US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1639

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MARGINS) 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA COLEMAN, EUR/UBI HOLLIDAY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2014 
TAGS: CU, EAID, ETTC, NL, PHUM, PREL, EUN 
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: DUTCH/CUBA: STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS; 
WAVERING ON ISOLATION 
 
REF: A. REF: (A) STATE 135512 
 
     B. (B) HAVANA 2996 
     C. (C) BRUSSELS 2733 
 
Classified By: Classified by POL Counselor Andrew Schofer 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. (C) The EU Common Position forms Dutch policy toward Cuba. 
While the Dutch prefer a policy of engagement to one of isolation, 
they are resolute that Cuba must first improve human rights before 
any thaw in EU-Cuban relations -- even to pre-2003 "constructive 
engagement" as usual.  Besides this tough official policy, the 
Dutch are working to cultivate civil society in Cuba, and several 
Dutch NGOs support local efforts to strengthen human rights, 
democracy and fundamental freedoms, and hasten the arrival 
of a post-Castro Cuba.  Strong Dutch policies and actions 
toward Cuba, together with general cooperation with the U.S., make 
a renewed suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act a matter 
of U.S. national interest. 
 
European Policy Ties Relations to Human Rights 
 
2. (C) Dutch Cuba policy is primarily dictated by the EU.  In 
a June 24 meeting with Poloff, Dutch MFA Cuba desk officer 
Jan Jaap Groenemeijer reiterated that the Dutch do not intend to 
take a different line toward Cuba from the EU, and cautioned that 
the EU would take issue with a country-by-country U.S. approach to 
member states.  He also noted that the EU's July 6 Latin America 
Working Group meeting would discuss both Cuba and U.S. concerns. 
 
3. (C) Groenemeijer stressed that the EU gives a high priority to 
human rights in its dealings with Cuba, and that no easing in 
official relations will take place until the Cuban government 
improves the human rights situation of Cubans. Groenemeijer 
indicated that the EU Common Position toward Cuba had never been 
stronger, limiting official and cultural ties with Cuba and denying 
improved relations until the Cuban government makes human rights 
improvements.  This position will not weaken during the Dutch EU 
presidency. 
 
Dutch Interested in Unfreezing Relations When/If Human Rights 
Improve 
 
4. (C) Groenemeijer emphasized that the U.S. and EU share the 
same human rights objectives with regard to Cuba, but commented 
that Europeans generally prefer a strategy of engagement to one of 
isolation.  Groenemeijer said the effect of the recent crackdown 
in Cuba was that Havana has "isolated itself." The resulting 
diplomatic freeze was "not benefiting anyone," he said, and would 
ultimately be "a price paid by the Cuban people." 
While emphasizing the European preference to engage ("helping 
rather than isolating") Groenemeijer nevertheless said he did not 
foresee any EU move to unfreeze relations until the human rights 
situation in Cuba improved. 
 
5. (C) Groenemeijer placed particular emphasis on the 75 
political prisoners arrested in March 2003, commenting that no 
improvements in relations would take place until the prisoners 
were released.  The recent release of prisoners, he said, was not 
sufficient to change the Dutch or EU positions.  Groenemeijer 
added that he foresaw no change in EU policy during the Dutch EU 
presidency even if the situation improved, primarily because 
"reaching agreement with all European governments takes a 
long time." 
 
Optimistic About Civil Society; Wary of Appearances 
 
6. (C) Groenemeijer commented that he saw "a lot of potential 
for Cuban civil society."  He cited the Varela project, which 
continues to collect more 
signatures in its petition campaign despite the fierce 
Cuban crackdown, as evidence that Cuban civil society 
remains active and continues to grow even in the face of 
hardship. 
 
7. (C) When questioned as to whether Groenemeijer believed 
that the Dutch mission in Havana would be interested in working 
with the U.S. Interest Section the specific projects cited in 
Reftel B (Note: Schoudeboom is now Ambassador in Latvia rather than 
Director of the Latin America and Caribbean office), Groenemeijer 
expressed concern that the Europeans might be -- and in some cases 
already were -- seen as "slaves" to the U.S. in places like Cuba. 
"The EU has its own policy," he stated.  (Note:  This presumably 
would not preclude approaching the Dutch in the EU presidency 
capacity, however.) 
 
Dutch Activities in Cuba 
 
8. (C) Dutch officials routinely make their concerns regarding 
the human rights situation in Cuba known, both in public and 
through gestures such as issuing invitations to Cuban dissidents 
to attend national day celebrations overseas. Several Dutch NGOs 
also help focus public attention on human rights in Cuba. 
Dutch NGO Pax Christi, for example, whose work raised awareness 
about Cuban human rights prior to the EU's toughening of policies 
toward Cuba, supports the Plan Varela Campaign, a dissident-run 
petition drive to convince law-makers to put constitutional 
rights - which are currently ignored - into law.  Pax Christi has 
contact with the Cuban dissident movement Movimiento Cristiano 
Liberacion (MCL), which seeks to stimulate the democratization 
of the Cuban regime, and MCL-run magazine Vitral, which seeks 
to empower civil and political awareness in preparation for a 
democratic transition.  Dutch NGO Hivos (Humanist Institute for 
Cooperation with Developing Countries) provides financial and 
political support to twelve local partner organizations in Cuba, 
including agricultural, developmental, and cultural programs. 
 
Consequences if Title III Not Suspended 
 
9. (C) Groenemeijer reminded that the US-EU Understanding on 
Cuba reached in 1996 meant that the U.S. was expected to suspend 
Tier III of the Libertad (Helms-Burton) Act and the EU would drop 
its WTO case against the U.S. with reference to the legislation. 
Groenemeijer believed that the EU would renew its case against the 
U.S. legislation before the WTO if Title III were not suspended. 
 
Comment 
 
10. (C) Clearly the Dutch disagree with both the policy of 
isolating Cuba and what they view as "extraterritoriality" 
in the Libertad Act.  These differences, however, should not 
obscure the fact that the U.S. and Dutch generally share a 
similar view of a free post-Castro Cuba.  Failure to re-suspend 
Title III for the Netherlands or the EU would cause a 
major political fracas that would adversely impact political 
relations with the Dutch and the EU.  Even though the Netherlands 
reportedly has "blocking laws" that would stop enforcement in The 
Netherlands of any potential awards granted in U.S. courts 
(if indeed there are any actual cases of Dutch companies operating 
on confiscated properties ) Groenemeijer was not aware of any), 
the real result would be a political wedge between otherwise strong 
allies. 
 
SOBEL