Embassy officials 
that he supports staff exchanges, but none of his 
staff so far have volunteered to travel to Iraq.  The 
UAE Central Bank continues to advise the Iraqi Central 
Bank on an ad hoc basis, and working-level bank staff 
maintain informal contact with their Iraqi 
counterparts. 
 
Short-staffed UAE ministries 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The UAE would have difficulty sparing their 
existing staff, which in some ministries is very thin 
and at times short on experience.  Khalid Al-Ghaith, a 
deputy director in the MFA's GCC Department, said the 
Foreign Ministry is not even sure yet how it will beef 
up its own embassy in Baghdad.  Al-Hosani acknowledged 
that this was a problem, particularly during the 
summer season when many in the ministry take their 
vacations.  Al-Hosani said that it was more likely 
that the UAEG would consider assistance to Iraq's 
ministries after the summer, and perhaps even after 
Ramadan (October/November), which will allow it to 
assess whether the security situation has improved. 
"We also want to understand how the Iraqis, the people 
on the street, perceive other Arabs who come to help 
with their government.  Will they accept us?  Our 
experience so far is that they are welcoming us, but 
after a few months, there could be new frustrations," 
he said. 
 
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
ALBRIGHT