US embassy cable - 04ISTANBUL1019

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A/S JONES MEETING WITH IRAQI FM ZIBARI AND IRAQI MOD SHA'ALAN

Identifier: 04ISTANBUL1019
Wikileaks: View 04ISTANBUL1019 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Istanbul
Created: 2004-06-30 08:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IZ TU NATO Istanbul
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, TU, NATO, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: A/S JONES MEETING WITH IRAQI FM ZIBARI AND IRAQI 
MOD SHA'ALAN 
 
 
Classified By: A/S Elizabeth Jones for Reasons 1.5 (b&d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  During the run-up to the Istanbul Summit 
June 27, A/S Jones and CPA Foreign Policy Director Ronald 
Neumann discussed Iraq's security challenges and a new 
NATO-Iraq relationship with Iraqi FM Zibari and Iraqi MoD 
Sha'alan.  Jones and Zibari agreed that their informal 
meeting with NATO foreign ministers June 27 would be an 
important event both symbolically and practically.   Zibari 
said that Iraq had lost much time due to the occupation, but 
that he believed the new Iraqi cabinet members 
were willing to "risk everything" to overcome the terrorist 
threat and build the new Iraq.  Zibari and Sha'alan stressed 
the Ministry of Defense desperately needed equipment, as well 
as training, for Iraq's security forces.  Zibari also said 
that Iraqi PM Allawi recently clarified that the Iraqi 
Interim Government (IIG) did not want Turkish units on Iraqi 
soil, but that Turkish training officers and headquarters 
staff were welcome.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Important Beginning 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Prior to the informal Foreign Ministers Meeting June 
27, Jones told Iraqi FM Zibari and Iraqi MoD Sha'alan that 
Iraqi PM Allawi's letter to NATO Secretary General de Hoop 
Scheffer requesting Alliance support for Iraq was a very 
important beginning to the new NATO-Iraq relationship.  The 
informal NATO meeting was an important event, both 
symbolically and practically, as NATO Allies would have the 
opportunity to hear views from Iraqis directly.  Jones said 
that although NATO was already providing support to the 
Polish-led Multinational Division, Allied leaders would 
decide at the Istanbul Summit June 28 to ask NATO to take on 
a collective mission to train the Iraqi security forces.  A 
NATO training mission was significant because it would lead 
to a comprehensive approach; Iraqi authorities could 
coordinate directly with NATO, which would help match 
training requirements with member-state capabilities.  Jones 
said that the NATO Military Committee had ideas on how NATO 
could support Iraq, but that those ideas were not worth 
anything unless Iraqi leaders are engaged in developing them. 
 
-------------------------- 
To Rule is To Decide 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Zibari said he is finding that "to rule is to decide" 
and he believes that the new cabinet is made up of people who 
are willing to "risk everything" to fight in the struggle to 
build the new Iraq.  Zibari said that terrorists, 
anti-democratic forces, Ba'athists and many regional 
countries are trying to make the new Iraq fail.  He said they 
would not win, but they would delay progress and make it 
difficult to succeed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
IIG Progressing, Gaining Political Support 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4.   (C) FM Zibari thanked Jones and the State NEA Bureau for 
efforts to overcome difficulties over the past year.  He was 
pleased that the hard work on smaller issues had now opened 
the way to address more strategic decisions.  Zibari agreed 
that the informal Foreign Ministers meeting was important and 
said that Allawi had prepped him to request training and 
other types of support.  He also said that this meeting -- 
similar to the recent G-8 Sea Island Summit and the 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference -- would 
have a big impact in Iraq and a political statement by the 
Alliance was important to recognize the progressive and 
positive stage the IIG had achieved. 
 
----------------------------- 
Water Under the Bridge 
----------------------------- 
 
5.   (C) Zibari said that he had warned the U.S. not to move 
from liberator to occupier, and that even the closest friends 
of the U.S. had gone back on it.  He complained that Iraq had 
lost time, lost men, and lost money, but that this was "water 
under the bridge" and the IIG now has a new opportunity to 
address the country's needs.  According to Zibari, it is 
vital to demonstrate that the transfer of sovereignty is 
real, i.e. that ministries are spending money, purchasing 
equipment, and reaching out to other countries.  No one wants 
the return of Saddam, or a "little Saddam"; no one wants 
extremists or a theocracy, but people want the confidence 
that they can build their own future. 
 
-------------- 
Up to Iraqis 
-------------- 
 
6.   (C) Zibari said Iraq needs security to make this goal 
happen.  He said that CPA had encouraged Iraq's leaders to 
open their borders and relax their rules to encourage 
investment, but that without security, efforts to revitalize 
the economy would fail.  To achieve these goals, Zibari said 
they would need NATO's support. 
 
7.   (C) Zibari said that in the end, however, Iraq's future 
will depend on Iraqis and that it will be crucial to have the 
right Iraqi leaders.  He regretted that most Iraqis were 
trained with weapons and that even the opposition had to take 
up arms.  Zibari said the key was to find the right people to 
stand up and challenge this.  He said the cabinet was aware 
of the risks  -- car bombs, assassins, plots  -- but that it 
could not give up. 
---------------------- 
...And Equipping? 
---------------------- 
8.  (C) Jones shared highlights of the draft Political 
Statement on Iraq to which Allied leaders would agree at the 
Istanbul Summit.  Zibari asked why the statement only 
mentioned that Allies had decided to provide training, but 
not equipment.  Jones said that the U.S. concept included 
both training and equipping Iraqi security forces, and she 
encouraged them to tell NATO Foreign Ministers of their 
priorities for assistance. 
 
9.  (C) Zibari said that the Iraqi army needs 
counterintelligence training and equipment so that it can be 
a visible deterrence force.  Iraq has thousands of police, 
but not enough weapons, cars, or communications.  Zibari said 
NATO could help in many areas, but that he understood some 
Allies wanted to "settle certain scores" and were reluctant 
to send troops to Iraq.  Zibari said Allies could help in 
other ways, such as with training and equipment; his contacts 
tell him that Italy and Germany were open to this type of 
support.  However, U.S. support was most critical in his view. 
 
10.  (C) MoD Sha'alan added that the Ministry of Defense is a 
new ministry and is "in need of everything."  According to 
Sha'alan, Iraq's security forces need weapons, light 
aircraft, vehicles, and command and control communications 
equipment.  He said that Iraq faced serious threats from 
border infiltrations, and that training on NATO's high-tech 
border control techniques, modern communications, and 
leadership training would be crucial.  Sha'alan stressed that 
weapons training required weapons, however, and that Iraq 
needed NATO's help in this area.  He asked for help in 
pressing Gulf states to finance Iraq's equipment needs. 
Jones said that a new NATO International Cooperation 
Initiative (ICI), which would be launched in Istanbul, would 
open the door to security cooperation with Gulf states and 
other countries.  She suggested that this new framework might 
help to bring support to Iraq from Gulf states. 
 
--------------------- 
Time and Turkey 
--------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Zibari stressed that time was an important factor 
and that they could not afford a lengthy process for 
assistance.  Jones said that according to the Alliance 
decision, NATO must develop modalities "on an urgent basis" 
for implementing the decision.  Zibari also said that PM 
Allawi recently clarified that the IIG did not want Turkish 
units on Iraqi soil, but that Turkish training and 
headquarters staff were welcome. 
 
12.  (U) This cable was approved by A/S Jones. 
ARNETT 

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